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Abstract	
Current air traffic management systems are centred on piloted aircraft, in which all the 
main decisions are made by humans. In the world of autonomous vehicles, there will 
be a driving need for decisions to be made by the system rather than by humans due 
to the benefits of more automation such as reducing the likelihood of human error, 
handling more air traffic in national airspace safely, providing prior warnings of 
potential conflicts etc. The system will have to decide on courses of action that will 
have highly safety critical consequences. One way to ensure these decisions are 
robust is to guarantee that the information being used for the decision is valid and of 
very high integrity. To meet regulatory requirements there will still need to be some 
form of human involvement, or back up, and the interface between computer and 
human will be very important. This doctorate will examine the issues associated with 
guaranteeing that information on which decisions will be made is valid and of very high 
integrity. The issues that will be addressed in the research are understand and 
examine the current architecture of the Air Traffic Management System (ATM) and its 
evolution to enable integration of UAS into the national airspace system in a phased-
approach. Investigate UAS Sense and Avoid, a key UAS integration challenge, in 
order to determine the best place for decision-making processing (i.e. on board or 
remotely) from a technical and economical perspective. And finally, to develop a 
Ground-Based Sense and Avoid simulation architecture in order to investigate the 
impact of different configurations of GBSAA information display system on the 
decision-making capability of human operator 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  2 
Acknowledgement	
Firstly, I would like to take this opportunity to thank my academic supervisor Professor 
Roy S. Kalawsky for his full support and patience during this Engineering Doctorate 
journey. His input and knowledge has been invaluable to my work. I would also like to 
thank my Industrial supervisor, Dave Lunn, for his input and support while I was based 
at Thales undertaking the research as a research engineer.  
 Further, I would like to express my gratitude to all the staff at Thales Air Traffic 
Management (UK) who had accommodated me and providing their support during my 
time there. Special thanks to all the members of the software development team for 
their time and willingness to share their knowledge and experience with me. They also 
provided a great degree of information and a wealth of understanding that has 
contributed greatly to the research. I would also like to acknowledge the role of Thales 
UK for providing funding and supporting this research.  
 Finally, I would like to thank my family, my mother Mrs. Uma, my father Dr. 
Ramalingam and my sister Dr. Bhuvaneshwari, for their moral support and 
encouragement throughout the process without which I would not have been able to 
complete the thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  3 
Table	of	Contents	
 
Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................. 13 
1.1 Rationale: The Need for Autonomy	.........................................................................	13	
1.2 Autonomous Systems	................................................................................................	14	
1.3 Motivation for the study of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)	...........................	21	
1.3.1 The Wider motivation	.............................................................................................	23	
1.4 Thesis Structure	..........................................................................................................	26	
1.4.1 Part I – Introduction and Background	...............................................................	26	
1.4.2 Part II – UAS Integration in ATM: A System of Systems Architecture 
Analysis	..........................................................................................................................	26	
1.4.3 Part III – UAS Sense and Avoid	.........................................................................	27	
1.4.4 Part IV – Conclusions	............................................................................................	29	
1.5 Aim and Objectives	....................................................................................................	30	
1.6 Why Unmanned Aircraft?	..........................................................................................	32	
1.6.1 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Overview	................................................	33	
1.6.2 Historical Perspective of Unmanned Aircraft	..................................................	36	
1.6.3 UAS Types and Classifications	...........................................................................	38	
1.6.4 UAS Applications	....................................................................................................	44	
1.6.5 UAS Market Overview	...........................................................................................	46	
1.6.6 Current Regulatory and Operational mechanism of UAS	...........................	52	
1.7 Historical context of introduction of new technology into Aviation	....................	60	
1.8 Positioning the Study	.................................................................................................	62	
1.8.1 Factors influencing the research approach	.....................................................	62	
1.8.2 Scope	.........................................................................................................................	63	
1.9 Summary	......................................................................................................................	65	
Chapter 2: System-of-Systems Overview ................................................................. 67 
2.1 Introduction to System-of-Systems	.........................................................................	67	
2.2 System-of-Systems (SoS) Analysis	........................................................................	76	
  4 
2.2.1 Architecture Design Process	...............................................................................	77	
2.2.2 Architecture Design Principles	............................................................................	80	
2.2.3 SoS Architecture Design	.......................................................................................	81	
2.2.4 Architecture Frameworks	......................................................................................	84	
2.2.5 Modelling Language	...............................................................................................	86	
2.3 Methodology to Architect and Analyse SoS	..........................................................	87	
2.4 Air Traffic Management (ATM) as SoS	..................................................................	89	
2.5 Scope	............................................................................................................................	91	
2.6 Summary	......................................................................................................................	92	
Chapter 3: SoS Analysis of ATM and integration of UAS in ATM Using Architecture 
Patterns ................................................................................................................ 93 
3.1 Introduction	..................................................................................................................	93	
3.2 Architecture Patterns	.................................................................................................	93	
3.3 Architecture Patterns Mining	....................................................................................	95	
3.4 Verification and Validation of Architecture Patterns	.............................................	98	
3.5 Air Traffic Management (ATM) Architecture Patterns	.........................................	99	
3.5.1 Air Traffic Control Organisational Structure	....................................................	99	
3.5.2 Airspace Classification Structure	......................................................................	104	
3.5.3 Air Traffic Surveillance	........................................................................................	107	
3.5.4 Air Traffic Communication	..................................................................................	117	
3.5.5 Air Traffic Navigation	............................................................................................	120	
3.5.6 Air Traffic Weather	................................................................................................	126	
3.5.7 Future Air Traffic Management Structure	......................................................	131	
3.6 Summary	....................................................................................................................	133	
Chapter 4: Integration of UAS in National Airspace System – A Complex SoS 
problem .............................................................................................................. 134 
4.1 Introduction	................................................................................................................	134	
4.2 Wicked Problem	........................................................................................................	135	
4.3 UAS operations in ATM: A Wicked Problem Analogy	.......................................	141	
4.4 Discussion on ways to address airspace integration	.........................................	153	
4.5 Summary	....................................................................................................................	157	
  5 
Chapter 5: UAS Sense and Avoid Overview ........................................................... 160 
5.1 Current Progress	......................................................................................................	162	
5.1.1 Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA)	...............................................................	163	
5.1.2 Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA)	...................................................	166	
Chapter 6: Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) System Concept Overview 170 
6.1 Introduction	................................................................................................................	170	
6.2 GBSAA System Concept	........................................................................................	172	
6.2.1 System Requirements	.........................................................................................	172	
6.2.2 Stakeholders	..........................................................................................................	173	
6.2.3 System Definition	..................................................................................................	174	
6.2.4 GBSAA Functional Overview	............................................................................	182	
6.2.5 GBSAA System Elements	..................................................................................	184	
6.3 GBSAA Systems Operation	....................................................................................	186	
6.3.1 GBSAA Concept of Operation	...........................................................................	186	
6.3.2 Operational Level Description	...........................................................................	188	
6.3.3 GBSAA system Analysis	.....................................................................................	192	
6.4 GBSAA: Proving the Safety Case	.........................................................................	203	
6.4.1 See and Avoid	........................................................................................................	205	
6.4.2 Visual Acquisition Model	.....................................................................................	205	
6.4.3 Visual Acquisition Performance	........................................................................	207	
6.4.4 Sense and Avoid Encounter Timeline	.............................................................	209	
6.5 Summary	....................................................................................................................	210	
Chapter 7: Ground Based Sense and Avoid Experiment Design ............................ 211 
7.1 Introduction	................................................................................................................	211	
7.2 Background	................................................................................................................	211	
7.2.1 GBSAA Overview	..................................................................................................	213	
7.2.2 GBSAA Display Concept	....................................................................................	217	
7.2.3 Existing Air Traffic Display Systems for use as GBSAA display	.............	219	
7.2.4 Separation Assurance	.........................................................................................	222	
7.3 Experiment Method	..................................................................................................	223	
7.3.1 Display Concepts	..................................................................................................	224	
  6 
7.3.2 Design and Selection of Scenarios	..................................................................	224	
7.3.3 Participants	.............................................................................................................	225	
7.3.4 Experiment Set-up	................................................................................................	225	
7.4 Experiment Design	...................................................................................................	232	
7.5 Experiment Procedure	.............................................................................................	233	
7.5.1 Training	....................................................................................................................	233	
7.5.2 Experiment Scenarios	.........................................................................................	234	
Chapter 8: Ground Based Sense and Avoid Experiment Results and Discussion .. 238 
8.1 Introduction	................................................................................................................	238	
8.2 Results	........................................................................................................................	238	
8.2.1 Technical Performance Measures	...................................................................	239	
8.2.2 Workload Measurement Results	......................................................................	243	
8.2.3 Scenario Specific Results	...................................................................................	245	
8.2.4 Final Questionnaire Results	...............................................................................	248	
8.3 Discussion	..................................................................................................................	253	
Chapter 9: Conclusions ........................................................................................... 257 
9.1 Thesis Contributions	................................................................................................	259	
9.2 Further Research	......................................................................................................	260	
References .............................................................................................................. 262 
Appendices .............................................................................................................. 268 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  7 
List	of	Figures		
 
Figure 1.1 Autonomy classification model [13] .......................................................... 18	
Figure 1.2 History of accident rates in civil aviation [27] ........................................... 25	
Figure 1.3 Thesis Structure ....................................................................................... 29	
Figure 1.4 A typical Unmanned Aircraft System ........................................................ 35	
Figure 1.5 Worldwide UAS Market Forecast [48] ...................................................... 48	
Figure 1.6 UAS R&D expenditure by country (%) 2011 – 2020 forecast [48] ........... 49	
Figure 1.7 UAS category wide distribution market forecast [50] ............................... 50	
Figure 1.8 Global UAV Production Forecast by UAV Type ....................................... 51	
Figure 2.1 A basic SoS model [55] ............................................................................ 71	
Figure 2.2 Interactions between SoS and constituent systems in a Directed SoS .... 72	
Figure 2.3 Interactions between SoS and constituent systems in a Virtual SoS ....... 73	
Figure 2.4 Interactions between SoS and constituent systems in a Collaborative SoS
 ........................................................................................................................... 74	
Figure 2.5 Interactions between SoS and constituent systems in an Acknowledged 
SoS .................................................................................................................... 76	
Figure 2.6 SoS context [55] ....................................................................................... 82	
Figure 3.1 Overview of UPDM views used in DANSE methodology ......................... 95	
Figure 3.2 Pattern mining process [104] ................................................................... 98	
Figure 3.3 Air Traffic Control Organisational Structure (US) ................................... 100	
Figure 3.4 Air Traffic Control Organisational Structure (Europe) ............................ 103	
Figure 3.5 Airspace Classification Structure ........................................................... 105	
Figure 3.6 Air Traffic Surveillance ........................................................................... 109	
Figure 3.7 Air Traffic Management Non-Cooperative Surveillance ......................... 110	
Figure 3.8 Air Traffic Management Cooperative Independent Surveillance ............ 112	
Figure 3.9 Air Traffic Management Cooperative Dependent Surveillance .............. 113	
Figure 3.10 Air Traffic Management Cooperative Independent Surveillance (Multi-
lateration System) ............................................................................................ 117	
Figure 3.11 Duplex Radio Communication .............................................................. 119	
Figure 3.12 Air navigation Aids ............................................................................... 121	
  8 
Figure 3.13 Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) [67] ............................. 125	
Figure 3.14 Air Traffic Weather Service .................................................................. 127	
Figure 3.15 Future Air Traffic Weather Service ....................................................... 130	
Figure 3.16 Future Air Traffic Management Structure [88] ...................................... 132	
Figure 4.1 An overview of systems approach used to identify and analyse the key 
challenges of UAS Integration in ATM ............................................................. 142	
Figure 5.1 Airspace Conflict Management .............................................................. 161	
Figure 5.2 Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSA) dedicated sensor .................. 168	
Figure 6.1 Potential Stakeholders and their Grouping ............................................ 173	
Figure 6.2 Stakeholder Influence Map .................................................................... 174	
Figure 6.3 Ground based UAV Collision Avoidance System ................................... 175	
Figure 6.4 Ground based UAV CAS use case diagram .......................................... 176	
Figure 6.5 System level interactions of Ground based CAS ................................... 177	
Figure 6.6 Overall system Overview ....................................................................... 179	
Figure 6.7 GBSAA functional block diagram ........................................................... 183	
Figure 6.8 Concept of using GBSAA for operations of UAS in non-segregated 
airspace ............................................................................................................ 187	
Figure 6.9 GBSAA service level view ...................................................................... 188	
Figure 6.10 GBSAA System Performance Model ................................................... 202	
Figure 6.11 Observed acquisition probability and modelled visual acquisition 
probability for both unalerted and alerted search [16] ...................................... 207	
Figure 6.12 Relative airspeed frequency distribution of several types  of aircraft in 
uncontrolled airspace [19] ................................................................................ 209	
Figure 6.13 Time to react to collision threats [18] ................................................... 210	
Figure 7.1 GBSAA Simulation Architecture ............................................................. 227	
Figure 7.2 GBSAA System Experiment Set-Up ...................................................... 227	
Figure 7.3 Prototype GBSAA display ...................................................................... 229	
Figure 8.1 Boxplot of total decision processing time for the display configuration used
 ......................................................................................................................... 240	
Figure 8.2 Clustered bar chart of number of correct manoeuvres performed against 
the display configuration used .......................................................................... 242	
Figure 8.3 Clustered bar chart of frequency of correct manoeuvres performed 
against the scenario level ................................................................................. 243	
Figure 8.4 Boxplot of NASA-TLX workload rating ................................................... 244	
  9 
Figure 8.5 Box plot of Spotting scores .................................................................... 245	
Figure 8.6 Bar chart of average time taken to decide manoeuvre .......................... 246	
Figure 8.7 Box plot of total time taken to decide manoeuvre (Scenario 3) .............. 247	
Figure 8.8 Box plot of total time taken to decide manoeuvre (Scenario 6) .............. 247	
Figure 8.9 Bar chart of Average time taken to decide manoeuvre for correct 
manoeuvre selected ......................................................................................... 248	
Figure 8.10 Participant Display preference ............................................................. 249	
Figure 8.11 Value of ‘highlight of UAV track’ information ........................................ 250	
Figure 8.12 Value of ‘prediction vectors’ information .............................................. 251	
Figure 8.13 Value of ‘Highlight of intruder track’ information ................................... 251	
Figure 8.14 Value of ‘Surrounding aircrafts colour format’ information ................... 252	
Figure 8.15 Value of ‘Track list window’ information ............................................... 252	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
  10 
List	of	Tables	
 
Table 1: Levels of Automation [11] ............................................................................ 17 
Table 2: The PACT (Pilot Authorisation and Control of Tasks) Framework [11] ....... 19 
Table 3: NHTSA Classification of Vehicle Automation [11] ....................................... 20 
Table 4: UAS classification group in UK airspace (CAP722) .................................... 42 
Table 5: EASA UAS Classification ............................................................................ 43 
Table 6: UAS Groups recommended by small UAS ARC ......................................... 44 
Table 7: Architecture Pattern Template ..................................................................... 97 
Table 8: Quality of Service Aspects [15] ................................................................. 190 
Table 9: Quality of Service Aspects [15] ................................................................. 191 
Table 10: Quality of Service Aspects [14], [15] ....................................................... 192 
Table 11: Comparison of radar sensors .................................................................. 197 
Table 12: Alternative Sensor Technologies ............................................................. 199 
Table 13: Aircraft Flight Information  (On the two-dimensional system grid 1 unit = I 
Nautical Mile for both X and Y axis) ........................................................................ 235 
Table 14: Overall repeated measures ANOVA result .............................................. 241 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
  11 
List	of	Abbreviations	
 
UAV(s)  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle(s) 
UA   Unmanned Aircraft 
NAS   National Airspace System 
UAS(s)  Unmanned Aircraft System(s) 
ISR   Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance  
NextGen   Next Generation Air Transportation System 
SESAR   Single European Sky ATM Research 
EOD   Explosive Ordinance Disposal  
PACT   Pilot Authorisation and Control of Tasks 
LOA    Levels of Automation  
UK MOD   United Kingdom Ministry of Defence 
NHTSA   National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
FMVSSs  Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 
ACC    Adaptive Cruise Control 
SoS    System-of-Systems 
ATM    Air Traffic Management 
COTS   Commercial off the Shelf 
ATC    Air Traffic Control 
ABSAA   Airborne Sense and Avoid System 
GBSAA   Ground-Based Sense and Avoid System 
ISR   Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  12 
 					Part	I:	Introduction	and	Background		
 
 
 	
  13 
Chapter	1: Introduction	
1.1 Rationale:	The	Need	for	Autonomy	
According to the English dictionary the word ‘Autonomy’ is defined as ‘the right to self-
governance’. This word is used in various contexts in several varied spheres of studies 
ranging from sociology, politics, philosophy, medicine and many more. When used in 
the context of autonomous vehicles or systems, it means the car, air vehicle or any 
other vehicle or system that has the ability to self-govern i.e. the freedom to act 
independently. That is an autonomous system is one that can operate and manage 
(includes the ability to plan actions, reassess goals and make decisions) 
independently without any human intervention under any external environmental 
conditions. However, an autonomous system can have varying degrees of autonomy 
incorporated depending on the level of human intervention involved. 
Autonomy (i.e. self-governance), when used in the context of autonomous 
systems or vehicles, can significantly improve the efficiency and safety of a system 
[1]. This in turn can provide potential benefits both in cost and risk reduction [1]. 
Despite this the day-to-day/routine use of autonomous vehicles/systems in a wide 
range of commercial applications has not yet been possible [2]. This is especially true 
in the case of autonomous systems operations in safety critical environments i.e. air 
transportation, road transit system. The main reasons for the restricted usage of 
autonomous systems in commercial applications include technical, economic, social 
and political factors [3].  Among them key challenges include ensuring integrity and 
resilience in autonomous systems (i.e. ability to predict behaviour of systems that can 
adapt to changing conditions), certification and regulation of these systems, and public 
perception of risk about safety and privacy issues [4], [5]. However, there are great 
rewards for advancement of autonomous systems technology in terms of improving 
system safety and efficiency as well as the potential for providing entirely new 
capabilities in environments where direct human control is not physically possible.  
The main benefits of autonomous systems are that they can be operated and 
managed (includes the ability to plan actions, reassess goals and make decisions) 
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independently without any human intervention under any external environmental 
conditions. This enables them to perform missions that are characterised as dull, dirty 
or dangerous for manned systems [6]: 
● Dull missions involve performing mundane/routine tasks for long-duration. The 
nature of these tasks makes them ill-suited for manned systems, however they 
are ideally suited for unmanned systems. A good example is surveillance 
missions which involve observation for prolonged period of time ranging from 
few hours to several days. An unmanned system can perform such a 
surveillance task constantly for the entire duration unlike a manned system 
where the human can perform a surveillance task only for several hours due to 
tiredness. There is also the possibility of human error occurring due to boredom 
from repetitive tasks.  
● Dirty missions are those that can potentially expose personnel to hazardous 
conditions. For example, missions such as surveillance in nuclear plant 
accident site, biological or chemical leak detection. Unmanned systems can 
perform these dirty missions with less risk exposure to the operators [6]. 
● Dangerous missions are those which involve high risk for damage or loss of 
system in turn endangering operator’s life or people. A prime example is forest 
fire monitoring/firefighting missions [7]. Unmanned systems can significantly 
reduce the risk to personnel by increasingly having capability to fulfil inherently 
dangerous missions.  
1.2 Autonomous	Systems	
Autonomous systems are systems that can decide for themselves what to do and 
when to do it [8]. They have the ability to adapt their behaviour in response to 
unforeseen events in their operational environment. The capability and domains of 
application of such systems has expanded significantly in the recent years, with 
increasing incorporation of autonomy in industrial, household and military systems [8]. 
There are several examples of such systems used to perform range of tasks, all 
varying in the degree of autonomy incorporated, from almost complete human control 
to fully autonomous capability with minimal human interaction. The usage of 
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autonomous systems for commercial and military applications has increased in recent 
years with application areas ranging from industrial robotics to autonomous vehicles 
[8]. The use of robotics and autonomous systems has evolved from their initial use in 
industrial automation to their usage now across the domains of air, ground, sea and 
space [8]. Autonomous systems have been successfully implemented in commercial 
applications such as mining, agriculture, warehousing and medical logistics. These 
systems employ similar technology but have basic sensing and automated decision-
making to accomplish tasks i.e. they are more complex and larger than earlier adoption 
of such automated systems in industrial automation and household robotic solutions. 
Other area where autonomous systems have seen large proliferation is in 
government/military applications in the last decade [4]. Unmanned aircraft, ground, 
and maritime systems have been used by defence forces to perform functions such 
as Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), weapons delivery platform and 
other dangerous jobs such as explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) [6]. The 
government applications of autonomous systems are not only limited to military 
applications but also in multiples areas such as search and rescue, law enforcement, 
scientific research and disaster management [9].    
Autonomous systems can operate independently without any degree of human 
intervention under all external environments. Most of the autonomous systems in 
operation today have mission execution capability, which is they are typically fully pre-
programmed to perform tasks repeatedly and independently of any external influence 
or control [6]. However, in the future autonomous systems are envisaged to have 
mission performance capability without any human control, that is they have the ability 
to adapt/deviate from pre-programmed tasks when the mission outcomes change 
which may happen even during a mission [6]. A fully autonomous system is capable 
of self-deciding by choosing a behaviour it follows to operate itself to fulfil a human-
directed goal. Thereby various levels of autonomy exist in any system that determines 
the level of human interaction and frequency of their interaction with the autonomous 
system [10]. It is necessary to ensure the degree of autonomy incorporated in any 
system needs to be appropriate to the task.  
In order to enable interaction between the human and the system a framework 
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is required that defines the level of human control or intervention under a variety of 
different situations for autonomous systems operation. There have been several 
efforts in the past towards classification of levels of autonomy. The various frameworks 
for classification of autonomy are described briefly here, few of which are application 
domain specific [11].  
 The earliest model for defining levels of autonomy between the human and 
computer was put forward by Sheridan & Verplanck [11], which was later revised by 
Parasuraman et al. [12]. The first proposed framework consists of 10 possible levels 
of decision-making tasks between the human and computer, ranging from human 
making all the decisions (Level 1) to the computer making all decisions without any 
form of human control/intervention (Level 10), as shown in Table 1. The revised model 
also has 10 possible levels of automation however the framework considers the 
application of automation to a four-stage model of information processing function 
(information collection, analysis, decision selection, and action implementation) [12]. 
These levels of control provide a spectrum that can be correlated with proportional 
increase/lessening of the degree of human intervention/interaction with the system 
[10]. Thereby gives a way of understanding the type of interaction required between 
the human and system from a system design point of view.  
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Levels of Automation 
(LOA) Description 
10 
Fully Autonomous: The autonomous system decides 
everything; act autonomously, coordinating with other 
autonomous systems, ignoring the human. 
9 
The automation system informs the human supervisor  
only if the system decides to. 
8 
The automation system informs the human,  
only if asked. 
7 
The automation system executes actions autonomously  
and then necessarily informs the human supervisor. 
6 
The automation system allows the human supervisor a 
restricted time to veto before automatic execution. 
5 
The automation system executes that suggestion if the 
human supervisor approves. 
4 
The automation system suggests one decision action 
alternative. 
3 
The automation system narrows the decision choice 
selection down to a few. 
2 
The automation system offers a complete set of 
decision/action alternatives. 
1 
The computer offers no assistance; human must take all 
decisions and actions. 
Table 1: Levels of Automation [11] 
 In the Aerospace domain, variable levels of autonomy are achieved by adopting 
the PACT (Pilot Authorisation and Control of Tasks) framework, as shown in Table 2. 
This model was originally developed for UKMOD for use within the fast jet environment 
in order to alleviate the workload from the pilot and delegate some elements of 
decision support to computer automation [10]. The PACT levels of automation 
proposed by Bonner et al. [11], [12] outlines three automation or autonomy modes 
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namely, fully automatic, assisted or pilot commanded, which can be changed 
dynamically by the system or by the pilot. This provides a framework through which 
variable levels of autonomy can be assigned to different tasks, ranging from routine 
task to safety critical events, from a system design point of view [11].   
 
 
Figure 1.1 Autonomy classification model [13] 
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Mode Level Operational 
Relationship 
Computer 
Autonomy 
Pilot Authority 
Automatic  5 Automatic  Full  Interrupt 
 
 
 
 
Assisted 
4 Direct support Advised action 
unless revoked 
Revoking action 
3 In support Advice, and if 
authorised, action 
Acceptance of 
advice and 
authorising action 
2 Advisory Advice Acceptance of 
advice 
1 At call Advice only if 
required  
Full 
Commanded 0 Under command None Full 
Table 2: The PACT (Pilot Authorisation and Control of Tasks) Framework [11] 
Within the Automotive sector there has also been an increasing trend towards 
more automation of safety-critical control function (e.g. steering, braking or throttle) of 
vehicle, which has led to push towards crafting set of guidelines for regulating 
operations of autonomous or self-driving cars. One such effort to set guidelines has 
been by the NHTSA (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration) in USA [14]. 
NHTSA is responsible for developing, setting, and enforcing Federal motor vehicle 
safety standards (FMVSSs) and regulation for motor vehicles and motor vehicle 
equipment [14]. During the process of setting guidelines for self-driving cars the 
NHTSA has also created a framework for classification of autonomous vehicles. The 
model segments vehicles automation into five levels, ranging from vehicles that do not 
have any of their control systems automated (Level 0) through to fully automated 
vehicles (Level 4), as shown in Table 3. Currently the commercial use of vehicles 
operating at Level 3 and Level 4 are not sanctioned by the transport authorities [14]. 
However, the well-known Google driverless car is a Level 3 (Limited self-driving 
automation) vehicle under the NHTSA definition, which has already clocked over 1.7 
million miles test driven on the streets of Mountain View, California with city speed of 
the cars limited to 25 mph [16].  
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Level Function Description 
0 No automation Driver in control 
1 Function-specific automation One or more specific primary 
control system utilises 
automation 
2 Combined function 
automation 
At least two primary control 
systems are automated in 
order to assist the driver 
3 Limited self-driving 
automation 
Driver is able to cede all 
safety-critical functions to the 
vehicle in some instances 
4 Full self-driving automation Vehicle able to perform all 
safety-critical driving and 
monitor external conditions 
Table 3: NHTSA Classification of Vehicle Automation [11] 
In recent years there has been increasing trend towards automation in 
transportation systems (rail, road, air etc.) which are becoming more complex and 
interconnected [4]. As technology advances, systems are moving towards autonomy 
where more and more decisions will be made by the system rather than by humans. 
The system is intelligent in perceiving, deciding, learning etc. without any direct human 
control/involvement, in any environment it’s operating in. This trend towards 
autonomous systems technology can be seen in aviation, where unmanned aerial 
vehicles have found its way from original military applications into variety of 
commercial and civil applications. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been used 
for scientific research, disaster prevention (forest fire monitoring, earthquake damage 
assessments etc.), homeland security (border protection, coastal surveillance, 
monitoring public events etc.), protecting critical infrastructure (monitoring of oil and 
gas pipelines, monitoring the power grid etc.) as well as environmental protection 
(monitoring illegal fishing, pollution emissions etc.) [9]. Most of these civil applications 
have carried out primarily by state or government agencies [9]. The commercial use 
  21 
of unmanned aerial vehicles has not yet started fully [2].   
 Similar to air transportation sector, application of autonomous systems to 
automotive domain is also being explored by various automotive manufacturers. 
Already the vehicles produced in recent years have varying levels of “driver-assist” 
technologies being incorporated such as Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), Forward 
collision warning with brake support, Active parking assist, Rear view camera, Lane 
keeping system etc. [17], [18]. Many of the major manufacturers (Ford Motor Company 
2013; Nissan Motor Company 2013; Toyota Motor Company 2013) have announced 
research and development initiatives to explore even more sophisticated autonomous 
capability in vehicles moving toward driverless cars [4]. Google self-driving car 
program has successfully tested prototype driverless cars logging over 1.7 million 
miles in the test zones in Mountain View California since 2010 with total of 11 
accidents. According to Google, the accidents have been minor in nature with light 
damage and in none of them the Google’s robot cars are to at fault.  
 The consequences of system failures in the transportation domain are 
potentially dire; hence ensuring that autonomy incorporated into these systems can 
be trusted and remain resilient is essential [4]. The regulatory and certification 
standards for operation of autonomous systems to ensure they operate robustly in 
safety-critical situations have not kept pace with the technology advancements [4]. 
This research is only focussed on the air transportation sector, and the issues related 
to the integration of Unmanned Aircraft (UA) in the National Airspace System (NAS). 
1.3 Motivation	for	the	study	of	Unmanned	Aircraft	System	
(UAS)	
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are envisaged to provide many commercial and 
technical benefits due to their unique operational capabilities as compared to their 
manned counterparts. Due to the benefits they provide, UAS have been widely used 
in the military domain in the past decade primarily in performing Intelligence, 
Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) missions and more recently over the last few 
years have been used in a few state civilian applications (i.e. homeland security, 
disaster prevention, scientific research etc.) [19]. The potential benefits of UAS include 
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[19]: 
● High endurance capability i.e. can stay for a long time ranging from several 
hours to many days. 
● Ability to perform tasks that are risky or dangerous to human pilots in 
conventional manned aircraft. 
● An overall reduction in the cost of performing a mission. 
● Capability to reduce response time to attend to some missions. 
● Possible spin-off from new technologies developed for UAS into commercial 
manned aircraft. 
● In future may lead to new civil applications which have not been conceived yet. 
● Potential improvement in efficiency and reliability of future Air Traffic 
Management system as more and more decisions would be made by the 
system rather than the humans. 
 
Despite the great deal of benefits and the belief that more and more autonomous 
systems will be part of the future Air Traffic Management system (ATM), such systems 
have yet to be commonplace in commercial civil applications. Their operations have 
been restricted to certain segregated areas of the national airspace and for some 
civilian applications by state authorities. After the considerable amount of funding and 
effort spent in the domain of UAS airspace access it has brought very little progress. 
The systems developers and regulators together have not been able to address the 
technical and operational requirements for the introduction of such systems in order 
not to cause a detrimental effect on the efficiency and safety of the current airspace 
environment. Whilst many of the technologies needed to realise these systems exist, 
the process of integration of manned and unmanned aircraft in civil airspace is not 
routine.  
The UAS airspace integration  problem seems to be a complex one, with 
challenges that are well beyond the technical and regulatory hurdles. The economic, 
social and political issues also govern the integration and acceptance of autonomous 
systems. These systems have to ensure they are robust and establish a perception of 
trust to enable their operation routinely. The multiple stakeholders involved that 
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impose different constraints and requirements some of which are contradictory and 
changing, makes this problem more complex. Thus, there is a compelling case for 
looking at the barriers and challenges with different perspectives bringing a paradigm 
shift in thinking. One of the ways to formulate an understanding of the challenges from 
different perspectives is through looking at the problem holistically by following an 
underlying system thinking approach.  
1.3.1 The	Wider	motivation	
In the past 40 years the volume of air travel worldwide has expanded tremendously 
(almost tenfold increase when measured through revenue passenger kilometres). This 
is broadly in line with the rise in world trade during the same period, and the process 
has facilitated globalization [20]. Today’s globalized world would not be possible 
without the air transport sector. To meet this growing demand for air transport, airlines 
are incorporating new routes and providing more connectivity to passengers. This in 
turn has led to more and more aircrafts taking to the skies every year. As a result, air 
traffic volume is growing at an average rate of 5% every year, which is equivalent to 
doubling of air traffic in 15 years [21], [22]. This rapid growth has led to a big challenge 
in terms of ensuring safe and efficient performance of air transport sector to required 
levels. The anticipated growth in air traffic volume will far outstrip the capacity of the 
existing air transport system infrastructure [23]. The ageing technology and existing 
paradigms of existing Air Traffic Management have repeatedly been scaled up in the 
past to accommodate air traffic growth; however, they are rapidly approaching or 
exceeding their natural air traffic capacity limits [23]. The challenge of this air traffic 
growth will not only be about handling traffic in air but also on ground, as already there 
is saturation at our major hub airports [24]. Hence in the future the growing traffic has 
to be handled safely and efficiently in the air and on the ground.  Along with capacity 
constraints, another big challenge that today’s aviation faces is the impact on the 
environment. There is growing demand to address aviation’s environmental footprint 
in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, noise and air quality [21], [25].  
To cope with these multiple challenges, large-scale modernisation efforts are 
underway which are aimed at replacing old infrastructure and also providing new 
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operational capabilities by incorporating new technologies and operational 
procedures. The proposed changes and modernization to the airspace system in US 
and Europe are being carried out through the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System (NexGen) and Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) programs 
respectively [25], [26]. The modernisation initiatives are large-scale system levels 
integration effort where several components are combined together on a large scale 
with the significant procedural changes that will deliver new operational capabilities. 
These strategic aviation technology programs will bring air traffic management fully 
into the 21st century.  It is envisaged these initiatives will help ease congestion in an 
era where air traffic volume is expected to double and also lead to cleaner skies 
through lower CO2 emissions as well as drastically reduce the amount of fuel used by 
aircraft [25].  
One of the new operational capabilities proposed for the future ATM system is 
the introduction of trajectory-based operations that will incorporate time as the fourth 
dimension in the management of air traffic [25]. Also, other new technologies such as 
Automatic Dependant Broadcast Surveillance (ADSB) and data communication b/w 
pilots and Air Traffic Controllers are also proposed which will enhance the performance 
and efficiency of air traffic control [25]. With the use of these new technologies and 
operational capabilities, it is envisaged that in the future the workload of the humans 
(pilots and Air Traffic Controllers) will be reduced and several functions will be 
performed by the system, which are today being performed by humans [22]. Hence 
the air traffic capacity and its efficiency can be improved drastically by taking an 
integrated approach through all phases of aircraft flight [25], [26].   
Other reason for the future Air Traffic Management Systems to be based on 
decisions made by the system rather than humans is that the contribution of human 
error in the mishap rate of aircrafts is high. According to a 2002 congressional Service 
report, more than 70 percent (DoD, 2003) of all class A aircraft mishaps have been 
caused due to human error. When the figures are looked at for manned aircraft, it rises 
to approximately 85 percent [27].  
Generally, there has been a trend of increasing safety in the air transportation 
system. The total accident rates per hour of operation for general aviation have 
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reduced by a factor of 10 since 1940, and in the same period the total accident rates 
per hour of operation for commercial aviation have reduced by a factor of 1000 (DoD, 
2003) [27].  
Hence for increasing capacity and also to improve the reliability of manned 
Figure 1.2 History of accident rates in civil aviation [27] 
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aircraft, more and more decisions in the future will have to be made by the system 
[25]. The involvement of humans will be reduced to more of a monitoring role and 
taking decisions only during an emergency or any such situations. Thus, this will mean 
the design of interaction of the human with the system will have to be updated to new 
ways in which the decisions would be made. The shared decision-making environment 
would also lead to several new questions in terms of operator alertness level and 
his/her situation awareness as the operator will no longer be actively involved in the 
decision making at every level.  
1.4 Thesis	Structure	
This thesis consists of four parts: Introduction and Background, System of Systems 
(SoS) architecture analysis, System Concept implementation and Evaluation, and 
Conclusions. Each of these sections is briefly described below. 
1.4.1 Part	I	–	Introduction	and	Background	
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to research context, key Aims and Objectives and 
an extensive literature review. It gives an introduction into Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) and its various elements. The literature study also highlights the previous 
academic literature in several areas especially focussing on UAS classifications, civil 
UAS market potential, current regulatory environment for UAS operations and key 
challenges involved with their integration in national airspace.  The industrial context 
of the research is also outlined by briefly describing the industry wide project under 
which this research was a part of. The knowledge gained from the literature review is 
used to position the study and further substantiate the research objectives keeping in 
mind the industrial context of the research undertaken. Further background 
information and previous academic literature is provided in the thesis at the beginning 
of Part II and part III, and also where necessary. 
1.4.2 Part	II	–	UAS	Integration	in	ATM:	A	System	of	Systems	Architecture	
Analysis			
The underlying framework for a holistic approach towards addressing the research 
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problem is presented in Part II of the thesis. Chapter 3 introduces the Design for 
Adaptability and Evolution in System of Systems Engineering (DANSE) project under 
which this part of the research was carried out. It also provides an overview of the 
methodology used in order to perform a high level SoS architecture analysis of the Air 
Traffic Management (ATM) System and the integration of UAS into the ATM system. 
Finally, the chapter describes the SoS architectural patterns which are fundamental 
blocks in the creation/representation of any architecture. Chapters 4, 5 & 6 explain the 
different architectures of ATM ranging from the current to its evolution into a next 
generation ATM and also the possible architecture solutions of integrating UAS in such 
an evolving ATM architecture. Chapter 4 provides information on how and which of 
the architecture patterns were mined in order to represent the current ATM system. It 
also describes the operations of UAS in the current ATM architecture and analyses 
the operational deficiencies for UAS operations in the ATM system, based on the high 
level SoS architecture patterns developed. Chapter 5 gives information on the 
architecture patterns that were mined to represent the ATM architecture in the medium 
term (next 3 - 5 years) and also of the possible architecture solutions for UAS 
operations in the ATM system. Chapter 6 briefly mentions some of the architecture 
patterns that were mined to represent the next generation ATM architecture. It also 
briefly discusses the possible architecture solutions foreseen for routine UAS 
operations in the next generation ATM system (10 years’ time frame). 
1.4.3 Part	III	–	UAS	Sense	and	Avoid	
Parts III of this thesis gives background information on the sense and avoid system 
for Unmanned Aircraft (UA), a concept solution for near-to-medium integration of UAS, 
a proof of concept system development and finally the evaluation of concept on UAS 
synthetic environment. Chapter 7 provides the necessary information to understand 
the concept of sense and avoid and overarching requirements of a UAS sense and 
avoid system. A literature study on the various approaches to the design of sense and 
avoid system and architectural frameworks that could be implemented to avoid other 
airspace users in the air traffic environment is also given. The review highlights areas 
where considerable academic literature in this area and the gaps that exist with 
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regards to the UAS sense and avoid research. Finally, the reason for focussing the 
next phase of research study on Ground based approach to the sense and avoid 
problem is detailed. Chapter 8 gives a detailed overview of the Ground Based Sense 
and Avoid System (GBSAA) concept and the systemic analysis of its functions as well 
as the system functional and operational requirements to enable them to be able to 
operate in the current airspace environment. It also gives information on the key 
design requirements of a UAS separation assurance display and the academic 
literature that exists on previous work on the topic of separation assurance displays 
for UAS. The following chapters (9 & 10) explain the proof of concept development 
and the system evaluation. Chapter 9 explains the proof of concept display system for 
providing the function of UAS separation display that has been developed from a 
COTS Air Traffic Control (ATC) System. It also describes the experimental set-up for 
the evaluation of the concept display by integrating it with a UAS synthetic 
environment. The design of the experiment and also the parameters that will be 
evaluated in the research experiment are also detailed. Chapter 10 provides the 
results from the evaluation of various aspects of the separation assurance display are 
presented. The results demonstrate the ability of the proof of concept to be able to 
present aircraft traffic information in a manner that aid the UAS pilot to avoid other 
aircraft in its vicinity. A full-scale demonstration system for UAS sense and avoid can 
be further developed with this approach to have pre-operational demonstration system 
to validate the concept fully.  
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Figure 1.3 Thesis Structure 
1.4.4 Part	IV	–	Conclusions	
The final part of this thesis consists of conclusions. This section presents the 
conclusions on the SoS analysis of the integration of UAS in ATM using the DANSE 
methodology. It also presents future work in terms of the SoS modelling and simulation 
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to compare SoS architectural solutions. The conclusions section also includes the 
strengths of the approach towards proof of concept development and its evaluation for 
UAS Sense and Avoid; as well as the contributions made by this research. The various 
weaknesses with the method are discussed and also drawbacks of the experimental 
set-up are provided. The potential improvements to the proof of concept display 
system and further development of the demonstration system towards a full scale UAS 
sense and avoid system for further validation are also provided. Lastly, the subject 
areas for further research are mentioned.  
1.5 Aim	and	Objectives	
The Aim of this research is to examine the issues associated with guaranteeing that 
information on which decisions will be made is valid and of very high integrity in an Air 
Traffic Environment where Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) will be an integral part. 
The research will be undertaken using a systems engineering approach as an 
underlying framework. Given the industrial context of the research, gaining an 
understanding of problem and designing candidate solutions will be based not only on 
technical performance but also on their commercial viability.  
The issues that will be addressed in the research to ensure that decisions made 
by the UAS are robust and will consist of looking at the following aspects: 
● To understand and examine the current architecture of the Air Traffic 
Management System (ATM) and its evolution to enable integration of UAS into 
the national airspace system in a phased-approach.  
● To investigate UAS Sense and Avoid, a key UAS integration challenge, in order 
to determine the best place for decision-making processing (i.e. on board or 
remotely) from a technical and economical perspective. 
● To develop a Ground-Based Sense and Avoid simulation architecture in order 
to investigate the impact of different configurations of GBSAA information 
display system on the decision-making capability of human operator. 
 
In order to achieve these objectives, this research uses a systems engineering 
approach to understand, evaluate, propose and develop proof of concept solution so 
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as to enhance the validity and integrity of the information for decision making process. 
A systems approach enables one to understand the problem much better by looking 
at it more holistically through the use of various systems engineering tools/techniques 
and methods.  
The research considers the context of the problem from various stakeholders’ 
perspectives and the major issues associated with the integration of UAS in the 
national airspace in order to realise the potential benefits of such systems as listed in 
the previous section 1.3.  
The research also follows a holistic approach to tackle the problem of UAS 
integration.  The underlying framework for this holistic approach was a high-level 
System-of-Systems (SoS) Architecture analysis of the integration of UAS into the Air 
Traffic Management System. The inherent complexity of a SoS makes it very difficult 
to model and analyse it through conventional means. In order to perform detailed 
analysis of SoS one of first challenges faced is how to represent the SoS especially 
when full details of the constituent systems may not be readily available. Among the 
many encompassing methodology, models, tools and flows that enable future 
engineering of SoS, one such method is to use architecture patterns that can 
sufficiently deal with many analyses needs of SoS. This research involves use of 
architecture patterns to analyse the SoS, which in this case is the Air Traffic 
Management System, in order to compare different architectural solutions for 
integration of UAS into the air traffic management system. Further based on the 
analysis of existing ATM architecture using architecture patterns, a basis for analysis 
of future ATM architectures where UAS will be allowed to operate routinely emerged. 
This involved a high level SoS architecture analysis of UAS integration into the ATM 
system in its current architecture to its progressive evolution into the next generation 
ATM architecture.  
Among the key challenges regarding the problem of UAS integration, the UAS 
Sense and Avoid emerged as a prominent factor. Hence all the research aims were 
then investigated through the key integration of UAS sense and Avoid. This was 
decided through detailed analysis of the current academic literature and current 
industrial/regulatory perspective on the issue of UAS integration in national airspace.  
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In order to achieve the aims for the specific case of UAS Sense and Avoid, the 
following aspects were involved: 
● Gain an understanding of the problem of UAS Sense and Avoid system and 
the generic system requirements for such systems in view of current 
regulatory environment. 
● A systemic study of the Sense and Avoid system, to identify all the data 
sources involved internal and external for separation of UAS from other 
aircrafts. 
● Evaluate several system architectures for UAS sense and avoid with 
regards to decision making processing i.e. whether it is to be performed on-
board or remotely.  
● The probable solution for UAS Sense an Avoid system based in ground or 
air to be decided based on investigating the technical as well the commercial 
viability of the concept solution. 
● To develop a systemic overview and operational procedures for the 
probable solution that is chosen for detailed study. 
● To develop a proof of concept system based on Commercial off the Shelf 
(COTS) hardware and software. 
● Evaluate the developed proof of concept through various simulations in a 
synthetic environment. 
1.6 Why	Unmanned	Aircraft?	
The main drivers for the increased expansion of UA in the military sphere and the 
potential commercial uses are: 
● UA have increased capabilities to perform “dull, dirty or dangerous” tasks in 
place of manned aircrafts which are limited due to the human capability to 
perform these tasks for long periods of time without increased fatigue and also 
high risk to human life [19]. ‘Dull’ tasks are those which may require the aircraft 
to stay airborne for several hours/days at high altitudes [7].  ‘Dirty or dangerous’ 
tasks are those which involve operations with high risk for damage or loss of 
aircraft that may endanger human operator’s life [7].   
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● The operations of UA are also economically beneficial for performing 
surveillance, communication and other commercial operations compared to 
their manned counterparts. The cost of development, maintenance and training 
of personnel are much less compared to the overall costs of equivalent manned 
aircrafts [7]. 
The unique operational capabilities of UA such as flying at high altitudes for long 
duration, better manoeuvrability and ability to fly very close to structures on the ground, 
as well as several new technologies emerging from its use in military applications 
provides the opportunity for new applications in the future that have not been 
conceived of yet [28]. 
1.6.1 Unmanned	Aircraft	Systems	(UAS)	Overview	
An Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) also commonly known as a drone aircraft refers 
to an aircraft/flying machine without an on-board human pilot or passengers [29]. The 
term UAV has been commonly used in the past several years to describe unmanned 
aerial systems. Although the term ‘unmanned’ implies control totally absent from a 
human who guides and actively navigates the aircraft, in most instances there is some 
degree of direct human control involved by a pilot who is off-board located on the 
ground. Thus, the flight control functions for unmanned aircraft can be based on-board 
or off-board the air vehicle [29]. This is the reason the terms Remotely Operated 
Aircraft (ROA) or Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) are also used commonly to refer to 
such air vehicles [30]. There have been various definitions proposed for this term and 
a few of them are given below as a comparison. 
The CAA definition of Unmanned Aircraft or UA is as follows [31]: 
 
“An aircraft which is designed to operate with no human pilot on board and which does not 
carry personnel. Moreover, a UAV: 
• is capable of sustained flight by aerodynamic means, 
• is remotely piloted or automatically flies a pre-programmed flight profile, 
• is reusable, 
•is not classified as a guided weapon or similar one-shot device designed for the 
delivery of munitions.” 
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A reusable aircraft designed to operate without an on-board pilot. It does not carry passengers 
and can be either remotely piloted or pre-programmed to fly autonomously. [32]                                                          
[STANAG 4671] 
 
A device used or intended to be used for flight in the air that has no on-board pilot. This 
includes all classes of airplanes, helicopters, airships, and translational lift aircraft that have 
no on-board pilot. Unmanned Aircraft are understood to include only those aircraft controllable 
in three axes and therefore exclude traditional balloons. [33] 
 [FAA definition] 
 
The development of any new technology brings with it new terms and 
definitions. In the past few years, various international organizations such as ICAO, 
EUROCONTROL and several national aviation authorities have moved to the position 
where the term UAV has been phased out and replaced by the phrase Unmanned 
Aircraft System (UAS) instead [29]. The change in acronym is caused by following 
aspects [29]: 
● The term ‘unmanned’ refers to the absence of an on-board pilot. 
● The term ‘aircraft’ signifies that it is an aircraft and as such properties like 
airworthiness have to be demonstrated. 
● The term ‘system’ is introduced to emphasise that it’s not just the aircraft but a 
system consisting of various ground systems, communication links and other 
human assets needed to operate the aircraft itself.  
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Figure 1.4 A typical Unmanned Aircraft System 
A generic UAS can be categorised into systems consisting of three major parts 
as shown in figure 2.1: 
● Air system – The air system consists of the Unmanned Aircraft (UA) platform 
that carries the payload and the payload itself, which consists of various 
sensors for collecting remote sensor data and other communication 
equipment’s [34]. For the purpose of this research, a UA is a reusable, powered 
aircraft capable of controlled, sustained and level flight. It also referred to as 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) or Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) [34].  
● Ground system – The ground system consists of the UAV control station (UCS) 
and the Air Traffic control (ATC). The ATC is responsible for maintaining safe, 
orderly and efficient flow of air traffic. Whereas the UCS is responsible for the 
following tasks [7]: 
➢ Mission planning and setting objectives 
➢ Flight control during taxi, take-off, approach and landing as well as 
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guidance during flight 
➢ Control of sensors for gathering data and processing it, for further 
display and usage 
➢ Communication with UAV and the ATC 
● Communication System – It consists of control and data links between the 
ground segment and the air system which can range from direct line-of-sight 
and also non-direct line-of-sight via satellite communication system [7]. 
 
The analogy UAS is used for single or multiple systems and means the same 
in the plural form as well.   
1.6.2 Historical	Perspective	of	Unmanned	Aircraft		
The modern notion of UA appeared during the First World War in 1917 [35]. However, 
the first breakthrough or earliest reported successful work on autonomous flight 
occurred about 2500 years ago during the era of Pythagoras (first student of Thales’ 
for few years and Pythagorean mathematicians), and is attributed to Archytas from the 
city of Tarentum in South Italy [36]. He was known as Archytas the Tarantine, also 
referred to as the Leonardo Da Vinci of the Ancient World. He created the first UAV in 
425 B.C by building a mechanical bird, a pigeon that could fly by moving its wings 
getting energy from a mechanism under its stomach [36]. It is alleged that it flew 200 
metres before falling to the ground. The pigeon could not be flown again, unless the 
energy mechanism was reset [37].  
During the same era, around 400 B.C the Chinese were the first to document 
vertical flight aircraft. In China, the first version of the aircraft was a Chinese top that 
consisted of feathers at the end of the stick [29]. The stick was spun between the 
hands to generate enough lift before it was released into free flight.   
Nearly seventeen centuries later a ‘flying bird’ was documented, similar to the 
initial idea of Archytas, credited to some unknown engineer of the Renaissance [29]. 
It is unclear whether this new design was based on the Archytas idea; however, the 
concept was very similar.  
Leonardo Da Vinci, in 1483, designed an aircraft capable of hovering, called 
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aerial screw or air gyroscope [29]. It had a 5-meter diameter and the idea was to turn 
the shaft and apply enough force so that the machine would spin and fly [29]. It is 
considered by some experts that this machine is the origin for today’s helicopters. 
In 1860s, Ponton d’ Amecourt flew small helicopter models powered by steam. 
It was the first time the term helicopter was coined. Additional helicopter models were 
introduced between 1860 and 1907. One of the standout models was introduced by 
Thomas Alva Edison who in the 1880’s experimented with different rotor 
configurations, eventually using electric motor for power.  The experiment revealed 
that a large diameter of the rotor was needed with a low blade area for best hovering 
capabilities. In 1907 Paul Cornu developed a two-rotor vertically flying machine that 
presumably carried the first human off the ground. The two rotors rotated in the 
opposite directions and the machine flew for about 20 seconds and merely being lifted 
off the ground.  
 The modern origin of UAV was first developed in 1916 by the Americans 
Lawrence and Elmer Sperry [35].  They manufactured it by combining wood and fabric 
airframes with either gyroscope or propeller revolution counters to stabilize the aircraft 
body to carry payload of almost 200 pounds of explosives at distances exceeding 30 
miles [38]. They called their device ‘aerial torpedoes’ and were experimented by the 
American Navy and Army during World War I (WWI) but never fielded them in 
battlefield [38]. The periods following the war their development was limited and UAVs 
were successfully used target drones in Naval exercises. The military soon realized 
the potential benefits of unmanned aircrafts and increased efforts towards 
development of UAVs and their use. Such systems were used in World War II as 
unmanned ordinance delivery platforms and radio-controlled flying bombs also called 
‘smart bombs’ [38]. UAVs were also used during the war to operate as target ‘drones’ 
to assist the training of anti-aircraft gun operators.   
 After the limited success of UAVs as weapon delivery systems, UAVs began to 
be used for reconnaissance missions during the Cold War by USA [38]. The first 
unmanned aircraft which resembles the today’s definition of UAS which was Ryan 
Model 147 series aircraft were using during this period [36]. They were also used 
during the Vietnam War and the further development of UAVs continued through the 
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1960s and 1970s [29]. After the Vietnam War UAVs were developed that were smaller 
and cheaper. They also carried video cameras and transmitted images to the operator 
on the ground [29]. The UAVs were then put to practical use by USA during the Gulf 
war and by the time Baltic conflict began; UAVs were being used regularly to collect 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) information which were 
incorporated frequently by the military personnel in their analysis [38]. After this the 
usage of UAVs for military applications increased quickly and was extensively used in 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The use of UAVs during these wars was not only 
limited to reconnaissance but also expanded to carrying missiles for striking at targets 
with more precision. The most famous of the UAV used by the military for this purpose 
is the Predator [29]. They have also been used in various countries by USA and its 
allies for the war against terrorism since the beginning of the 21st Century.   
 Most of the early applications of UAVs were in military sphere however the 
civilian use of UAVs began gradually [29]. NASA has been at the forefront of research 
for UAVs use in civilian applications. The initial development of UAVs in civil use 
started in the early 1990’s and focussed on using UAVs for scientific and 
environmental research missions [39]. One such project is the Environmental 
Research Aircraft and Sensor Technology (ERAST) which was a joint NASA-industry 
initiative to development and demonstration of aeronautical technologies that could 
validate the capability of UAVs to fly at high altitudes and for long durations to carry 
out earth sciences and environmental missions [39]. The research efforts also included 
the development, miniaturization and integration of special-purpose sensors and 
imaging equipment for UAVs [39]. The UAVs developed in this project include 
Pathfinder, Predator B, Perseus B, Altus II, Proteus etc. [29]. Gradually the use of 
UAVs in civil use has expanded over the last decade into homeland security and 
monitoring/protecting of critical infrastructure such as oil pipelines, transmission lines 
etc. [9].   
1.6.3 UAS	Types	and	Classifications	
The large proliferation of UAS, due to their increasing demand in the military domain 
over the recent decades has resulted in different configurations ranging from different 
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sizes, shapes, endurance levels and capabilities. During the last decade, the 
significant efforts in the development of UAS have focussed towards increasing the 
flight endurance and the payload carrying capacity in order for UAS to perform some 
missions in place of manned aircrafts in the military domain.  
The tremendous growth in the number of UAS over the last decade has led to the 
development of several new design concepts and configurations. Hence there are 
several approaches to the classification of UAS. However, there is no consensus on 
a single UAS classification protocol from a civil use perspective that has been agreed 
by the aviation community yet.  
One of the criterions used to classify UAS is size and endurance, which are often 
used by the military. Weibel and Hansman of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) describe a UAS classification approach which is similar to the one 
presented in US DoD report on Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2005 – 2030, is as 
follows [40], [19]: 
● High altitude long endurance (HALE) UA, as for example the Northrop 
Grumman Global Hawk (65000 ft. altitude, 35 hours flight time, 1900 lb 
payload).  
● Medium altitude long endurance (MALE) UA, as for example the General 
Atomics’ Predator (25,000 ft. altitude, 35 hr endurance, 120 kt max. Speed, 450 
lb payload).  
● Tactical UA, as for example Hunter (15,000 – 18,000 ft., 11 – 18 hr flight 
endurance, 106 kt max. speed, 200 lb payload); also, Shadow 200 and Pioneer 
(15,000 ft. altitude, 5-11 hours flight time, 105-110 kt max. speed, 25 kg 
payload). 
● Small and mini-portable Mini UA such as the Pointer, Raven and Dragon Eye 
(1000ft, 1-2 hr flight time, 1-2 lb payload); or Scan Eagle, Silver Fox, Aerosonde 
(16000 – 20,000 ft., 10-30 hr, 5 -12 lb payload). 
● Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAV) is class of UA that have a size restriction and may 
be autonomous. These have dimensions as small as 15 cm and recently the 
development of MAVs inspired by biological systems (flying birds or insects) 
has enabled to achieve unprecedented flight capabilities. Some examples 
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include gMAV (10,500 ft. altitude, 40 min flight time, 2 lb payload) manufactured 
by Honeywell, AeroVironmnets’ Hornet and Wasp (1, 200 ft. altitude, 60 min 
flight time, 0.1 lb payload). Also include new design concepts produced by 
several universities such as Entomopter (Georgia Tech Institute of Technology) 
with a wingspan of 15 -18 cm and a payload in the range of 10 grams, Delfly 
Micro (TU Delft University) built a small ornithopter which measures 10 cm and 
weighs 3 grams, along with other designs such as Micro Bat (California Institute 
of Technology), MFI (Berkley University), MuFly, etc.  
 
Another way in which UA could be categorised is according to their characteristics 
such as aerodynamic configuration, size etc. [29]. UA platforms typically fall into one 
of the following four categories [29]: 
● Fixed-wing UA’s are a category of unmanned aircrafts having wings that require 
a dedicated runway for take-off and landing or catapult landing mechanism.  
These aircrafts usually have high cruising speeds and long flight endurance as 
well as in most instances at high cruising altitudes.  
● Rotary-wing UAs also referred to as vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) UAs, 
are driven by rotary internal combustion engines as the name suggests. This 
provides them the advantages of hovering capability and high manoeuvrability. 
A VTOL UA may consist of different configurations, with main and tilt rotors (a 
conventional helicopter), coaxial rotors, tandem rotors, multi-rotors, etc.  
● Flapping-wing UAs are such unmanned aircrafts which have been developed 
by inspiration from biological systems such as birds and flying insects. They 
have flexible and/or morphing wings which enable them to achieve 
unprecedented flight capabilities.  
● Blimps consists of both balloons and airships, which are large in size and are 
lighter than air. They have the capability to fly at low speeds/tethered at a 
location and also have a long endurance typically ranging from several days to 
months. This capability enables them to be used primarily for surveillance roles 
in both military and civilian domains.  
● Hybrid or convertible configurations, also referred to as tilt rotor category, 
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which combine the vertical take-off capability of VTOL UA’s and with a speed 
and range of a conventional fixed-wing UA’s.  
 
The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) which is responsible for regulating UAS 
operations in the United Kingdom (UK) provides guidance under Civil Aviation 
Publication (CAP) 722: Unmanned Aircraft System Operations in UK Airspace (CAP-
722) for a path to UAS certification [31]. CAP 722 outlines the current framework used 
by the CAA (see Table 5), which is similar to the framework used by other National 
Aviation Authorities (NAAs) that classifies aircraft based on simple type (e.g. balloon, 
fixed or rotary wing) and mass [31]. Although this classification method reflects the 
historic development in manned aviation but do not necessarily fully appropriate for 
UAS that have unique operational characteristics [31]. Hence until an alternative 
classification protocol is established which takes into consideration the concept of 
operations of UAS, the current classification framework is used in the interim. 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and Joint Authorities for Rulemaking 
on Unmanned Systems (JARUS) are currently undertaking work to formulate 
internationally recognised classifications for UAS. These classifications will likely use 
mass as a discriminator but will also other factors including operating environment and 
system complexity [31].  
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) provides a common regulatory 
framework for the member states in the European Union. EASA’s responsibilities 
include type certification of aircraft and components. EASA also provides guidance on 
general principles for type certification of UAS in EASA Policy Statement (EASA-
EY013-01-2009), Airworthiness Certification for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). 
EASA UAS policy is only applies to civil use UAS and UAS more than 150 Kg [41]. 
Other categories of UAS less than 150 Kg are regulated based on the NAAs in the 
member states. The EASA describes an approach for UAS classification for the 
purpose of civil certification based on kinetic energy principles and equivalence with 
conventionally piloted aircraft [41]. Table 6 summarizes the classification approach 
which applies based on per design feature basis.  For features those would affect the 
ability to maintain altitude, “unpremeditated descent” standard is use. For features 
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whose failures would affect the ability to maintain control, the “loss of control” standard 
is used [41]. EASA’s classification approach towards type certification for civil UAS for 
ensuring airworthiness is primarily targeted at protecting people and property on the 
ground. The classification framework also has preference to maintain the existing 
manned aircraft categories/classes for CS-23, CS-23 etc. (equivalent to 14 CFR Part 
23, Part 25, etc.) [41]. 
 
Weight 
Classification group 
Civil category Weight (Kg) Broad military 
equivalent 
Civil regulation 
1 Small aircraft 0-20 Micro (<5Kg) National 
Mini (<30Kg) 
2 Light UAV >20 - <150 
Tactical 
3 UAV 150 or more EASA 
(State Aircraft are 
national) 
MALE 
HALE 
Table 4: UAS classification group in UK airspace (CAP722) 
In the US, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) established a small UAS 
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to provide recommendation on standards for 
integration of small UAS in the NAS [41]. Based on the recommendations the FAA 
released its notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for the regulation of small UAS 
(sUAS) in February 2015 [42]. The sUAS ARC report recommends sUAS as UA 
weighing less than 25 Kg and classifies sUAS into five different groups based on their 
take-off weight as well as speed [42]. The operational limitations and required 
capabilities for five different groups of sUAS are as shown in Table 6 [41] .  
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Failure 
Consequence 
If the Kinetic 
Energy, KE (GJ), of 
the aircraft is… 
Fixed Wing Airplanes 
would 
apply the 
airworthiness 
requirements from 
Rotorcraft would 
apply the 
airworthiness 
requirements from 
 0 ≤ KE ≤ 0.0015 Microlight (similar to 
ultralight) 
 
 0 ≤ KE ≤ 0.003 CS-Very Light Airplanes 
(similar to light sport 
aircraft) 
 
 0.0015 ≤ KE ≤ 0.02 CS-23 single engine CS-27 
 0.01 ≤ KE ≤ 0.1 CS-23 dual engine CS-29 
 KE ≥ 0.06 CS-25  
 0 ≤ KE ≤ 0.01 Microlight (similar to 
ultralight) 
 
 0 ≤ KE ≤ 0.025 CS-Very Light Airplanes 
(similar to light sport 
aircraft) 
 
 0.01≤ KE ≤ 0.2 CS-23 single engine CS-27 
 0.1 ≤ KE ≤ 2 CS-23 dual engine CS-29 
 KE ≥ 0.3 CS-25  
Table 5: EASA UAS Classification 
Group Group 
Characteristics: 
Gross Take-off 
Weight (GTOW), w 
(lbs.) Speed, s 
(Kts) 
Operational 
Limitations  
Recommended 
System Standards 
I w ≤ 4.4 
s ≤ 30 
Frangible 
Generally, include: 
▪ Limitations 
on how high 
they can 
fly, within certain 
distances from 
airports; e.g., 
Operate ≤ 400 
7 of the 17 
recommended 
standards apply to 
Group 1 
II w ≤ 4.4 
s ≤ 60 
17 of 17 
recommended 
standards apply to 
Groups 
III w ≤ 19.8 
s ≤ 87 
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IV w ≤ 55 
s ≤ 87 
AGL 
in Class C, D, E, 
and G airspace 
▪ Requireme
nts on the 
pilot in 
control and visual 
line of sight 
▪ Proximity to 
airports 
Requirements 
become more 
stringent as weight 
increases. 
II-V. These include 
▪ standards 
for: 
Structural 
integrity 
▪ Fire 
protection 
▪ Control 
Station 
synchronization 
▪ Powerplant 
fail safe 
▪ Weight and 
balance 
▪ Fuel/power 
markings 
▪ Materials 
Table 6: UAS Groups recommended by small UAS ARC 
1.6.4 UAS	Applications	
Over the last decade the UAS have been primarily used for military applications and 
this trend has continued until now. Most of the investments in the development of UAS 
are also predominantly in the military sphere. In the past, the UA’s were used primarily 
in performing Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions, however 
more recently UAs have been used increasingly in military strike capability role as 
seen in the recent conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere.  
According to the UAS market forecasts by Teal Group, the current worldwide 
expenditure on UAS is around $6.4 billion and set to nearly double over the next 
decade to $11.5 billion annually, totalling almost $91 billion in the next ten years [43]. 
A significant portion (approximately 89%) of the overall UAS spending is in the military 
domain [44]. The primary reason for use of UAs in the military domain has been to 
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replace manned missions, especially in ‘dull, dirty and dangerous’ tasks. Although 
most military missions can be dulling or dangerous, humans continue perform them 
whether as a matter of technology or as a substitute for technology inadequacies [19].   
However, in the future, this trend is set to change as the next generation of UAS will 
be executing much more complex missions such as target detection, recognition and 
destruction, air combat, electronic attack, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare and 
other offensive capabilities.  
The growing use of UAS in the last several years in military applications, has 
increasingly lead to the demand for potential applications of UAS in civil/commercial 
scenarios. Although the current share of global UAS spending for civil purposes is very 
small at nearly 11% cumulative for last decade, according to several market forecasts, 
the civil UAS market is set to expand tremendously in the future, with Teal Group 
market forecasts predicting a shift for civil UAS spending from 11% to 14% of the 
overall worldwide UAS spending at the end of next ten years [44]. The civil UAS sector 
has not yet started significantly due to the inability of the UAS to access national 
airspace for routine flight.  
Presently, there are a few organizations that have used UAS to perform a few 
civil applications. Some of the civil applications where the UAS have been used in the 
past are performing topographical land surveys, aerial photography capability for 
monitoring construction and highway projects, agriculture land survey and monitor as 
well as forestry monitoring uses. However, all the civil applications are limited in scale 
due to the operational restrictions on the use of UAS in the national airspace.  
There are several research efforts ongoing by various organizations in order to 
realize the potential use of UAS in a range of scientific and civil operational mission 
scenarios. A few organizations which are focusing on the civil applications are Radio 
Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) and NASA in US and in Europe an 
example is the UAVNET. Based on several research studies and workshops 
performed by such organizations, broad areas of potential UAS civilian mission 
concepts and their requirements have emerged. From these research analyses, the 
potential civil applications of UAS can be categorized into five groups [9], [45]. 
● Monitoring Applications: These include forest fire detection, crop and harvest 
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monitoring, coastal monitoring, homeland security (law enforcement, 
international border patrol, traffic monitoring, infrastructure monitoring 
(pipelines, power lines, oil/gas lines etc.) and terrain mapping (high accuracy 
terrain mapping, forest mapping, oil/gas lines, etc.). 
● Communications/ Navigation applications: A few examples of communication 
applications are telecommunication relay services, broadband communications 
and satellite based navigation aids.  
● Environmental (or earth science) applications: These include atmospheric 
research, geological surveys (i.e. mapping of mineral resources, oil exploration, 
etc.), oceanographic observations, weather forecasting, hurricane evolution 
research, volcano study and eruption alerting, etc.  
● Emergency applications: A few examples of these are search and rescue, 
firefighting, catastrophe situation assessment, humanitarian aid delivery and 
disaster operations management, etc. 
● Commercial applications: These include transport of cargo and postal service, 
agricultural purpose such as precision crop spraying and farm land mapping, 
aerial photography, etc.  
1.6.5 UAS	Market	Overview	
The large proliferation of UAS in the military domain in the last decade has led to 
several countries defence forces and private defence companies, involved with 
developing and producing a large variety of UA designs. Many large defence 
contractors are developing and producing UA designs (like Lockheed Martin, Northrop 
Grumman, Boeing, EADS and Raytheon, etc.) [29]. This is evident from the rapid 
growth in the number of UA designs registered with UVS international, a non-profit 
society that promotes unmanned systems. According to UVS international, the number 
of registered UA designs more than doubled between 2005 and 2011. During the same 
time period the number of developers and producers has also more than doubled. At 
the same time, smaller companies have also emerged providing innovative 
technologies for largely developing sub-systems as sub-contractors for major defence 
contractors or developing and producing small/mini UAS [29]. With the advent of new 
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technologies and growth of many companies it is envisaged that in the world 
aerospace industry, UAS sector would be the most dynamic growth sector [44].   
The UAS market has seen unprecedented growth since 2001 [19]. There are 
numerous market forecasts that project global UAS markets will experience strong 
growth during the next 10 years [46]. According to Teal Group, the worldwide UAS 
spending on research and development as well as procurement is expected to double 
from the current annual spending of $6.4 billion in 2014 to $11.4 billion in 2024 (see 
figure 2.2) [44]. Cumulatively, the market for UAS during the forecast period is 
expected to value just over $91 billion (see figure 1.5å) [44].  Throughout the forecast 
period, Teal Group expects the US to account for 65% of worldwide spending in 
Research, Development, Training and Evaluation (RDT&E) while US will hold 55% of 
the procurement spending worldwide [44], [46]. It also expects the military applications 
to dominate the market and the UAS spending to follow the recent demand for high-
tech arms procurement worldwide (for internal and national security; territorial and 
defence modernization initiatives), with Asia-Pacific representing the second largest 
market (about 18% of total worldwide spending) followed closely by Europe at 
approximately 15% [46]. Out of the worldwide UAV market 89% is expected to be 
military and 11% civil cumulative for the decade, with the numbers shifting to 86% 
military and 14% civil by the end of the ten-year forecast in 2024 (see figure 1.5) [44].  
The United States remains a key driving force behind the world UAS market. 
And the sales of UAS equipment have been driven primarily by military needs. In the 
US, annual budget for FY2013 requested $3.8 billion for UAS acquisition, down from 
$4.6 billion in FY2012 [46]. In April 2012, the US DOD reported that it had more than 
7,100 UAS in its inventory [47]. The DOD has emphasized that in a highly constrained 
fiscal environment “Unmanned Systems (must) be affordable at the outset and not 
experience significant cost growth in their development and production evolution” [47]. 
Although there are fiscal constraints, the DOD procurement costs for the period 2011 
– 2020 are reported to be nearly $37 billion [46].  
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Figure 1.5 Worldwide UAS Market Forecast [48] 
The US aerospace and manufacturing firms have a significant lead in military 
UAS and this is expected to continue. In 2007, US firms accounted for about 63-64% 
of the market share; Israeli companies were also a strong competitor while European 
companies held less than 7% of the overall market [49]. In 2005, some 32 nations 
were developing or manufacturing more than 250 models of UA, and about 41 
countries were operating some 80 types of UA, primarily for reconnaissance in military 
applications [19]. Forecast International projects that US based companies account 
for 41 percent of the market’s production value (nearly $16.5 billion) and could gain 
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more in the future.  Similarly, the Teal Group also forecasts US dominance is set to 
continue in the future. The projections carried out by Teal Group place USA far ahead 
of other countries in the world when it comes to production of UAVs as shown in Figure 
1.6 [48]. US manufacturers with the largest market share of global UAS market could 
include General Atomics (20.4%), Northrop Grumman (18.9%), Boeing (1.5%) and 
AAI (1.2%) [46]. On the contrary European companies are projected to produce only 
3.9% of the global production value over the next decade, slightly more than 3.7% 
share that Israeli companies are expected to hold [46]. 
When it comes to R&D expenditure on UAS, the scenario is no different with 
US accounting for majority (56%) of worldwide R&D spending. The relative distribution 
of total R&D expenditure on UAS in the period 2011-2020 is as shown in figure 2.3. 
The figure also shows that Europe lags far behind when compared to US, China and 
Israel.  
 
Figure 1.6 UAS R&D expenditure by country (%) 2011 – 2020 forecast [48] 
There have also been a few market studies on the production forecast for the 
category wise distribution of UAS. A Teal group study in 2011, estimated the market 
for the year would be led by MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) at 28% of 
market share, followed closely by HALE (High Altitude Long endurance) UAS with 27% 
of share and Tactical UAVs would account for 26% of the total UAS market (see figure 
2.4) [50].  Further a Teal Group study in 2014, on world UA production forecast by UA 
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type estimated that small-sized UAVs, and in particular the mini-UAV category, is 
expected to dominate the market in the next ten years (see figure 2.5) [48].  
A category wise study of global UAS market by ICD forecasts that in the next 
10 years, the MALE UAs are most likely to account for a higher spending of the world 
UAS market [50]. The demand for MALE UAs is expected to be higher due their better 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. As has been the 
case until now, MALE, HALE and TUAs will hold a substantial market share and are 
expected to be the three most popular UA categories during the forecast period [50]. 
A few examples of current MALE UAS include the US Reaper, Israeli Heron TP, Heron 
I and Hermes 900. Other new entrants into the market are the Turkish Anka and India’s 
Rustom [29].  
 
 
Figure 1.7 UAS category wide distribution market forecast [50] 
While the global demand for UAS is increasing, the military expenditure of most 
national governments especially in the developed economies has reduced due to the 
global economic slowdown in 2008/2009. Hence many countries are establishing joint 
projects in order to share Research and Development (R&D) costs [50]. An example 
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of which is the joint UAS development initiative between UK and France to develop 
next generation of military UAs. This environment has also lead to the increase in 
partnership between defence companies across different countries, to further 
strengthen the strategic alliances between countries and have technology transfer 
agreements with global UAS manufacturers, in order to provide greater investments 
and commitment to the growth of the domestic UAS markets in their host countries 
[50].  
 
 
Figure 1.8 Global UAV Production Forecast by UAV Type 
The global UAS industry is a dynamic and a highly fragmented market due to a 
large number of established defence manufacturers and a significant number of small 
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and medium- scale companies in leading production markets, namely US, Europe and 
to an extent Israel [50]. As the military expenditure in the coming years is set to reduce 
in these leading markets, there is pressure that could drive consolidation in these 
markets, as more and larger defence manufacturers are acquiring small UAS 
manufacturers, who have niche capabilities [50]. This has also lead to the increase in 
the partnership between the defence companies, who are partnering with defence 
companies from outside their host countries to form strategic alliance and technology 
transfer deals, so as to align with their host countries investments and commitments 
for the growth and development of the domestic UAS markets. For example, in 2011, 
Selex Galileo (a part of Italy-based Finmeccanica group) acquired the Unmanned 
Technology Research Institute (UTRI), an Italian developer of MUAs for defence and 
homeland security [50]. 
Although majority of UAS spending in the next decade is projected to be in the 
defence segment, however the share of the UAS spending aimed at the civilian market 
is progressing steadily and is set to be one of the fastest growing segments in the next 
decade due to easier access to national airspace for UAVs [44]. According to Teal 
Group civilian applications of aerial drones is projected to be nearly 12% of global UAS 
spending (estimated at $98 billion) through to 2023 [44]. The commercial use of UAS 
in the national airspace is restricted and thus the civil UAS market has not yet made 
much progress. However, as the access to national airspace for UAS becomes easier 
the future the civilian UAS market is set to grow the coming years, initially with the 
non-military government use of UAS for coastal surveillance, border patrolling and 
other homeland security applications. Teal Group expects the largest single portion of 
UAS spending over the next decade to be shaped by non-military government use of 
UAVs [48]. As the safety and regulatory challenges are addressed, a commercial non-
government UAS market is expected to emerge much slowly. 
1.6.6 Current	Regulatory	and	Operational	mechanism	of	UAS		
The operation of UAS in the national airspace can provide several benefits (as outlined 
earlier in section 2.2), however those have not been realised due to the restrictions on 
the use of UA in certain segregated areas of the national airspace. Currently UAS are 
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authorised to fly only in segregated airspace. That is the UA operations are carried out 
only in restricted zones, where the manned and unmanned flight operations are 
physically separated in order to avoid an encounter between manned aircraft and 
UAS. Whilst the segregation of UAS from other airspace users (i.e. manned aircrafts) 
provides a safe environment presently for UAS operations, however the process of 
establishing such airspace reduces the flexibility of operation sought by the UAS user 
community [31]. These strict operational limitations adversely impact both the 
commercial profitability of civil missions and also the military missions (i.e. training, 
surveillance) during peace time. 
Several countries around the world foresee international civil UAS operations 
in the near future. In view of this a first exploratory meeting of ICAO member states 
was organised in Montreal, Canada in May 2006; in which all the attending members 
agreed that ICAO was not the appropriate body to lead the regulatory effort and that 
although it could guide and coordinate to some extent the regulatory efforts, the latter 
should be based on the work of RTCA, EUROCAE and other standardisations bodies. 
Following on from the initial exploratory meeting the ICAO had established a UAS 
study group in its second ICAO exploratory meeting on UAS in January 2007, with a 
goal to supporting the regulation and guidance development within ICAO.  The UAS 
Study Group enables ICAO to serve as focal point for the development of common 
terminology, definitions and non-technical aspects associated with the operation of 
UAS. 
 The acceptable means of compliance issued by various regulatory authorities 
relies on the standards published by the different standardization bodies.  These 
standardisation bodies usually constitute working groups in which different 
stakeholders involved with the product or activity to be standardised are represented. 
Many working groups exists, however the most representative ones in terms of UAS 
regulations are: 
● EUROCAE Working Group 73 (WG-73) – This working group is addressing the 
standards required for civilian UAS to fly in non-segregated airspace. This 
group is further sub-divided into four groups that are responsible for publishing 
standards for operations and send and avoid (SG-1), airworthiness aspects 
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(SG-2), command and control, communication, spectrum and security (SG-3) 
and visual line of sight operations for UAS below 150 Kg (SG-4). 
● RTCA special Committee 203 (SC-203) - This working group is responsible for 
developing standards for UAS to enable safe, efficient and compatible 
operations with other air vehicles in the operating environment. The committee 
aims to produce a finalised document on Minimum Aviation System 
Performance Standard (MASPS) for Sense and Avoid (SAA) for UAS based on 
the premise that UAS operations will not have a negative impact on the existing 
airspace users. 
● ASTM International Committee F38 – This committee is responsible for 
developing standards including the design, manufacture and operation of UAS, 
as well as the training and qualification of aircraft crew. This committee is also 
divided into different sub-committees which are Airworthiness Standards 
(F38.01), Operations Standards (F38.02) and Pilot & Maintenance 
Qualifications (F38.03). 
 
According to the various aviation authorities, the integration of UAS in the 
national airspace must be such that it does not have any detrimental impact on the 
safety and efficiency of airspace operations in the current ATM environment. The UAS 
operating in the national airspace must at least meet the safety and operational 
standards of manned aircrafts. Thus, UAS operations must be as safe as manned 
aircraft insofar as they must not present or create a greater hazard to persons, 
property, vehicles or vessels, whilst in the air or ground, than that attributed to the 
operations of manned aircraft of equivalent class or category (CAP 722). The principle 
of a minimum level of safety objectives in terms of regulations, engineering and 
training standards, general flight rules of air and operational practices equivalent to 
conventionally piloted aircrafts has proven difficult to achieve for UAS manufacturers 
and operators. Thereby the UAS are operating under significant restrictions by 
inhibiting their flight within un-segregated airspace and over populated areas. 
Presently, the aviation authorities use two different mechanisms to allow UAS access 
in the national airspace and they are: 
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● Special permission to fly: A special permit to fly for individual UAS is currently 
the primary means by which civil operators of unmanned aircraft are accessing 
the national airspace. A specific airworthiness certificate in the experimental 
category of civil aircraft that is subject to operational restrictions has to be 
obtained for civil UAS operators. The UAS flight operations under this approval 
mechanism cannot be performed for commercial purposes. Majority of UAS 
operating in the national airspace could be under this approval mechanism, 
since there are not many certification specifications that exist at the moment. 
The conditions under which the UAS is eligible for a permit to fly may differ 
slightly from country to country. 
● Certificate of Authorisation (COA): A certificate of authorisation is provided on 
a case-to-case basis to particular UAS primarily for public aircraft operations in 
the civil airspace. The Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) permits 
public agencies and organisations to operate a particular aircraft, for a particular 
purpose, in a particular area. The COA allows an operator to use a defined 
block of airspace and includes special safety provisions unique to the proposed 
operation. The COA is aimed to ensure a level of safety equivalent to that 
manned aircraft. The conditions and limitations imposed on UAS operations by 
the aviation authorities are to ensure they do not adversely impact the safety of 
other aviation operations. Some examples of the current users include the 
military, law enforcement, other governmental agencies and public universities. 
The COA application includes aspects on airworthiness, flight operations and 
personnel qualifications. COAs are usually issues for specific period – ranging 
from one or two years in most cases. 
 
The access to UAS in the national airspace currently is based on many 
operational restrictions to their flight. The permission to fly UAS in national airspace is 
issued to individual UAS subject to several operational limitations imposed on UAS 
flight. A COA or permit to fly is provided by aviation authorities based on following 
general and operating principles: 
● COA allows UAS to be operated in a restricted area of the 
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airspace/segregated airspace through the use of temporary Danger Areas 
(DAs) and also includes certain provisions unique to the proposed 
operation. For example, a COA may impose UAS flight only under VFR 
and/or in daylight hours, normally issued for a certain time period. 
● For flights outside of segregated airspace, most COAs issued require 
continuous communication with the ATS provider and also include carrying 
of special equipment (e.g. SSR transponder) mandated for manned aircraft 
in certain classifications of airspace.  
● When operating outside of segregated airspace, UAS must have an 
approved method of aerial collision avoidance (to avoid collision with other 
airspace users). Without an acceptable detect and avoid system, the 
operation of UAS outside segregated airspace is constrained by restrictions 
detailed below that are normally applied. The following restrictions are those 
applied in the UK airspace: 
➢ Within visual line-of sight of the remote pilot/Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
(RPA) observer of the particular UA, or a maximum range of 500 
metres, whichever is less. 
➢ Cannot be flown in controlled airspace without prior permission of 
appropriate ATS provider. 
➢ Within a height not exceeding 400 feet above the earth’s surface. 
➢ Cannot be flown in/near any aerodrome traffic area without prior 
permission from aerodrome in charge or appropriate ATC unit. 
➢ Within 50 metres of any person, vehicle, vehicle or structure not 
under the control of remote pilot; while during take-off or landing, the 
aircraft must not be flown within 30 metres of any person, unless that 
person is under the control of the remote pilot. 
● Safety requirements need to be considered such as including mechanisms 
or procedures in place for emergency situations such as land in the event 
of disruption to or failure of its control systems, loss of control or radio link.  
 
In US, the FAA presently issues COA to a public operator for a specific UA 
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activity. A comprehensive operational and technical review is carried out by the FAA 
before issuing COA. If necessary operational limitations or conditions are imposed as 
part of the approval process to ensure UA can operate safely with other airspace 
users. The operational restrictions usually are in the form of a prohibition of operations 
over populated areas and a requirement that the UAS can be constantly observed. 
FAA issued an updated guidance document titled “Interim Operational Approval 
Guidance 08-01” that contains operational guidelines for both public and civil UAS 
operations. The typical COA application approval process is completed within 60 
business days of receipt by the FAA and is valid for up to two years in many cases.  
According to the aviation policy FAA only accepts COA applications for public 
UAS operations. Civil UAS can get a special certificate under the experimental 
category with the limitations imposed for that category in FAR part 21 and additional 
provisions set by the FAA, specifying operational restrictions. The procedures and 
requirements for issuing such a certificate have been provided by the FAA in “Order 
8130.34 Airworthiness Certification of UASs”. The other mechanism through which 
civil UAS operations in the US can take place is by determination by secretary of 
transportation that airworthiness certification is not required and an exemption from 
the FAA’s regulations is approved. The FAA modernisation and Reform Act 2012 
(FMRA) created the specific authority for the secretary of transportation to determine 
whether an airworthiness certificate would be required for certain civil, including 
commercial, UAS operations. Civil UAS operator can petition for exemption pursuant 
to section 333, after the receipt of which the FAA begins its approval process. Firstly, 
FAA determines whether the request for exemption meets the section 333 elements 
and provides a recommendation to secretary of transportation on whether he/she 
should make a determination that an airworthiness certificate is not required. 
Secondly, FAA determines the proposed operations would not adversely affect safety 
and whether the operations would be in public interest. If these conditions are satisfied, 
the FAA issues an exemption valid for two years to the petitioner with conditions and 
limitations on proposed operations to ensure safety. Since 2012 FAA has been using 
this process to authorise civil UAS operations in national airspace. This has provided 
significant relief for UAS operators because FAA has issued very little airworthiness 
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certificated for UAS in the past. As of June 2015, FAA has issued nearly 700 
exemptions to allow civil UAS operations using this process.  
Model aircraft may be flown in the national airspace without a need for FAA 
authorisation. The FMRA prohibits the promulgation of any rule or regulation regarding 
model aircraft by the FAA. The FMRA also specifically defines a model aircraft and 
only those which satisfy these criteria can be considered as model aircraft. The act 
defines the tem “model aircraft” as an unmanned aircraft that is (1) capable of 
sustained flight in the atmosphere, (2) flown within visual line of sight of the person 
operating the aircraft, and (3) flown for hobby or recreational purposes. Also, the 
aircraft must meet the following additional statutory criteria: 
● The aircraft is operated in accordance with a community-based set of 
safety guidelines and within the programming of a nationwide 
community-based organization;  
● The aircraft weighs no more than 55 pounds unless otherwise certified 
through a design,  
● The aircraft is operated in a manner that does not interfere with and gives 
way to any manned aircraft; and  
● When flown within 5 miles of an airport, the aircraft operator provides the 
airport operator and the airport air traffic control tower (when an air traffic 
facility is located at the airport) with prior notice of the operation. 
 
In Europe, the national regulators retain the authority to certify UAS that weigh 
below 150 kg [31]. The CAA (Civil Aviation Authority) in UK is the first organisation in 
Europe so far which has come up with a guidance document for the civil UAS 
operations in national airspace. The CAP 722 document issued by the CAA highlights 
the safety requirements to be met by UAS, in terms of airworthiness and operational 
standards, before they can be allowed to fly in the UK airspace [31]. It also provides 
assistance to those who are involved with the development of UAS towards the route 
of certification, in order to ensure that all UAS operators meet the required standards 
and regulations. It sets out the primary factors for consideration in the development of 
UAS so that they will have a better chance of getting certification to fly UAS in UK 
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airspace.  
The current view of CAA as outlined in CAP 722 is that the UAS must meet at 
least the same level of safety and operational standards as manned aircrafts for them 
to be able to fly in national airspace [31]. The integration of UAS should not require 
any changes to the rules of the air or any such special provision is likely to be made. 
It also suggests that UAS must be as safe as manned aircraft of equivalent class or 
category in so far as not to present or create a greater hazard to persons, property, 
vehicles or vessels while in the air or on the ground [31]. 
According to the latest version of CAP 722, in UK the non-military state 
unmanned aircraft must have a certificate of airworthiness or a permit to fly issued by 
the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) under the Air Navigation Order (ANO) unless it is a 
small unmanned aircraft (UA weighing not more that 20 Kg) or it is an UA of mass 20 
-150 Kg with an exemption from the ANO issued by the CAA [31]. Small UA can be 
flown without any prior approvals however under a certain set of conditions. The set 
of conditions include flying at a maximum altitude of 400 ft. above the surface, not 
permitted to fly within an aerodrome traffic zone or in controlled airspace unless prior 
permission is obtained from the CAA and also a prohibition on flight for purposes of 
aerial work without the permission of the CAA [31].  
Australia also has similar programs run by CASA (Civil Aviation Safety 
Authority) to regulate UAS operations in their airspace [51]. Australia was the first 
country in the world to regulate remotely piloted aircraft, with the first operational 
regulation for unmanned aircraft in 2002. The regulation referred to as Civil Aviation 
Safety Regulation (CASR) Part 101 is being reviewed and CASA aims to modernise it 
into CASR Part 102 which is expected to be completed by 2016. The CASA waivers 
the certification requirements for micro light UAS (weight below 0.1 kg) and require 
rest of the light UAS to operate away from populated areas at a maximum altitude of 
400 ft. [52]. The ARCAA (Australian Research Centre for Aerospace Automation) was 
founded in order to facilitate UAS research and certification by providing simulation, 
development and testing facilities with regards to all aspects of UAS operations [52].  
In Japan, the use of UAS for civil applications started almost 25 years ago [9]. 
Japan first developed and introduced unmanned helicopters that were used as 
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efficient way of supplementing the manned helicopters to spray pesticides on rice 
fields. Later, as unmanned helicopters namely Yamaha Rmax models became more 
useful and changes in social environment surrounding agriculture changed, 
unmanned helicopters use surged for agricultural purposes mainly for spraying 
pesticides. The fleet of Yamaha Rmax model has been steadily rising with 2000 in 
service by 2002 [10] and the use of unmanned platform for agriculture is immense, 
which are now expanding into other applications. These include aerial seeding for 
forestation and tree planting, eradicate insects that cause harm to pine trees, and 
observation of geological features during natural disasters such as landslides, 
earthquakes etc. [9]. Japanese civil aviation authorities have issued UAS certification 
procedures, which allow vehicle weighing up to 50 kg to fly over unpopulated areas 
[9]. The current operational rules are such that the unmanned aircraft are such that 
they can be flown at or below 250 m above ground except near airports. However, a 
recent incident where a drone (about 50 cm wide) which was equipped with a camera 
and a plastic container with liquid believed to have a tiny amount of radioactive material 
was found on the roof of Prime Minister’s office. This sparked security concerns and 
a need to strengthen the security of important facilities, rules of UAS operations and 
legal regulations surrounding their use. The new regulations that have been introduced 
for the operation of UAS, prohibit civilians from flying them above or around a 300-
metre radius around the important government buildings (such as Prime Minister’s 
Office, Imperial Palace etc.), nuclear power plants and other sensitive areas.  
1.7 Historical	context	of	introduction	of	new	technology	into	
Aviation	
Unlike many other sectors, aviation is a highly safety conscious domain. The main 
reason for it is the perception of risk to the benefits by society is different. Because the 
relationship between benefit and the primary individual at risk (people on ground and 
inside the aircraft) is not as apparent or difficult to show when compared to other 
domains [53]. Hence the acceptability of risks against its benefits by society is 
different. This means that introduction of new technology into aviation is a slow and 
difficult process. It must be ensured that it does not have any detrimental impact on 
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their operations in the current Air Traffic Environment.    
The past history of aviation substantiates the point that the introduction of new 
technology and corresponding regulations has been slow and long process. It is also 
being seen that many of the new regulations adopted in the past has been more of a 
reactionary process where major incident or accidents have forced or prompted the 
regulations to be brought in until after their occurrence.  
A brief look at the history of the aviation with a few instances where the major 
regulations have followed a reactionary approach is described. The Grand Canyon 
crash in 1956 triggered the introduction of new terminal area aircraft speed limit and 
mandatory use of TACAN (Tactical Air Communication and Navigation) distance-
measuring equipment in the airports [53]. There were also recommendations to 
introduce the computer-generated displays for the Air Traffic Controllers to be able to 
visualize the traffic information better. However, this recommendation was not adopted 
until after a crash in 1965, which could have been a worst crash in aviation history, 
then prompted the aviation authorities to act in order to introduce computers generated 
displays as supporting aids for controllers. This was the beginning for the introduction 
of Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), where individual centres could keep 
watch on all traffic within major metropolitan areas [53].  
The history of introduction of regulation of airborne collision avoidance system 
shows that the initial interest in the development of a collision avoidance system dates 
back to the mid 1950’s when an accident occurred between two US carriers over the 
Grand Canyon [53]. There were several approaches to collision avoidance that were 
explored before the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) narrowed to the use of 
Beacon Collision Avoidance System (BCAS). Only after a second mid-air-collision 
near San Diego in 1978 and then a third such mid-air collision in 1986 near Cerritos 
which prompted a legislation to be passed which mandated the FAA to implement an 
airborne collision avoidance by the end of 1992 [53]. The BCAS effort was expanded 
and its name was changes to Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) 
[53]. 
The perception of risk to the benefits by the public as well as the impact of an 
accident that can have on the public sentiments must also be taken into account when 
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new technologies are brought into the aviation domain [54]. Thus, safety is of highest 
priority because of which meticulous risk assessment and rigorous testing are required 
before they can be certified to enter the air traffic environment.   
However, unlike the past, the introduction of unmanned aircraft brings in entirely 
new concept and set of technologies associated with it. Fundamentally the presence 
of pilot remotely on the ground rather than the aircraft system in a UAS, presents a 
paradigm change from the basic concept of the airspace users that access the national 
airspace presently. Thus, the need to introduce new technologies and regulations for 
UAS operations has been slow and is also envisaged to be a gradual process in the 
near future [2]. 
1.8 Positioning	the	Study	
This section combines the knowledge gained in the background and literature review 
chapters to position the study and further substantiate the research objectives. In order 
to narrow down the research area there were various factors considered in the process 
of selecting the specific areas of the research and the methodology which are also 
discussed here. 
1.8.1 Factors	influencing	the	research	approach	
There are a number of important aspects that emerged from the background study 
and literature review which significantly influenced the research approach. These 
factors are broadly related with the aims of the research, gaps in academic research 
and the industry research needs. 
● The stipulated research has a broad focus and in view of the research 
degree in the Systems Engineering, the approach to the research was 
based on a systems perspective. The literature review looks at a system 
level analysis of the major issues involved with the integration of UAS in the 
national airspace. 
● Thales, as an industrial partner in the UK industry-led consortium 
programme was responsible for Autonomy and Decision-making work 
package. Hence the research focussed on the specific issue of UAS Sense 
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and Avoid after the system level study of all the major issues related to UAS 
integration in non-segregated airspace in the literature review.  
● Most of the academic literature and industry related research on UAS Sense 
and Avoid were based on UAS using airborne sensors to avoid collisions 
with other aircrafts except a few research programmes in US(US Army) and 
Australia (Smart Skies Project) which focussed on the ground based 
sensors for UAS Sense and Avoid. The lack of research on ground based 
sense and Avoid in Europe was also a factor in pursuing further research in 
GBSAA system. 
● Important to look at architectures and understand the current ATM structure 
and its evolution in order to have a phased approach to UAS integration in 
non-segregated airspace.  
● In order to fulfil the degree regulations, it is necessary the research should 
make both academic and industrial contribution. 
● The industry needs stipulated that this research should not only consider 
the system’s technical success but also lead to a system implementation 
that is commercially viable.  
1.8.2 Scope	
The various factors outlined in the previous section influenced the scope of the 
research.  The scope of the research is as follows: 
● The problem of UAS Sense and Avoid has several approaches to solve 
which have varying technology readiness, commercial viability, 
development risks and timescales for operational implementation. 
Hence this research focuses on a Sense and Avoid approach to 
integrate small UAs (i.e. less than 30 kg) as a near-to-medium term 
integration alternative and the development of a proof of concept for the 
same, based on the academic gaps in understanding and the needs of 
the sponsoring company (Thales). 
● The research considers only the evaluation of proof of concept in a 
simulation environment and not the wider validation of the concept 
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thorough field trails. 
● System architectures looks at the architectures only but it was part of 
DANSE project which looked at end-to-end system engineering toolset 
for developing complex systems. 
 
Further to the scope of the research outlined above, there are several constraints and 
limitations that influenced the research approach adopted: 
 
● The proof of concept system development was conceived as pre-
operational demonstration system for evaluating different interrelated 
aspects of the sense and avoids system.  
● The Sense and Avoid Display concept was developed using a 
Commercial Off-the Shelf (COTS) Air Traffic Control display.  As this was 
COTS Air Traffic Management System software, the changes that could 
be made to the aircraft track information display format and air track data 
processing were limited.  
● The UAS simulation environment that is part of the overall UAS sense 
and avoid concept demonstration system was not conceived as part of 
a complete pre-operational system for evaluation and proving the 
concept solution. This was a basic prototype display test environment 
and a full scale UAS Ground Control Station (GCS) simulation 
environment which would be needed for full scale operational 
demonstration of the sense and avoid system concept.  
● The limitation of using a basic UAS GCS simulation environment is a 
product of the resources made available to this research and also 
logistical difficulties leading to inability in accessing Thales system 
laboratory facilities consisting of a full scale UAS GCS demonstrator 
(developed as part of Autonomous Systems Technology Related 
Airborne Evaluation & Assessment (ASTRAEA) programme). 
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1.9 Summary	
The literature review has provided background information on UAS and also outlined 
academic literature on the various aspects related to UAS such as UAS classifications, 
their market potential and currently regulatory environment for UAS. Currently UAS 
are restricted to certain segregated areas of the NAS and the integration into the 
current Air Traffic Management System has not yet occurred. A high-level system 
study of the key issues involved with the inability of UAS to access the non-segregated 
airspace was described. The academic literature review combined with the industrial 
requirements of the research enabled in narrowing down the research problem to 
focus further research on two specific areas which were: A System-of-Systems (SoS) 
architecture analysis of the problem of UAS integration into NAS and UAS Sense and 
Avoid.  
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Chapter	2: System-of-Systems	Overview	
2.1 Introduction	to	System-of-Systems	
Recently there has been a rapid growth in the inter-connected nature of systems, 
whose constituents are themselves complex. The ubiquitous nature of software 
intensive systems has meant that software is embedded into systems ranging from 
household appliances, automobiles, to large complex systems such as air 
transportation; which has in turn accelerated the growth of inter-connectedness of 
these systems. In its elemental form the term SoS is defined as a collection of entities 
that are in themselves systems; which are distributed, evolve over time and have 
different kinds of hardware and software working together to achieve a common goal 
[55]. Each element of the SoS is designed to achieve well-substantiated goals even if 
they are detached from the SoS [55]. Some of the examples of SoS are transportation 
systems, disaster management system, water management systems, healthcare 
systems, space systems and many others.   The SoS concept presents a high-level 
viewpoint of the whole and describes the interactions between each of the 
independent systems [55]. This view of systems as SoS enables to obtain higher 
capabilities and performance than would possible with a traditional system view [55]. 
The origin of the SoS concepts dates back to the period of 1960’s – 1970’s, 
which provided early insights into the concept of SoS as we know now [56]. Berry 
[1964] and Ackoff [1971] provided the earliest references in literature to terms such as 
“systems within systems” or “system of systems”. Although the term SoS was not used 
extensively during the early years, SoS were being designed and developed. The SoS 
concept was used primarily by the US defence community to design and develop SoS. 
Some of the SoS that were conceptualised and developed during this period were 
Anti-Submarine Warfare System used during cold war, Integrated Undersea 
Surveillance System, Sound Surveillance System, Global Positioning System (GPS) 
and Military Command and Control Centres [56]. Also during the 1970’s the concept 
for the modern-day battlefield emerged, where the battlefield consists of autonomous 
vehicles interacting with each other and the human managing them from 
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geographically distant location from the battlefield. All the intelligent vehicles would be 
managed in a way that enables them to work together to achieve a common goal.  
There are numerous definitions of SoS based on the literature survey, however 
the term System-of-Systems does not have a clear and accepted definition as noted 
by Maier [58]. Here are only five of many potential definitions of SoS: 
 
Definition 1: Defence Acquisition Guide [57], [58] 
A SoS is defined as a set or arrangement of systems that results when independent 
and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities 
[DoD, 2004]. 
 
Definition 2: Sage and Cuppan [57], [58] 
System of Systems exists when there is a presence of a majority of the following five 
characteristics: operational and managerial independence, geographic distribution, 
emergent behaviour, and evolutionary development. 
 
Definition 3: Jamshidi [57], [58]; Carlock and Fenton [57], [58] 
System-of-Systems are large-scale concurrent and distributed systems that are 
comprised of complex systems. 
 
Definition 4: Manthorpe [57], [58] 
In relation to joint war-fighting, system of systems is concerned with interoperability 
and synergism of Command, Control, Computers, Communications, and Information 
(C4I) and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Systems. 
 
Definition 5:  Pei [57], [58] 
Systems of Systems integration is a method to pursue development, integration, 
interoperability, and optimization of systems to enhance performance in future 
battlefield scenarios. 
 
Definition 6: Carlock and Fenton [57], [58] 
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Enterprise Systems of Systems Engineering is focussed on coupling traditional 
systems engineering activities with enterprise activities of strategic planning and 
investment analysis. 
 
Most of the definitions mentioned above provide a definition of SoS that is 
applicable to the field of military and engineering. Among the several definitions 
described, Sage and Cuppan [57], [58] provide a more concise definition that is 
applicable to varied fields. However, none of the definition address all the 
characteristics of SoS and there is a need for the development of a clear and 
generalised definition of SoS [57], [58].  
There is an emerging class of systems whose constituents are large-scale 
systems in their own right, however not all of them are System-of-Systems. The 
taxonomic grouping of Systems-of-Systems implies that they are distinct classes 
within systems. The term “Systems-of-Systems” does not have a widely accepted 
definition but there is a useful taxonomic distinction between various complex, large-
scale systems that are referred to as System-of Systems. Maier states that SoS should 
be distinguished from large, but monolithic systems, by the independence of their 
components, their evolutionary nature, emergent behaviours and a geographic extent 
that limits the interaction of their components to information exchange [58]. Maier 
argues that the taxonomic distinction of SoS is based on their unique characteristics 
of operational and managerial independence of the system components and not the 
commonly cited characteristics of SoS such as complexity of systems and geographic 
distribution [58]. Based on Maier [58] and previous works of Shenhar and Eisner [58], 
the significant characteristics of SoS are as follows: 
❑ Operational Independence of the elements: The constituent systems can 
usefully operate independently when disassembled from the SoS. 
❑ Managerial Independence of elements: The constituent systems are acquired 
and integrated separately but maintain operational independence to fulfil their 
own purposes. 
❑ Evolutionary Development: The constituent systems evolve over time, as the 
functions of the component systems are changed, added or removed. 
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❑ Emergent Behaviour: The SoS exhibits functions and capabilities that are 
beyond those of the constituent systems which are referred to as Emergent 
behaviour.  
Emergence is defined as: 
“Emergent system behaviour can be viewed as a consequence of the 
interactions and relationships between system elements rather than the 
behaviour of individual elements. It emerges from a combination of the 
behaviour and properties of the system elements and the systems structure or 
allowable interactions between the elements, and may be triggered or 
influenced by a stimulus from the systems environment.” [59] 
Emergence is a main objective of SoS as capabilities and functions are 
generated by interaction of the constituent systems, however 
unanticipated/unintended emergent behaviour is a risk to SoS that can have a 
detrimental impact on the SoS. 
❑ Geographic Distribution: The constituent systems are separated from each 
other over large geographic areas. 
❑ Collaborative: SoS is collaboratively integrated systems in which the 
constituent systems collaborate with each other to achieve a common goal. The 
constituent systems may also compete with each other during normal 
operation.  
 
A basic SoS model can be outlined based on the definitions and characteristics 
of SoS mentioned in the above paragraphs. The figure 2.1 shows the basic SoS model, 
which depicts the SoS is comprised of system elements that are themselves systems 
[55]. The system elements have their own purpose of existing, address own needs, 
solve their own problems. They also have their own emergent properties resulting from 
interaction of sub-systems within the system elements. However, the system elements 
are part of the larger SoS that enables achieve higher capabilities and performance. 
The SoS has its own needs, solve its own problems and has emergent properties, 
resulting from the interaction of systems within the SoS. The objectives and purpose 
of existence of the system elements within the SoS may not always be aligned with 
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the objectives and purpose of SoS. Hence the need to maintain autonomy while at the 
same time operating within the SoS context greatly increases the complexity of an 
SoS.  
Many of the examples of SoS in operation today have some components of the 
SoS that already exists, also commonly referred to as legacy systems. The legacy 
systems have been interconnected with other new component systems much later into 
their system lifecycle to spontaneously evolve into a SoS over time, in order to achieve 
a set of high-level objectives and capabilities. As a result, many of SoS have 
developed and evolved without concern for SoS design considerations. Many SoS that 
exist may not be recognized and treated as SoS (NATO SoS Characterisation and 
Types). However, based on a recognised taxonomy of SoS, SoS can take different 
forms. SoS can be categorised into four types based on the levels of authority and 
responsibility exercised between the SoS and its constituent systems. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 A basic SoS model [55] 
Each of the types is as shown in figure and are discussed below [58], [55]: 
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➢ Directed:  Directed SoS are integrated SoS that are developed and managed to 
fulfil specific purposes. Directed SoS are centrally managed and evolved. While 
the component systems in a directed SoS maintain the ability to operate 
independently, however the normal mode of operations of the component systems 
are centrally managed to align with central purpose of the SoS. The relationships 
between the SoS and the constituent systems in directed SoS are depicted in figure 
2.2. The figure shows that operator/owner O2 owns systems S2 and S3, whereas 
O3 owns system S4. Operators/Owners O2 and O3 are highly controlled by a 
central managing operator O1. In this type of SoS O1 directs O2 and O3 in terms 
of design specification and operation of the systems owned by O2 and O3, hence 
referred to as directed SoS. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Interactions between SoS and constituent systems in a Directed SoS 
  73 
➢ Virtual SoS: Virtual SoS is a type of SoS that lacks a central management authority 
and have no commonly agreed purpose for the SoS. The constituent systems in a 
virtual SoS may not be necessarily known and also the emergent behaviours 
exhibited from Virtual SoS rely upon relatively invisible mechanisms to maintain 
the SoS. The best example of a Virtual SoS is the Internet, where all the component 
systems (products/services) are integrated in an ad-hoc manner. Figure 2.3 shows 
the relationships between the systems and the SoS in a Virtual SoS. As the figure 
shows in a virtual type of SoS there is no central management entity, no overall 
goal or contract between operators. The operators O1, O2 and O3 access other 
system through their own systems which interoperate by recognised standards or 
protocols. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Interactions between SoS and constituent systems in a Virtual SoS 
➢ Collaborative SoS: In Collaborative SoS, the constituent systems interact 
voluntarily to fulfil agreed central purposes of the SoS. Collaborative SoS do not 
have a central authority, rather the systems collectively decide based on 
agreements among the systems alone on how to interoperate between 
themselves, by developing, enforcing and maintaining standards. An example of 
  74 
Collaborative SoS might be the regional area crisis response system where each 
agency that is involved in the first responder situation is responsible for its own 
systems and have an agreed protocol for interacting between the agencies to 
respond to the situation. The relationships between the constituent systems and 
the Collaborative SoS are as shown in Figure 2.4. The figure shows systems 
owners O1, O2 and O3 operate their own systems and collaborate with others 
realize a shared benefit. The collaboration between system owners in a 
collaborative SoS is based on a mutual agreement with no overall management 
entity controlling it. 
 
Figure 2.4 Interactions between SoS and constituent systems in a Collaborative SoS 
➢ Acknowledged SoS: Acknowledged SoS is a type of SoS with recognised 
objectives, a designated manager and resources for the SoS. The constituent 
systems in the Acknowledged SoS maintain their independent ownership, 
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purposes, management and resources. These types of SoS essentially fall 
between directed and collaborative SoS.  Figure 2.5 shows the relationship 
between the SoS and the constituent systems in the Acknowledged SoS. The 
figure shows that in an Acknowledged SoS, the system owner O1 has a contractual 
relationship with O2 (owns S2) and O3(owns S3 and S4), and has less control over 
the systems owned by them. The central managing entity O1 in this type of SoS 
must rely more on influence on direct choice of systems and operation. The most 
common examples of Acknowledged SoS can be found in the military. For 
instance, the military command and control SoS can transition from collaborative 
SoS to an acknowledged SoS to address a new capability that arises. In order to 
fulfil the new top-level mission objectives, the SoS would tend to be formed with 
ensemble of existing systems with the purpose of improving the way the systems 
work together to achieve new agreed capability. The designated SoS manager 
typically balances the top-level mission objectives with the objectives of the 
constituent systems that participate in the SoS not by controlling/directing the 
constituent system but by influencing the constituent systems to meet the purposes 
of the SoS.  
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Figure 2.5 Interactions between SoS and constituent systems in an Acknowledged 
SoS 
2.2 System-of-Systems	(SoS)	Analysis	
The several definitions and characteristics of SoS described in Section 2.2 help to 
illustrate the complexity of these systems, which affect the way systems engineering 
can be applied to SoS. Hence the Systems engineers when developing SoS must 
approach the design process with that complexity in mind. One of the important jobs 
of the systems engineers apart from defining the problem is to partition the problem 
into smaller, more manageable ones and make critical decisions about the solution 
[55].  One of the most critical decisions to be made by systems engineers is the system 
architecture [55]. While designing any system, the first stage in the design process is 
the development of the system architecture. System architecture can be defined as - 
the fundamental organisation of a system embodied in its components, their 
relationship to each other and to the environment, and the principles guiding its design 
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and evolution [ANSI/IEEE-1472, 2000]. In this context, it is the primary role of the 
systems architect to decide on the system structure during initial stage of design 
process, although at this early stage of the system development all the characteristics 
and consequences of the architecture may not be known. However, at this early stage 
of the design process, it is possible for the system architect to produce a system 
architecture that maximizes the capability of the system to meet user needs, while 
minimizing the unintended consequences. 
2.2.1 Architecture	Design	Process	
The basic process of architecture design and its principles are the same whether 
architecting a simple system or a large complex system that consists of a number of 
independent systems interacting with each other. The process of architecture design 
has been well documented; it starts with recognition of a need, definition of the problem 
and proposing a solution strategy [55]. It continues with the synthesis phase where 
various solution designs are developed and then all these alternatives are evaluated 
to eventually arrive at a solution. The process ends with the solution description which 
involves an architectural model of the system to be designed. On the face of it the 
process of architecting a system looks pretty straightforward as it seems the design 
process flows logically from the customer needs and requirements. However, the 
process is complicated due to the fact that there can be needs that are contradictory 
and also multiple stakeholders can have competing requirements. Thus, the Systems 
architect has to balance these competing priorities which require design compromises 
to be made. There is no simple method or way to be followed to make the necessary 
design compromises. There is, however a well-defined process for architecting 
systems and a comprehensive set of design principles that must be considered when 
architecting any system. 
The various stages involved in the architecture design process are as shown in 
figure and are briefly described here [55]: 
 
Analysis  
The first stage of the architecture design process is the analysis of the needs. It is 
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important that the needs are well understood in order to produce an effective design. 
The needs can be communicated concisely and thoroughly through user 
requirements, statement of needs and/or operational concept descriptions. But it 
hardly occurs that all the needs of the user are well understood by the system architect. 
Among the stated needs, there is the possibility that some user requirements may be 
extremely contradictory and also commonly some of the needs may also be based on 
perception rather than real needs. The role of the systems architect in the analysis 
phase involves fully understanding all the needs including non-stated needs, remove 
the extremely contradictory and non-feasible requirements and also separate the real 
needs from the perceived ones stated by the user. Also, another important role of the 
systems architect in the analysis phase is not to overlook understanding solution 
constraints, which can have significant effect on the design. In certain cases, the 
design can be driven by constraints as much as the needs. This is particularly true for 
SoS, which consists of systems that have their own needs and solve their specific 
problems. The solutions to the SoS needs are based generally on existing systems 
and their infrastructure. This certainly provides rich readily available resources from 
which to explore new solutions, however this may also constraint the solution space 
to produce an effective design.  
 
Synthesis  
The next phase in the architecture design phase is the solution synthesis. This is the 
phase where all the needs and constraints are merged together to into solution 
designs. The design synthesis phase is where the creative and innovative 
characteristics of the system architect are brought to the fore. It is a process of truly 
human endeavour. The role of system architect during the synthesis phase is to make 
critical decisions on how to balance between the characteristics that are important and 
those which can be compromised to produce effective solution designs. While 
designing a system in the real world, the problem is usually large where multiple 
designers with wide range of skills needed to solve the problem tend to work together 
from geographically distributed locations. However, in the case of designing a SoS, 
the decision decisions made by the system architect has to contend with many other 
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factors such as operations and infrastructure of existing systems, environment context 
(i.e. politics, economics) and other risks along with the usual challenges of space and 
time.  The synthesis phase ends with system architect coming up with a set of solution 
alternatives so that they can be evaluated by comparing the solutions with each other. 
In order to evaluate these solutions, it requires that the solutions have to be modelled 
in a way that will support evaluation. The output of the synthesis phase is a set of 
alternative solutions that are modelled to a sufficient level to enable the evaluation 
stage to proceed.  
 
Evaluation   
The final stage in the design process is the evaluation phase. The primary aim of this 
phase is to evaluate the alternative solutions that resulted from the design synthesis 
stage. The evaluation of multiple alternative solutions is a crucial part of the 
architecture design process. However, the design evaluation process is not only 
concerned with evaluation of alternatives; there are other criteria’s to be considered 
as well. The most significant factors among them are cost and capability which drive 
the selection and further refinement of design solution. Evaluation stage in the 
architecture design process does not only include the evaluation of the alternative 
solutions with respect to a set of design criteria and down selection to a single “best” 
alternative, but this is the stage where the design optimisation/refinement occurs. 
Design optimisation can be driven by the requirement to meet the cost and 
performance targets outlined by the customer need. Similarly, critical design 
refinement that may require a major architecture design rework can be caused due to 
implementation and technical feasibility issues. The output of the architecture design 
process is the description of solution. The solution must be described based on three 
critical aspects. The first aspect is the architecture model – basic structure of solution 
- which clearly communicates the solution to those who implement the solution and to 
the users. The second aspect is to outline the lower-level system requirements (at the 
sub-system level) including interface requirements which may affect the design and 
implementation of the system elements within the architecture.  
The final aspect is the implementation concept, which describes the strategy 
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for implementation of the solution concept. The architecture design process is an 
iterative process and it is difficult to determine when the design has been completed. 
This is because design refinement and implementation issues occur throughout the 
system lifecycle. However, the system designers have to decide on a baseline high-
level architecture design so that the design of the lower-level entities of the 
architecture can proceed. Hence the goal of the architecture design process is to 
perform enough analysis, design synthesis and evaluation so as enable the system 
designers to decide on baseline architecture to allow the next stages of design 
refinement and implementation to proceed, with minimal risk for need of a significant 
architecture rework.  
2.2.2 Architecture	Design	Principles	
While following the architecture design process for architecting a system there are a 
set of guiding principles that exist and need to be taken into account. The four guiding 
architecture design principles have been outlined by Mo jamshidi, are based on the 
comprehensive set of principles laid out by Mayhall that can be applied to all types of 
engineering design [55]. The four architecture design principles are [55]: 
➢ Needs often compete - The nature of needs is that they have a tendency to 
compete. A complete set of needs often impose a competing set of criteria on 
design solutions. The systems designer has to reconcile with these competing 
needs and balance between competing needs to produce an effective design 
solution.  The trade-off involves prioritising one need to be satisfied to an 
acceptable level by sacrificing the optimal satisfaction level of a competing need. 
For example, in a car need for improving safety and minimising cost can compete 
with each other. Similarly, the need for fuel efficiency and power can also be a 
difficult balance to achieve effectively while designing a car.  
➢ Needs change over time – The system development lifecycle is time consuming. 
Most systems take time to design, implement, test and deploy. It is perfectly 
possible that some of the needs defined at the design phase may have changed 
during the operational lifecycle of the system. This may be due to several factors 
such as expectation of users may have changed over time or technology has 
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advanced within that time etc.  As the size and complexity of system grows so does 
the time to design and build these systems. The most important needs are those 
that are present during the prime of the system lifecycle. Hence it is important 
aspect to keep in mind for system designers when architecting systems. 
➢ Availability of resources constraints solution space – The availability of resources 
is necessary for the design, development, implementation, operation and 
maintenance of all systems. The most critical resource that has a significant impact 
on the design solution is money. As the size and complexity of the system 
increases so does the increase the capital required to design, build and operate 
these systems. However, money is not the only resource that can considerably 
constrain the solution space for system designers. Other resources that are 
important for an effective design are availability of knowledge and skill as well as 
the necessary technology infrastructure, which are especially relevant for 
architecting SoS.  
➢ Design compromise is necessary – The result of following the above three 
principles, leads inherently to the final principle of the necessity for design 
compromise. As has been described in the above three principles, design process 
is driven by needs – which have a tendency to compete and change over time – 
and is constrained by resources. Thus, compromise is necessary to generate an 
effective solution that balances the competing user needs and deal with the 
resource constraints such as cost, availability of human capital and technology. In 
the end, as all designs are a result of compromise, there is really no perfect design, 
just those that are less flawed than others.  
2.2.3 SoS	Architecture	Design	
The architecture design process and architecture design principles apply to systems 
architecting at all levels. However, SoS architecting presents its own set of challenges 
and requires some special considerations has to be kept in mind while architecting 
SoS solutions. Systems-of-Systems (SoS) architecture is primary concerned with 
architecture of systems whose constituent elements are themselves systems. The 
system elements of SoS may already exist having their own behaviour and operational 
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autonomy within the SoS. The SoS architect is unable to influence the operation or 
behaviour of constituent systems of SoS as they are outside the scope of architect’s 
control. Therefore, while architecting SoS the SoS architect must consider the 
characteristics of the component systems that comprise the SoS, the design of those 
systems is not be their main focus. The SoS architect must also consider the larger 
enterprise context of the SoS. The figure 2.6 shows the SoS context, which illustrates 
that normally systems that make up an enterprise interact with each other to enhance 
the capabilities of the enterprise. However, the core functions of systems comprised 
in the enterprise are not dependent on other systems which they interact with. A SoS 
can consist of collection of systems from one enterprise or in some instances it may 
consist of systems from multiple enterprises. Thus, it is necessary for the SoS architect 
to also consider multiple enterprises. The SoS architect need not consider the design 
of the enterprise as the enterprise architecture is the primary concern of the enterprise 
architect. Enterprise architecture is principally concerned with organizational 
resources (information, capital, and people and physical infrastructure) and process 
within an enterprise. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 SoS context [55] 
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The design process of SoS is not so different from that of design process of any 
other systems. However, the challenge of design in a SoS is to leverage the functional 
and performance capabilities of the constituent systems to achieve the desired SoS 
capability as well as ensure the characteristics of SoS across all its constituent 
systems meet the broad SoS user needs. The performance of a SoS is not only 
dependent on the performance capability of the constituent systems but on their 
combined end-to-end behaviour. To ensure effective performance of SoS, the 
constituent system elements must work together to achieve necessary end-to-end 
performance. The definition of boundaries in a SoS is not a static problem as in the 
case of engineering of a single system, but it is more ambiguous. It is necessary first 
to identify the capability needs of SoS and to then use these capability requirements 
to choose the systems that are expected to fulfil the SoS capability objectives. It is 
important to focus on these set of identified systems which will affect the SoS 
objectives and understand their interdependencies. As these constituent systems 
themselves have varied purposes, needs and structures, it is particularly important to 
analyse their capabilities and interrelationships and how will affect the SoS capability 
objectives. Although this process of identifying constituent systems is analogous to 
establishing boundaries for the SoS, but other individual systems in the enterprise can 
also affect the SoS. Thus, SoS boundaries can be ambiguous. (SE guide for SoS 
military OSD) 
The design of a SoS follows similar process as that of any individual system. 
The SoS systems engineer is responsible for initially translating the SoS capability 
objectives into high-level technical objectives of SoS, identify the constituent systems 
that affect the SoS objectives and define the current performance of the SoS. 
Consequently, the architecture structure of the SoS is developed, either a new SoS 
architecture is designed or it is evolved from an existing architecture of SoS. SoS 
architecture design is an iterative process similar to an individual system design 
process, where incremental decisions are made to satisfy the architectural and 
functional requirements. Architectural requirements are usually extracted and 
specified using quality sensitive scenarios. Scenarios have widely been used by the 
software community for a long time as a technique during requirements elicitation, 
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evaluation of design alternatives and performance modelling. Scenarios can be used 
effectively for specifying architecture requirements as they differ widely in their scope 
and breadth; and also, they are generally specific thereby enabling the user to 
understand their desired effect. The architectural requirements provide the criteria to 
be considered by SoS systems engineer while making architecture design choices. 
The SoS systems engineer identifies the design options and based on trade-offs to 
maintain the balance between system’s needs and constraints, decides from available 
design options that satisfies most of the desired non-functional requirements.  
The architecture of the SoS provides a technical framework for assessing the 
changes needed in systems for evolution of SoS. Whether the SoS systems engineer 
is beginning with a new architecture or an existing architecture, he/she needs to 
consider the current state of objectives and future plans of the constituent systems in 
the SoS as important factors in developing an architecture for the SoS.  The 
architecture of a SoS addresses the following aspects [SoS guide] [60]: 
● Concept of operations for the SoS 
● Encompasses the functions, relationships and dependencies of constituent 
systems, both internal and external 
● Includes end-to-end functional and data flow as well as communications 
 
The focus of the SoS architecture is on the relationships and interdependences 
of the constituent systems and not the specific aspects of the constituent systems. The 
SoS architecture is constrained by the capability objectives of the individual systems 
and extent to which they affect the SoS behaviour to meet the user needs. 
2.2.4 Architecture	Frameworks	
Numerous architecture frameworks exist for architecting systems. They have been 
developed and matured over the last several decades, to meet specific needs.  An 
architecture framework is an encapsulation of a minimum set of practices and 
requirements for artefacts that describe a system’s architecture [Mite.org]. Some of 
the architecture framework standards address different elements of the architecture 
process; however, there may be natural synergies among the frameworks. Also, some 
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of the standards are more suited to SoS architecture development than the others. 
The various architecture frameworks that are used widely are as listed below [55]: 
➢ The Zachman Framework – It was invented by John Zachman in 1980 for IBM [61]. 
This was the first architecture framework introduced that was applicable to SoS 
architecture. It is still in use today and has been the foundation from which most 
other architecture frameworks have been derived [55].  
➢ The Department of Defence Architecture Framework (DODAF) - The DODAF 
framework is primarily used by the US DoD for the development of architectures to 
facilitate the ability of DoD managers to make key decisions effectively [62]. It is 
maintained by the Office of the Secretary of Defence (OSD). Its structure has three 
core views namely Operational view, System view and Technical standards view; 
and several view products within each view [63]. The structure is well suited for 
describing architectures large scale systems and SoS with complex integration and 
interoperability issues [63]. DODAF is an established industry-standard 
architecture framework for defence and aerospace applications. Although it was 
designed for use in defence applications, it can also be used for commercial 
applications.  
➢ The Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework (MODAF) – The UK MOD 
MODAF based on DOAF. As it was derived from DODAF, MODAF structure has 
similar core views as DODAF along with two additional core views which are 
Strategic view and Acquisition view [55]. MODAF is also a very good framework 
for representing SoS architectures.  
➢ The Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework (FEA) – This architecture 
framework is used to represent enterprise architectures to support planning and 
decision-making information in all US federal government agencies except defence 
[64]. The structure of this framework is such that it provides an abstracted view of 
the enterprise at various levels of scope and detail [64]. FEA is maintained by the 
US Office of Management and Budget. FEA describes a suite of tools that enables 
to implement a common approach that enhances the effectiveness of the 
government by standardizing the development and use of enterprise architectures 
within and across federal agencies [55]. FEA can be used to represent SoS 
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architecture, however it is most useful for representing enterprise architectures. 
➢ The Rational Unified Process (RUP) –Rational Unified Process (RUP) is a software 
development process that is developed and maintained by IBM [65]. Its primary 
objective is to ensure the development of high-quality software that meets needs 
of end users, within a specified budget and time schedule [65]. It is widely used to 
represent software enterprise architectures, but it is not useful for representing 
specific architectures.   
➢ The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) – TOGAF is an Open Group 
Standard, which is a proven enterprise architecture methodology and framework 
[66]. It is used by world’s leading organizations to improve business efficiency. The 
Open Group Architecture Forum, comprising of more than 200 enterprises, 
develops and maintains the TOGAF standard [66]. The first TOGAF standard was 
published in 1995 based on the US DOD Technical Architecture Framework for 
Information Management (TAFIM) [66]. TOGAF has a primary focus on the 
architecture methodology – the process of how to architect without prescribing 
architecture describing artefacts [55]. Hence it more suitable to represent 
enterprise architectures rather than SoS architectures.  
 
Among the many architecture frameworks discussed, some of the architectures 
are most significant for representing SoS architectures. These architecture 
frameworks (DOADAF, MODAF & FEA) have a primary focus on the architecture 
description through a set of views, without a detailed description of methodology. They 
were all developed by government of United Kingdom and United States for their use 
within government agencies; however, they are freely available and also are well 
documented. Therefore, they can be used as standard architecture framework for 
representing SoS architectures across government organizations as well as private 
enterprises. 
2.2.5 Modelling	Language	
Once the decision on selecting the architecture development framework and 
methodology is made, it is also important to select the modelling technique to 
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represent the architecture structure and processes. SySML (Systems Modelling 
Language) is a comprehensive modelling language used for describing systems. It is 
an extension of the Unified Modelling Language (UML) and is better at representing 
system related problems. The UML is a standard modelling language widely used in 
the software community to represent software-intensive systems. It is more suited for 
modelling software architectures than system architectures. Hence, the International 
Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) and the OMG (Object Management 
Group) joint with other industry partners (IBM, Motorola, Airbus, Boeing etc.) to define 
a general-purpose modelling language based on UML to address Systems 
Engineering needs, in order to bridge the semantic gap between systems, software 
and other engineering disciplines. SySML was officially adopted by the OMG in 2006 
and there have been several updates since. SySML reuses a subset of UML2 and 
defines some new features. It introduces two new extensions namely requirements 
and Parametric diagram to address the limitations of the systems engineering in 
modelling non-software intensive systems.  
Presently, SySML is the standard modelling language used by systems 
engineering community for representing systems. However, until now there is no 
formal semantics specifically for SoS modelling and design languages. The primary 
modelling techniques for SoS currently comprises the use of architecture modelling 
languages such as UML and SySML to represent various SoS aspects. SySML can 
be used to represent SoS, its constituent systems and other entities through following 
diagrams: 
▪ Behavioural aspects 
▪ Constraints on physical and performance properties 
▪ Relationships between requirements 
▪ Allocations between behaviour, structure and constraints 
▪ Structural composition, interconnection and classifications 
2.3 Methodology	to	Architect	and	Analyse	SoS	
The above definitions and design considerations for SoS help to illustrate the complex 
nature of these systems and suggest that using traditional approaches are inadequate 
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to define the problem space. Using the conventional means to model and analyse SoS 
will be unsuitable or inappropriate to provide tangible and verifiable results due to lack 
of availability of full details of component systems. SoS are likely to be comprised of 
legacy and new system. During the evolution of SoS through its lifecycle, while each 
of the component systems changes may be well understood, however it is not 
uncommon for the impact on overall SoS to be ignored. Hence there is an increasing 
requirement for new techniques to model and analyse SoS that will reduce the 
dependency on missing details of inadequately specified component systems within 
the overall SoS architecture.  
The Danse project aimed to develop a cohesive methodology to support evolutionary, 
adaptive and iterative SoS life-cycle along with tools that support SoS analysis, 
simulation and optimisation [103]. The Danse methodology can be summarized based 
on use cases that provide a means for describing the solution methods and various 
tools that offer value from end user’s point-of-view. The first use case is to develop 
SoS objectives/goals and models and enable simulation of multiple models with 
different levels of abstraction and fidelity at different phases of the SoS development 
in order to understand the SoS behaviour. This included using high fidelity component 
system models with ability to use different tools that enable co-simulation. The second 
use case was to develop new architecture views for the SoS to identify emergent 
behaviour and improve its responses is specific goals and contracts. The final use 
case is to check how the SoS and component systems meet their goals. The validation 
of the DANSE methodology was carried out through the use of a semi-theoretical 
concept alignment example and through three actual SoS test cases developed by the 
industrial partners [103].  
 In the DANSE methodology the challenge of investigating architecting and 
analysis of SoS was tackled with modelling approaches though the use of patterns 
[103]. Use of patterns in not new to certain areas of engineering, where they have 
been used in the past at different abstraction levels (design, interaction etc.) especially 
in software engineering and civil/building architectures to understand, communicate, 
and implement design concepts. In the same way, large scale systems can be 
managed by breaking them chunks for humans to understand, communicate, 
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implement and maintain such systems. The patterns which enable large scale system 
to be represented in structure and behaviour are called architecture patterns. The 
architecture patterns provide an ability to architect and analyse by breaking SoS into 
chunks but the process also maintain the characteristics, structure and relationships 
between the various components of the SoS. Chapter 4 provides more details on 
architecture patterns and their role in understanding and analysing SoS. 
2.4 Air	Traffic	Management	(ATM)	as	SoS	
The global ICAO airspace can be viewed as an example of a system-of-systems based 
on the definition and characteristics of SoS described in the previous sections. The 
global airspace is composed of 190 National Airspace Systems (NASs), each of which 
is part of member nations National Transportation System (NTS). The NTS can be 
viewed as a collection of layered networks composed by heterogeneous systems, in 
which the Air Transportation System (ATS) and its National Airspace System (NAS) is 
a part. The individuals or groups operate within each ATS based on standard 
regulations and structure to provide synergy with global system enabling to achieve 
the desired overall system performance with a very high safety rate. Air Transportation 
System consists of airports, runways, airlines, cargo terminal operators, concourses, 
fuel depots, retailers, catering establishments, air traffic controllers, etc. The 
successful operation of this SoS requires standard communication protocols and 
procedures to be followed among individual and groups across enterprises.  The 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), as a United Nations agency, manages 
the international Air Traffic Control (ATC) system since it has been founded in April 
1947 based on already existing agreements and regulations agreed among the 
member nations.  
 The current National Airspace System (NAS) consists of a complex collection 
of facilities, systems, equipment, procedures, and airports that are operated by several 
people to provide safe and efficient environment for airspace users. The flow of air 
traffic is managed in the NAS by Air Traffic Management personnel based on demand 
and supply. They use a systems approach that considers the impact of allowing an 
airspace user or their individual actions on the whole air traffic flow to ensure equity in 
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the delivery of air traffic services. Air Traffic Management (ATM) is provided through 
the integration of humans, information, technology, facilities and services supported 
by air, ground and/or space-based communications, navigation and surveillance [10]. 
ATM as described by ICAO is defined by an aggregation of air and ground based 
functions required to ensure the safe and efficient movement of aircraft during all 
phases of operations. The primary goal of the air transportation sector is to provide 
capability to transfer people and goods from one place to another in a safe and efficient 
way. In the air transportation system, the various airspace users and ground-based 
elements interact to provide this capability [3].   
 UAS when integrated into the national airspace system will be part of the air 
transportation system. UAS is in itself a complex system which involves the integration 
of unmanned aircraft, various ground systems, communication link and human 
operators. There is a myriad of stakeholders such as UAS manufacturers, UAS 
operators and UAS standardisation bodies which are all part of the process to be able 
to operate UAS in the National Airspace System (NAS).  
In a system of systems context, the introduction of a new technology or 
applications such as unmanned aircraft should contribute to providing the capabilities 
of the overall system-of-systems and not cause any negative impact on the provision 
of the system capability. One of the key aspects of an evolutionary system-of-systems 
architecture is that the introduction of new constituent systems into the system-of-
systems must not increase the complexity of system or require re-engineering of other 
existing constituent systems to maintain the same performance levels as before [10]. 
In terms of integration of UA in current air traffic environment, when viewed from 
a SoS concept, the most important criteria would be that it must not cause any 
detrimental impact on the safety and efficiency of the current airspace users. This is 
one of the driving thoughts behind the views of the aviation authorities. According to 
them, UA will have to follow same rules and procedures as that of manned aircraft 
thereby no special provisions would be made for UA’s [2]. Thus, UA flight must follow 
the principle of equivalence and transparency. UAS has to interact with other airspace 
users in the national airspace, without reducing the safety of the current airspace 
system. Also the interactions of the UAS with other airspace users also depends on 
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the size of the UAS and which category of airspace its flight operations are conducted.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
One of the key aspects for UAS integration is also that the UAS have to fit in 
with the next generation Air Traffic Management Systems. The UAS as an airspace 
user must be part of the definition and design phase of the next generation ATM 
system [5]. Also, the UAS as a new type of airspace user must be recognised and a 
regulatory framework has to be developed balancing the need for following the current 
regulatory standards and also on the other hand not to overburden the industry with 
higher regulatory costs [7] 
2.5 Scope	
The knowledge gained from the  background study and literature review of System-of-
Systems enabled to scope the research. The previous section described the system-
of-systems nature of the current National Airspace System and highlighted some 
important points to consider for integration of UAS into an already existing complex 
large-scale system which is evolving due to modernisation into next generation 
systems. The scope of the research into analysis of UAS integration into ATM as a 
SoS, is as follows: 
● The research uses architecture patterns to analyse the current Air Traffic 
Management system as an SOS, and integration of UAS this SoS. The 
architecture patterns enable in capturing the SoS at an abstraction level which 
lends itself useful to architect and analyse SoS in order to compare different 
architecture solutions and provide guidelines for the development of future 
architectures based on the analysis of existing architectures. This research was 
a part of the DANSE project which was developing new methodologies, models 
and tools for architecting and analysing SoS so that they can be operated 
effectively. The focus of the research was only on capturing the architecture 
patterns to enable systems architect to improve SoS characterization and 
architecture analysis in order to provide improved SoS capability. Chapter 3 
shows how architecture patterns were being used to characterise ATM system 
and also presents the architecture patterns that were mined. The chapter also 
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shows the key aspects to consider for the architecture pattern when integrating 
UAS in the national airspace system. 
● The issue of integration of UAS into ATM system has challenges well beyond 
the technical and regulatory hurdles, to factors that are socio-political in nature. 
In order to understand the key challenges from important stakeholder’s 
perspective the research uses ‘wicked problem’ analogy commonly used in 
social sciences. Chapter 5 describes the ‘wicked problem’ and its 
characteristics. It also presents the major stakeholders perspectives on the 
main challenges for the problem of UAS integration in ATM. This analysis 
provides a better understanding of the constraints and competing requirements 
of the major stakeholders involved.  Thereby ensuring that needs and solution 
constraints are well understood in order to produce an effective design. 
2.6 Summary	
This chapter has provided an introduction into System-of-Systems (SoS), its 
characteristics and the architecture design process for system design. However, this 
chapter also highlighted the challenges presented with to a system architect when 
following the standard architecture design process for engineering SoS. A brief 
overview of the DANSE methodology to architect and analyse SoS was outlined. The 
SoS nature of the ATM system and the integration of UAS (a complex system on its 
own) into an existing SoS was outlined. Further this chapter provided the scope of the 
research related to SoS analysis of UAS integration into ATM system and the research 
aspects described in Chapters 3 and 4 were briefly mentioned.  
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Chapter	3: SoS	Analysis	of	ATM	and	integration	
of	UAS	in	ATM	Using	Architecture	Patterns	
3.1 Introduction	
The inherent nature of a System of Systems (SoS) makes it very difficult to model and 
analyse it. An approach to characterize SoS to enable architecting and analysis is by 
using model abstractions. Modelling approaches using use of patterns may enable 
model abstractions to tackle challenge of SoS analysis. This chapter provides a brief 
overview of architecture patterns and how they would be useful in SoS modelling and 
analysis. It also describes the pattern mining process and contents of pattern template 
used to capture the architecture patterns. The verification and validation aspects of 
the patterns mined are also mentioned.  
The reusable architecture patterns captured for the ATM System are detailed. 
Also, the key aspects to consider for the architecture pattern when operation of UAS 
is made possible in ATM in the future. This will enable system designers/architects to 
model SoS and analyse its behaviour to understand the impact on the overall SoS 
capabilities of the National Airspace System with the integration of UAS into the ATM. 
3.2 Architecture	Patterns	
The use of patterns in certain areas of engineering such as software engineering or 
Information Technology, is not new as part of architecture and design process. 
Another field where patterns are important and used frequently is in constructing 
building and city architectures. It has been stated that “A pattern is the abstraction 
from a concrete form which keeps recurring in specific non-arbitrary contexts” [104]. 
The form that a pattern has is defined through its representation as a set of interacting 
components and their relationships. Thus, a pattern exhibits structural and dynamic 
properties, and the visible components within a pattern can range from software, 
services, and hardware, technical or non-technical entities. Traditionally design 
patterns have been used in the software community which represent the design 
structure of software components and their relationships. Expanding on this definition 
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of design patterns, architectural patterns exhibit architectural structure [103]. A pattern 
fundamentally can be thought of a set of guidelines that describes how to create the 
particular entity and the context in which it can be used. Patterns can exist at different 
levels of system hierarchy and when used correctly can provide an effective way to 
represent common concepts at the operational through to implementation levels. The 
use of patterns in support of architecting and analysing SoS is at an early stage [104].  
An architecture pattern can be considered as a framework that provides a 
template for the structure and behaviour of an entire system within a domain [104]. At 
a system level the architectural model refers to the system requirements, its logical 
components and its physical entities. Architectural pattern when applied to SoS can 
support system designers working at higher abstraction levels rather than be 
constrained by specific limitations of a particular technological solution, thereby 
providing system designers the ability to see more clearly the system-to-system 
interactions at the top-level. Architecture patterns are concerned mostly with the top 
most level blueprints expressed in an architectural framework such as UPDM enables 
the systems architect to decompose SoS into manageable elements for analysis 
purpose, while still preserving the SoS capabilities in its entirety [105]. Architectural 
frameworks offer a huge number of different viewpoints and not all of these are 
relevant for the current situation and may be useful for other situations. It has also 
been clearly mentioned in Chapter 3 that different modelling languages can be used 
to model architecture patterns.  
Architecture patterns provide a variety of patterns (operational, system and 
functional) to develop a SoS architecture description of SoS and its constituent 
systems. The DANSE methodology enables system designers to break down the SoS 
and its constituent elements into manageable parts through several views in UPDM. 
The operational, functional and system views captured in the DANSE methodology 
were used to form the fundamental architecture description. The various UPDM view 
used in the DANSE methodology are as shown in Figure 3.1. The primary tool chosen 
for modelling an SoS and its constituent parts in DANSE methodology is Rational 
Rhapsody (using SysML and UPDM profiles). 
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Figure 3.1 Overview of UPDM views used in DANSE methodology 
3.3 Architecture	Patterns	Mining		
 The previous section provided an introduction to architecture patterns and 
outlined the benefits of using architectural pattern paradigm in SoS analysis. Here the 
anatomy of architecture patterns is looked at i.e. elements which make up the pattern 
template, creating architecture patterns and its verification and validation. 
 The pattern template used for capturing the architecture patterns in this 
methodology are as shown in Table 7. The pattern template consists of 
diagrammatical structure and textual elements which together provide important 
information regarding the pattern. The structure of the architecture pattern is a 
simplified model of the pattern and shows the various elements of the pattern at high 
levels of abstraction. As the architecture patterns are mined and their numbers 
increase it is imperative to have an online repository that provides an accessible and 
easier mechanism to share information. 
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Pattern Name  
& Classification 
The name of the pattern 
Keywords Any key words that may appear in the pattern that will be useful 
when looking up the pattern in a repository. 
Intent This refers to the problem and why you would use the pattern to 
address the issue. 
Also Known As Common names referring to the same pattern, if any. 
Motivation Goals Statement of why the pattern would be utilised to address the 
design problem or situation. It will help understand the structure 
and consequences later in the pattern. 
Capabilities Describes what the pattern has to offer to the user and the 
characteristics which it possessed which will be of benefit to the 
pattern implementer. 
Limitations Refers to the restrictions of the pattern. 
Applicability The level at which the pattern can be applied. In an architectural 
pattern the first Level, Level 0 ((L0) shows the pattern in its most 
basic form at the highest level of abstraction. Level 1 (L1) begins 
to show a little more detail in the different arrangements of 
elements that make the architectural pattern. And so on... 
Structure The general interconnecting arrangement between elements 
included in the pattern. E.g. 
Participants The units that are involved within the pattern. Possibly differing 
systems that make up the SoS, depending on the applicability 
level being shown. 
Collaborators Here, not only are the participants being shown that make up 
pattern, but also how, and with which other elements are 
interacting, describing briefly the relationship between elements 
which facilitate the tasks they need to conduct. 
Consequences The consequences refer to differing variables that may influence 
the usage of the pattern. What aspect of the pattern structure 
does it allow you vary in order to fit your specific application? 
Known Uses/ Domain Where the pattern has known to be used in real-life scenarios and 
in which domains. E.g. Military, Emergency Services. 
Related 
Patterns 
Parent 
Patterns 
If the pattern has stemmed down from an original pattern, or 
patterns. Which are these? 
Child 
Patterns 
Any patterns that may have been form from the pattern. 
Implementation Advice/Guidance on the usage of the pattern, providing some 
considerations to be undertaken when the pattern is applied. 
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Performance (Quality 
Attributes) 
E.g. bandwidth, response time, cost, redundancy level, etc. 
Model (e.g. SysML) An app lied model of the pattern as an example. 
Example An example 
Table 7: Architecture Pattern Template 
 The creation of patterns does not have a single approach; however, a first stage 
of mining process is from existing systems. Legacy systems are the foundation of 
today’s SoS and provide most of the SoS capabilities of the overarching SoS. The 
architecture pattern can be mined from legacy system by first determining if they have 
adequate system documentation for the SoS and its constituent components, which 
then could be used by stems architect to identify and extract the common patterns. 
The idea is to capture the architecture based on high level functional and behaviour 
aspects [104]. If the documentation is not available then it is necessary an equivalent 
architecture is developed using architecture framework such as UPDM and then 
reviewed by appropriate subject matter experts who understand the function and 
behaviour of the SoS under consideration. The next stage of the architecture mining 
process is to identify and extract candidate architecture patterns manually to compare 
them against existing patterns. If the pattern does not exist already then it is subjected 
to review by subject matter experts to ensure the pattern captured is indeed a pattern 
that can be used. The pattern mining process and its various stages are shown in 
Figure 3.2 [104]. There are two key aspects that have to kept in mind while mining 
architecture patterns. Firstly, the extracted patterns must be of a form that lends itself 
useful for reuse later. Secondly, the patterns must wherever possible be independent 
of the specific system implementation since this would lend them not transferable to 
other domains. 
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Figure 3.2 Pattern mining process [104] 
3.4 Verification	and	Validation	of	Architecture	Patterns	
The verification and validation of architecture patterns extracted for SoS analysis is 
extremely challenging. The main reason being the abstract nature of the patterns 
makes it difficult to verify and validate. The constant evolution and lack of detailed 
information for all its constituent components makes is almost impossible to validate 
complete SoS. The use of architecture patterns is a starting point for architecting and 
analysing SoS by drawing upon existing knowledge about the systems. IN order to 
have a robust architecture pattern, the architecture pattern can be mined or extracted 
by subject matter experts (SMEs) and then further scrutinised by other to SMEs to 
ensure the pattern accurately captures the key elements of the architecture. At present 
the patterns are verified by the SMEs rather validated, however in the future as specific 
patterns are re-used across domains, then a robust set of domain specialist 
architecture patterns could be obtained. 
 In this research, the SoS architecture patterns of the Air Traffic Management 
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system are identified and extracted based on the architecture mining process 
described in the previous section. The architecture patterns were reviewed by subject 
matter experts (SMEs) from Thales (industrial partner of DANSE project) to ensure the 
key elements of the architecture have been captured accurately. The SMEs only 
verified the correctness of the architecture pattern, however the SoS architecture 
patterns were not validated due the challenges mentioned in above paragraph 
regarding abstract nature of SoS. 
3.5 Air	Traffic	Management	(ATM)	Architecture	Patterns	
The airspace in the present day is a combination of different airspaces with 
specific rules and regulations. The flight rules can be classified into two types, visual 
flight rules (VFR) and Instrument flight rules (IFR). The classification based on VFR 
and IFR varies depending on the weather conditions prevalent, airspace density as 
well as existence of infrastructure to provide this capability in the airspace region and 
so on.  
3.5.1 Air	Traffic	Control	Organisational	Structure	
United States 
This is a generic architectural pattern of an air traffic control organisation structure for 
monitoring the overall air traffic flow in the United States National Airspace System.  
This pattern enables to manage, organize and communicate between various control 
authorities in the air traffic control organisational structure, in order to provide traffic 
separation services to air traffic participants. The constituent parts and their control 
hierarchy are as shown below. 
➢ The hierarchy enables air traffic management personnel (ATSCC) to analyse 
demand in the system and implement initiatives that are then relayed to the air 
traffic controllers (ARTCC). 
➢ Air traffic controllers can relay information to traffic management personnel for 
use in their decision-making process. 
➢ Air traffic command centre is the final authority on all national air traffic 
management initiatives and is responsible for resolving inter-facility issues. 
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➢ The centralised command and control structure provides ultimate authority to 
system command centre to balance air traffic demand with system capacity in 
the national airspace, especially during significant events such as adverse 
weather, equipment outages, runway closures, national emergencies.  
➢ The command centre acts as a single point interface with its customers 
(aviation industry partners), and also maintains frequent contact with them to 
update on the air-traffic management issues in real-time.   
  
 
 
Figure 3.3 Air Traffic Control Organisational Structure (US) 
The main participants or collaborators of the ATC organisation structure in the US are 
[67]: 
 
➢ Air Traffic Control System Command Centre (ATSCC) – Provide oversight to 
air traffic management personnel. It has the final authority for all national 
management initiatives and is also responsible for resolving inter-facility issues.  
It also acts as a point of contact with customers for providing real-time air traffic 
management issues on a daily basis [68].  
  101 
➢ Air Route Traffic Control Centres (ARTCC) – ARTCC coordinate with ATSCC 
to relay information on system demand and air traffic management initiatives.  
They are responsible for controlling air traffic over a large territory.  Primary 
responsibility is sequencing of aircraft between waypoints.  
➢ Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) – TRACON exists at busy 
airports as a buffer between ARTCC and control tower. It handles air traffic 
operating in departure or approach phases of flight. 
➢ Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) – It typically controls traffic immediately prior 
to landing or take-off within 10 miles of the facility. It performs specific tasks 
such as monitoring traffic, ensuring traffic separation and granting clearances 
for landing or take-off. 
 
The implementation of this pattern in the current air transportation system depends 
on the national airspace region being managed and the various characteristics of the 
operating airspace i.e. air traffic density, controlled airspace volume, type of air traffic 
encountered. Also, the implementation of this pattern will vary based on the future 
demands of the national airspace. The increase in air traffic volume and the advent of 
new technologies in aviation would give rise to migration of air traffic controllers role 
from tactical control to strategic management.   
The National Airspace System in US is managed by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). The FAA organisation structure comprises of an Air Traffic 
Control System Command Centre (ATCSCC) that manages air traffic demand with 
system capacity. The US national airspace is divided into 22 regional sectors, each 
controlled by an Air Route Traffic Control Centre (ARTCC) [69].Every regional sector 
or ARTCC region is further partitioned into between 20 to 80 local sectors depending 
on the air traffic density and airspace volume. Each of these is controlled by a 
combination of Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) or/and Air Traffic Control 
Tower (ATCT) [69]. Additionally, there are 15 local flight services stations (FSS) in the 
US and 61 Automated FSS.  
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Europe 
This is a generic architectural pattern of an air traffic control organisation structure for 
monitoring the overall air traffic flow in the National Airspace System. This pattern 
enables to manage, organize and communicate between various control authorities in 
the air traffic control organisational structure, in order to provide traffic separation 
services to air traffic participants. The constituent parts and their control hierarchy are 
as shown in Figure 3.4.  
The main capabilities of this architecture pattern are: 
● Air Traffic Control service is provided by ground controllers who safely separate 
aircraft on the ground and through controlled airspace and can provide advisory 
messages to aircraft in uncontrolled airspace.  
● In Europe, the control hierarchy is organised without a single Air Traffic Control 
Command Centre unlike US.  
● European airspace is divided into cross-border sectors extending over a 
multinational airspace.  
● European airspace is fragmented according to national borders rather than 
traffic flows.  
● In each European nation, the control authority in the national airspace system 
is currently organised hierarchal with many Area Control Centres responsible 
for air traffic control in large airspace regions and each of those regions 
subdivided into aerodrome air traffic control services at airports [70].  
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Figure 3.4 Air Traffic Control Organisational Structure (Europe) 
The main participants or collaborators of the ATC organisation structure in the US are 
[67]: 
● Area Control Centre (ACC) – They are responsible for controlling air traffic over 
a large territory.  Primary responsibility is sequencing of aircraft between 
waypoints. There were more than 60 Air Traffic Control Centres in Europe 
before the transition towards Single European Sky programme.   
● Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) – TRACON exists at busy 
airports as a buffer between ARTCC and control tower. It handles air traffic 
operating in departure or approach phases of flight. 
● Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) – It typically controls traffic immediately prior 
to landing or take-off within 10 miles of the facility. It performs specific tasks 
such as monitoring traffic, ensuring traffic separation and granting clearances 
for landing or take-off. 
 
The implementation of this pattern in the current air transportation system depends 
on the national airspace region being managed and the various characteristics of the 
operating airspace i.e. air traffic density, controlled airspace volume, type of air traffic 
encountered. Also, the implementation of this pattern will vary based on the future 
demands of the national airspace. The increase in air traffic volume and the advent of 
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new technologies in aviation would give rise to migration of air traffic controllers role 
from tactical control to strategic management.   
The national airspace in United Kingdom is managed by NATS (formerly National 
Air Traffic Services Ltd.), a public/private partnership, who are regulated by Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA) [71]. The majority of activities in controlled airspace are 
managed from two air traffic control centres. 
3.5.2 Airspace	Classification	Structure	
The airspace classification structure aims to provide a high degree of safety and 
efficiency in the national airspace system. The pattern enables the management of air 
traffic safely and efficiently in the national airspace system, through an international 
standard of airspace classification system that controls the access of aircrafts into 
different flight regions.    
 
The various capabilities of this architecture are: 
● The airspace classes are fundamentally defined in terms of flight rules and 
interactions between aircraft and Air Traffic Control (ATC). 
● Ensures separation between aircrafts to avoid collisions by requiring aircrafts 
to fly at different flight levels, directions or by controlling an aircraft’s speed.  
● Enables aircraft operation under different flight rules, Visual Flight Rules (VFR) 
and Instrument Flight Rules (VFR).  
● Permission to fly in certain airspace regions where air traffic services are 
available has to be granted by ATC in order for pilot to proceed under certain 
conditions.   
● The air traffic services provided and flight requirements vary for each airspace 
type.    
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Figure 3.5 Airspace Classification Structure 
The main regions/areas into which the airspace can be classified are [67]: 
➢ Flight Information Region (FIR) – For organisation and management purposes, 
national airspace is divided into flight information regions. The division of FIR’s 
of a national airspace varies among countries depending on volume of 
airspace, number and kind of air traffic movements expected in the national 
airspace. The FIR’s are divided into difference airspace type based on the ICAO 
airspace classification system. In the current ATM structure, the airspace is 
classified based on the air traffic services provided in it and on the 
meteorological conditions needed for visual flights. The airspace can be divided 
into basic types based on function of air traffic control in the airspace limit: 
➢ Controlled Airspace: Controlled airspace is one in which air traffic control has 
executive authority over the aircraft flying in this airspace. The level of control 
exerted by air traffic control varies with different classes of airspace. Controlled 
airspace generally exists in regions where there is high-volume of air traffic 
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i.e.in the vicinity of airports during take-off and approach of aircrafts, and also 
at higher altitudes once aircrafts have climbed to cruise phase of flight. 
According to the Annex 11 rules of the ICAO, the airspace is classified into five 
classes ranging from A to G, with Class A being most restricted and G being 
the least controlled. The ICAO provided a clear basis for different airspace 
classes in the airspace; however, the classification does not provide advice on 
location of each category in the airspace structure. The national regulations are 
responsible for the location of vertical and lateral limits of airspace categories 
within their countries airspace, because it may differ significantly for each nation 
➢ Uncontrolled airspace: In this airspace, the air traffic control does not have 
executive authority, although it may provide advisory services to aircraft which 
are in radio contact. Aircrafts operating in uncontrolled airspace generally are 
conducted under VFR; however, some countries also allow IFR in 
uncontrollable airspace. IFR flight carried in uncontrolled airspace should not 
expect separation services from other air traffic, however advisory separation 
messages ‘as far as practically possible’ might be provided in certain 
uncontrolled airspace areas.  
➢ Upper Flight Information Region (UFIR) – The airspace above the FIR is known 
as UFIR. The vertical separation between the FIR and UFIR in many countries 
such as UK, Spain, US is established at flight level FL 245.  
➢ Special Use Airspace - Special use airspace consists of that airspace wherein 
activities must be confined because of their nature, or wherein limitations are 
imposed upon aircraft operations that are not a part of those activities, or both. 
Operations within special use airspace are considered hazardous to civil 
aircrafts operating in the area. Consequently, civil aircraft operations may be 
limited or even prohibited, depending on the area. Special use airspace is 
further divided into: 
● Prohibited - Areas where the flight of an aircraft is not permitted for 
reasons of national security. These areas are designated as prohibited 
areas and are depicted on aeronautical charts. 
● Restricted - In certain areas, the flight of aircraft, while not wholly 
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prohibited is subject to restrictions. These designated often have 
invisible hazards to aircraft, such as artillery firing, aerial gunnery, or 
guided missiles. Aircraft operations in these areas are prohibited during 
times when it is “active.” 
● Warning - A warning area contains many of the same hazards as a 
restricted area, but because it occurs outside of national airspace, 
aircraft operations cannot be legally restricted within the area. 
● Alert - Alert areas are shown on aeronautical charts to provide 
information of unusual types of aerial activities such as parachute 
jumping areas or high concentrations of student pilot training. 
● Military Operational Area - Military operations areas (MOA) are blocks of 
airspace in which military training and other military manoeuvres are 
conducted. MOA’s have specified floors and ceilings for containing 
military activities. 
3.5.3 Air	Traffic	Surveillance	
Surveillance is an integral part of the ATM infrastructure. The primary objective of the 
surveillance service is to provide a comprehensive and accurate picture of actual air 
traffic to ensure safe separation and efficient air traffic flow. The aircraft positional data 
acts as a primary means of surveillance of aircraft for the efficient provision of Air 
Traffic Control. The main function of ATM surveillance is to observe a region or area 
of airspace for the purpose of detecting aircraft or other air targets in that area of 
airspace. The tracking position and movement of aircraft or air targets in the area of 
airspace operating under, is used to enable the Air Traffic Control to maintain safe and 
efficient air traffic flow. The surveillance systems in the past and presently have relied 
primarily on ground based radar systems. However, there are other new technologies 
which have emerged in the last few years. 
This is a generic architectural pattern of air traffic surveillance mechanism used 
by air traffic management systems to detect and track all aircrafts during all phases of 
their flight. The primary objective of the air traffic surveillance system is to provide a 
comprehensive and accurate picture of actual air traffic to ensure safe separation and 
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efficient air traffic flow. 
The main capabilities of the air traffic surveillance architecture are: 
● It provides the ability to accurately and reliably determine the location of aircraft. 
● Surveillance systems detect aircraft and provide an accurate estimate of 
altitude, position and identity information of aircraft to the air traffic control 
system allowing the air traffic controllers to safely guide the aircraft.  
● They also provide the ability to detect and monitor aircraft movements as well 
as other vehicular movement on the aircraft’s surface to prevent runway 
incursions. 
● At smaller airports having less air traffic movement, air traffic controllers use 
visual observations to detect airport surface movements on runway. In larger 
airports due to more air traffic movements, surveillance sensors are used by air 
traffic controllers to supplement visual observations. 
 
The air traffic surveillance mechanism can be broadly classified into different types 
based on the capabilities of the surveillance sensors deployed as follows [72]: 
● Dependant Surveillance – This is a surveillance type in which the position of 
aircraft is determined by aircraft data derived from on-board transponder. 
● Independent Surveillance – This is a surveillance type in which the aircraft 
position is measured from the ground.  
● Non-cooperative surveillance – The aircraft position is derived from 
measurement from a surveillance sensor not using the cooperation of remote 
aircraft. An example is a system using a ground based Primary Surveillance 
Radar (PSR) which determines the aircraft location but not the identity or any 
other aircraft derived data.  
● Cooperative Surveillance – The position of air craft is derived from 
measurements from a surveillance sensor which cooperates with the remote 
aircraft to obtain this information from aircraft derived location data or through 
aircraft data transmissions from on-board transponder.  Cooperative 
surveillance requires aircraft to be equipped with a transponder. Examples of 
such system are Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR), Wide-Area Multi-
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lateration (WAM), multi-lateration and Automatic Dependant Surveillance 
Broadcast (ADSB).  
 
 
Figure 3.6 Air Traffic Surveillance 
Air Traffic Management Non-Cooperative Surveillance 
This is a generic architectural pattern of air traffic surveillance mechanism used by air 
traffic management system to detect and track all aircraft. The structure enables the 
detection and tracking of all aircraft's irrespective of whether they carry transponders, 
predominantly through the use of primary surveillance radar as well as other 
surveillance technologies. This will enable the ATC to have a complete air surveillance 
picture, thereby ensuring a secure and safe airspace.   
 
The capabilities of this architecture are [73]: 
● The non-cooperative surveillance architecture enables for detection and 
tracking of target aircraft independently i.e. no interrogation reply required from 
aircraft to provide a radar return.  
● Non-cooperative surveillance carried out through the use of primary radar 
technology predominantly along with other technologies, presents a complete 
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air traffic picture to ensure security and safety of airspace regions especially at 
high airspace density regions or major airports. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Air Traffic Management Non-Cooperative Surveillance 
There are a few limitations of this architecture and they are: 
● Primary Surveillance Radar does not provide aircraft identity and altitude. Although 
some primary radar has height finding capability but there are too expensive for 
civil ATC use and have poor altitude accuracy for civil aviation needs. 
● Detection range is restricted by high transmitter power requirements and direct 
line-of-sight view of aircraft.  Thus, restricted by terrain and obstacles surrounding 
the region where radar is installed. 
● The performance of the primary radar can be affected by weather and ground 
clutter. 
● It can often report false targets (such as windmills, ground vehicles, weather, birds 
etc.). 
 
Air Traffic Management Cooperative Independent Surveillance 
This is architectural pattern of a type of air traffic management surveillance system for 
identifying and locating positions of aircrafts in the airspace. The pattern enables the 
surveillance of aircrafts in an airspace coverage area thereby providing position and 
identity of aircrafts to the air traffic controllers. The surveillance mechanism is based 
on a cooperative system which implies that only aircrafts equipped with transponders 
are detected and controlled.   The high integrity position and identity information of 
aircrafts provided by surveillance mechanism has increased safety and efficiency of 
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air traffic flow in the airspace especially in high density regions. Cooperative 
independent surveillance has been a principal component of ATC surveillance and is 
expected to remain so in the future. 
 
The main capabilities of this architecture are: 
● The transponders on the aircraft respond to ground interrogations from ground 
radar. The two-dimension information determined by ground radar and aircraft 
position as well as identity provided the aircraft together give high integrity 
position information of aircraft location to air traffic controllers. 
● The two-way directional flow of information between ground station and aircraft 
enables additional information from aircraft to be used by advanced ATC 
automation tools to alert pilots of aircraft separation violation and other alerts. This 
in turn allows improved capacity and efficiency of air traffic flow safely in the 
airspace especially in high density traffic regions.  
One of the main limitations of cooperative independent surveillance 
architecture is that it requires target aircraft to carry transponder. Hence when used 
as only ATC surveillance means, the aircraft not carrying any transponder cannot be 
detected. This increases the security risk and also negatively impacts safety of other 
airspace users especially in medium and high air traffic density areas. 
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Figure 3.8 Air Traffic Management Cooperative Independent Surveillance 
Air Traffic Management Cooperative Dependent Surveillance 
This surveillance architecture pattern provides a mechanism for aircrafts to broadcast 
their position information periodically, enabling them to be detected and tracked by air 
traffic control and other surrounding aircraft. This surveillance architecture is an 
integral part of future ATM development initiatives and considered vital in ensuring the 
standards of safety and efficiency are maintained or even enhances as envisaged. 
This surveillance mechanism is set to replace secondary surveillance radar as the 
primary surveillance method for air traffic control worldwide in the future. 
The various capabilities of this architecture are [74]: 
● This surveillance mechanism is based on a cooperative system, which implies 
that only aircraft's equipped with transponders are detected and controlled by 
ATC.  
● Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast is a cooperative surveillance 
technology which uses this architecture to broadcast an aircraft's position 
periodically. 
● It allows ATC to monitor and control aircrafts with greater precision and over 
large areas of coverage on earth’s surface which was not possible before. 
● As well as position, aircraft also broadcast other information such as altitude, 
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speed and aircraft identity. 
● The broadcasted position and other information is received and presented to 
air traffic controllers. 
● The broadcast information is received, processed and presented to air traffic 
controllers so as to provide an air traffic picture. 
● The ADS-B data broadcast by aircraft can also be received by other aircraft's, 
thereby enabling the pilot to view traffic information and other surrounding 
aircraft's. 
● Unlike conventional radar ADS-B can operate at low altitudes and on the 
ground, thus vehicles equipped to transmit ADS-B data can be used to monitor 
traffic on the runways and taxiways of an airport. 
● This surveillance technology is developed and certified as a low-cost 
replacement for conventional. The ground receiver stations are significantly 
cheaper to install and operate as compared to conventional radar systems. 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Air Traffic Management Cooperative Dependent Surveillance 
One of the main limitation of this surveillance type is the integrity of the position 
information can be affected as the position information is derived from the global 
navigation satellite system. Hence any disruption in the satellite system can affect the 
accuracy and precision of position information thereby adversely impacting the safety 
and efficiency of the national airspace system.   
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The main collaborators of this architecture are: 
● The aircraft determines its position information from Global Navigation Satellite 
System and broadcast it every second. ADS-B ‘Automatic’ refers to the fact that 
it requires no external input or pilot input.  
● ADS-B has two different services, ADS-B IN and ADS-B OUT. ADS-B IN is the 
reception of FIS-B data, TIS-data and ADS-B data from other surrounding 
aircraft's.  FIS-B and TIS-B surveillance mechanism are defined in separate 
patterns for each in the patterns database [75].   
● ADS-B OUT provides a means of automatically broadcasting information 
periodically from aircraft equipped with this capability such as current position, 
altitude, velocity and identification, through an on-board ADS-B transponder. 
The ADS-B ground stations receive the ADS-B data, process and send it to be 
presented to air traffic controllers on a display screen. Thus, providing an air 
traffic picture of all aircraft's in the surrounding airspace thereby improving the 
situation awareness, of air traffic controllers. 
 
Air Traffic Management Cooperative Independent Surveillance (Multi-lateration 
System) 
This surveillance architecture provides a mechanism for detection and tracking of 
aircraft's over large areas such as airport approach and en-route areas through the 
use of multi-lateration techniques, for use by ATC to separate air traffic safely and 
efficiently in the national airspace. Multi-lateration system is an emerging solution to 
replace the secondary surveillance radar as the primary surveillance method for air 
traffic control in the future ATM system. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast 
(ADS-B) and Wide Area Multi-lateration (WAM) are key enablers of the future ATM 
network to achieve performance objectives such as capacity, safety, efficiency and 
environmental sustainability. 
 
The capabilities of this architecture are: 
● This surveillance mechanism is based on a cooperative system which implies 
that only aircrafts equipped with transponders are detected and controlled.  
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● This is a system that uses the aircraft transponder signals (Mode A/C, Mode S 
or ADS-B) signals to calculate an aircraft position in two dimensions or three 
dimensions.  
● This system is based on the principle of multialteration, which comprises of 
several ground stations that receive the signals emitted by the aircraft 
transponder. 
● The aircraft transponder signals are either unsolicited/unsynchronised squitters 
or responses (conventional Mode A/C and Mode S) to the interrogations from 
ground station of a multi-lateration system.  
● Aircraft localization is performed by the Time Difference of Arrival Technique 
(TDOA) technique at the multi-lateration processing centre.  
● Multi-lateration systems were initially deployed for airport surface surveillance, 
however they are also being used for airport approaches (MLAT) and for en-
route surveillance (Wide Area Multi-lateration). 
● Multilateration systems can be defined as being either passive or active 
systems. A passive system requires only ground-based receivers. It relies on 
other sources to trigger transmissions from aircraft. Whereas active systems 
require ground-based receivers and at least one interrogator. This system can 
trigger transmissions from aircraft using one or many interrogators depending 
on the coverage area requirements.  
● Wide Area Mulilateration (WAM) system is more accurate and can provide high 
update rate once per second as compared to conventional Secondary 
Surveillance Radar (SSR). 
● WAM system comprises of multiple non-rotating sensors that are less affected 
by terrain or weather. Thereby providing surveillance coverage to remote and 
challenging areas as well as consistent, highly available surveillance capability.   
● The capability of WAM system to detect both transponder and ADS-B out 
signals makes the technology an ideal solution for enhanced surveillance at 
present while also be operational during transition to ADS-B technology in the 
future.   
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However, there are few limitations with WAM system when used for air traffic 
surveillance purpose and they are: 
● Multi-lateration can be costly when deployed for surveillance coverage of large 
regions. Due to the number of sensors and numerous sites required to install 
the sensors, this may lead to high infrastructure costs. 
● For surveillance coverage over large regions, the complexity of the system to 
manage also increases. As the multi-lateration system will comprise of multiple 
interrogation stations and receiving stations, hence synchronization across the 
system is necessary to get accurate and highly reliable aircraft localization 
information.   
 
One of the key collaborators of the WAM system architecture is a centralised 
processing centre which is referred to as Multi-lateration Processing Centre. The main 
objective of the multi-lateration central processing centre is to determine aircraft’s 
position from the time difference of arrival (TDOA) of the aircraft’s transponder signals 
at the various ground receiving station antennas. The TDOA between each receiving 
antenna pair corresponds mathematically to a hyperbolic surface on which the aircraft 
is located. When four antennas (3 distinct pairs) detect the aircraft’s signal, it is 
possible to calculate the 3D position of the aircraft by calculating the intersection of 
the resulting hyperbolas. The central processing centre also performs key functions 
such as system time synchronization, target identification, target tracking and 
interrogation scheduling [76]. 
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Figure 3.10 Air Traffic Management Cooperative Independent Surveillance (Multi-
lateration System) 
Multi-lateration system has a scalable architecture and is designed to meet the 
specific surveillance coverage requirements cost-effectively. This system can be 
implemented for use in various applications ranging from surface movement 
surveillance, airport approach and en-route/wide area surveillance. The configuration 
of the multi-lateration system is highly dependent on the terrain and environment in 
which the system would be deployed. To achieve highly accurate and cost-effective 
system, terrain and signal environment modelling have to be carried out to identify 
candidate sites for ground stations, in order to deploy multi-lateration system 
especially wide area systems. 
3.5.4 Air	Traffic	Communication	
Communication is a key element of the current ATM system and advances in 
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communication technologies are to be adopted in the future to support the new 
operational concepts which are envisaged to cope with the anticipated air traffic 
growth. The primary objective of the communication service is to provide a means for 
information exchange between the various ATM stakeholders (i.e. pilots, air traffic 
controllers etc.), meeting the communication capacity under an acceptable Quality of 
Service (QoS) requirement. In the past, voice radio communication has been the 
primary means of communication between the aircraft and controllers on the ground. 
However, in the future it is envisaged that, in order to meet the increasing demand for 
information exchange between the ATM stakeholders, a transition from analogue to 
digital communication means and technology would occur. Already digital 
communications (transmitting data between computers in binary signal format) have 
come in to use for ground-ground interaction by linking various ATC ground stations, 
but they have not been applied yet in the air-ground communication extensively. An 
exception is their use in the transmission of aircraft identity and altitude data between 
aircraft transponders and ATC Radar Beacon System (RBS) [77]. The aeronautical 
communication infrastructure can be basically characterised into two parts, the air-to-
ground and ground-ground communication also referred to as mobile and fixed 
communication [78].  
This is a generic architectural pattern of radio communication that is presently 
used for communication between the air traffic control centre and the aircrafts widely.  
The pattern enables the transmission of voice messages from air traffic controllers to 
pilots to manage air traffic safely.  The safe operation of air traffic management system 
depends on a reliable and accurate means of communication between air traffic 
controllers and pilots.  
The capabilities of this type of communication architecture are: 
● Enables two way communications between air traffic controllers and pilots. 
● A discrete frequency used by the transceiver system.  
● Air Traffic Controllers can transmit instructions, procedures or clearances to 
pilots for separating air traffic through verbal communication. 
● Enables pilots to verbally communicate with Air Traffic Controllers. 
● Each radio transmitter performs half duplex communication, where each entity 
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can communicate to the other but not simultaneously. The communication is 
one direction at time. 
The limitations of this communication architecture are: 
● Radio frequency congestion can occur quite often in busy sectors when many 
aircraft attempt to communicate with an air traffic controller. 
● Voice communication between pilots and air traffic controllers are prone to 
miscommunication and errors which may lead to adversely impacting the safety 
of the airspace. 
 
 
Figure 3.11 Duplex Radio Communication 
The range from 118 MHz to 137 MHz in the Very High Frequency (VHF) has been 
allocated by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for radio communications 
between air traffic communications between air traffic controllers and pilots. ATC voice 
communication is via voice channels with a frequency spacing of 25 KHz or 8.33 KHz 
and uses [79]. Oceanic flight use HF (High Frequency) band for voice communication 
with ATC, using the long-range communication property of this frequency band. 
Military ATC takes place in the UHF (Ultra High Frequency) band from 225 MHz to 
400 MHz [77]. 
To ensure that miscommunication is kept to a minimum when air traffic 
controllers are communicating with pilots, standard procedures and verbal 
phraseology have been detailed by ICAO. The communication procedures are laid 
down in the Air Traffic Control Handbook [78]. 
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3.5.5 Air	Traffic	Navigation	
Navigation is another integral part of the air traffic management system to ensure the 
safe and efficient flow of air traffic in the national airspace system. The main purpose 
of the navigation element of the CNS/ATM systems is to provide accurate and reliable 
aircraft position determination capability and also managing aircraft trajectory during 
all phases of flight. Navigation is a vital element for civil aviation and thereby aid to 
navigation was the first service provided to aircrafts by national governments when 
civil aviation flights began.  
The air navigation aids have evolved over the decades, since the initial years 
of civil aviation when ground beacons were placed for visual guidance of pilots along 
the airmail routes. In the 1930’s, the US Post Office replaced the ground beacons with 
a system of low-frequency radio navigation beacons along the airmail routes – namely 
non-directional beacons and four-course radio range stations. This essentially enabled 
aircraft flight at night and during times of poor visibility by guiding aviators along the 
air routes.  
Currently, navigation during all phases of flight is provided by a large range of 
navigation services using conventional terrestrial systems and more recently global 
navigation satellite systems GNSS). Apart from this airborne navigation capability also 
exists, in the form of inertial systems on-board an aircraft based on multi-sensor 
navigation systems. Hence a myriad of technologies exist that provide navigational 
aids to the pilots in order to navigate the aircraft safely under normal and poor visibility 
conditions safely. Dependant on the different phases of flight (En-route, approach and 
landing, airport surface movement), different technologies apply and the various 
technologies used in the current CNS/ATM architecture are briefly described below.   
This architectural pattern represents the air navigation systems and aids that 
enable safe and efficient flight of aircrafts in the national airspace system. This pattern 
enables the movement of air traffic safely and efficiently in the national airspace 
system, through the use of technology, procedures and monitoring process to ensure 
that aircrafts can navigate and be guided safely and efficiently on the ground and in 
the sky. 
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The capabilities of this architecture are: 
➢ Through the use of air navigation rules, procedures and technologies the pilots 
are able to plan and navigate the aircraft safely and efficiently through all 
phases of flight. 
➢ Visual Flight Rules (VFR) navigation is carried out by pilots using combination 
of techniques, pilotage (aircraft position obtained by reading an aeronautical 
map and comparing it will surrounding terrain and landmarks) and dead 
reckoning (aircraft position obtained by using a compass, aircraft ground speed, 
a clock and an initial known position) .  
➢ The air navigation technologies provide aircraft positioning and trajectory 
management in all phases of flight.  
➢ Ground navigation aids act as a low-altitude navigation means with additional 
accuracy and reliability needed for landing aircrafts in conditions of low visibility.  
➢ Aircraft navigation en-route is provided by a network of high frequency radio 
beacon system based on land. Whereas in oceanic regions, satellite based 
systems are used for aircraft positioning and its guidance. 
 
 
Figure 3.12 Air navigation Aids 
The global air navigation system consists of several elements [67]: 
➢ Terrestrial air navigation system – Primarily these systems are based on a 
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network of beacons/transmitters, which transmit signals continuously, thereby 
enabling the pilot of an equipped aircraft (aircraft direction finder) to navigate 
by determining bearings and/or by determining range from beacon while 
homing on the signal.  The different technologies which operate on this principle 
in the national airspace system are shown below: 
➢ Non-Directional Beacon (NDB) – A radio beacon system that transmits non-
directional signals at low or medium frequencies ranging from 190 to 1750 KHz, 
enabling aircraft navigation by determining bearings.  
➢ VHF Omni-directional range (VOR) – An Omni-directional transmitting station 
operating at very high frequency band between 108 to 117.95 MHz, which 
enables aircraft navigation by determining bearings.    
➢ Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) – It operates based on line-of-sight 
principles to provide distance measuring information to aircrafts at very high 
level of accuracy. Operating frequency range from 960 to 1215 MHz. The DME 
and VOR combined together act as a primary navigation aid for civilian aircrafts 
for aircraft range and bearing measurement to a ground station. 
➢ Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) – It is specifically designed for military 
purposes thereby provides more accurate bearing and range measurement as 
compared to VOR/DME system.  
➢ Airborne navigation system – Inertial navigation aids are used to provide long-
range global navigation information to the pilots independent of external 
navigation aids. It acts as a backup in the event of loss of navigation signals 
from other external navigation aids.   
➢ Satellite based system – En-route navigation is provided predominantly by 
ground based navigation aids. However global navigation satellite systems 
(GNSS) have been used for en-route navigation in the recent years especially 
as an oceanic air navigation service capability. The GNSS that is widely used 
is Global Positioning System (GPS). Other GNSS that are used / deployed soon 
for commercial use are Russia’s GLONASS and the European Galileo system.    
➢ Approach/Landing system -   The landing//approach aids are primarily used 
under low visibility conditions when visual landing procedures cannot be 
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followed by pilots. The Instrument Landing system is the standard system 
widely used for navigation of aircrafts during their final approach to landing. The 
main components of a ILS and their functions are: 
o Localiser – Provides directional guidance in the horizontal plane along 
the extended runway central line. It transmits on a frequency between 
108.10 and 111.95 MHz in VHF band. 
o Glide Path – provides directional guidance in the vertical plane along the 
extended runway central line. Glide path transmitters emit signals at 
UHF frequencies between 329.15 to 335 MHz. 
o Marker beacons – It provides the pilot of an indication of range 
information from the runway threshold while on final approach to landing. 
 
Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS) 
The future air navigation system is aimed at providing flexibility in airspace 
navigational capabilities to aircraft in order to absorb the increase in air traffic flow in 
the future without having a detrimental impact on safety and efficiency of the national 
airspace [80]. This pattern aims to provide airspace users positioning and timing 
services with required accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability necessary to rely 
on satellite navigation system for all phases of flight, from en-route through to 
approach for all airports within the satellite navigation system coverage area. This type 
of system refereed by ICAO as Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS) are an 
integral part of the worldwide effort to reduce dependency on ground-based 
infrastructure and leverage the precision and accuracy provide by satellite based 
technologies.  
 
The main capabilities of this architecture are: 
● The primary objective of the satellite based navigation system is to increase 
safety for aviation.  
● SBAS increases the navigation capabilities for all classes of aircraft in all 
phases of flight by improving the accuracy, integrity, reliability and availability 
of global satellite navigation systems such as Global Positioning System (GPS), 
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Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) and Galileo system 
[81].   
● It aims to achieve compatibility and interoperability among all the SBAS 
systems existing/in-work such as Wide Area Augmentation System, the 
European Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), the Multi-functional Satellite 
Augmentation System (MSAS) and GPS aided geo augmented Navigation 
(GAGAN), to enable seamless air navigation service across regional 
boundaries.  
● It enables aircraft to fly any desired flight path between one airports to another, 
rather than constrained airway routes based on ground navigation signals.  This 
greatly saves fuel and time for airline operators. 
● The accuracy and system integrity capability provided by SBAS systems, that 
is provide information on accuracy of GPS satellite information and timely 
warnings to users when the system is producing hazardously misleading 
information, allows aircraft equipped with SBAS to operate at lower en-route 
altitudes than was possible with ground-based systems [82].  
● SBAS offers opportunity for airports to obtain approach capability similar to an 
Instrument Landing System (ILS) without the installation of ground based 
navigation system at the airport. This provides significant cost benefits for 
airport operators.     
 
There are several limitations in the use of satellite based navigation system and 
they are: 
● The uncertainty in ionosphere delay and interference effects caused due it 
adversely impacts the accuracy and integrity of positioning information received 
from SBAS system.  
● SBAS is not capable of achieving approach guidance accuracies required for 
Category II or III Instrument Landing System (ILS) approaches. In order to 
provide performance measure comparable to CAT II or CAT III ILS SBAS is not 
the solution, it would require existing ILS systems to be maintained or replaced 
by new systems such as Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS). 
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Figure 3.13 Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) [67] 
The SBAS system consists of several elements and they are: 
● Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) – It is a system of satellites that 
provides precise geo-spatial location of a GNSS receiver anywhere in the world. 
The system enables the satellite receivers to determine their location using time 
signals transmitted over a large coverage area along the satellite’s line of sight.  
There are several GNSS systems in operation/being built such as GPS, 
GLLONASS and Galileo. The GNSS system aims to achieve technical 
interoperability and compatibility between various satellite navigation systems 
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in order to have a seamless global navigation service for users across regional 
boundaries.  
● SBAS Reference Station – SBAS consists of a network of ground reference 
stations that receive and monitor the GNSS signals. The locations of the 
reference stations are precisely surveyed so that any errors in the received 
GNSS signals can be detected.  
● SBAS Master Station – Master station removes the errors in the GNSS signal 
and corrections to signals are calculated, allowing for a significant increase in 
location accuracy and reliability. The GNSS information collected by the SBAS 
reference stations is forwarded to the SBAS master station via a terrestrial 
communications network. These messages contain information that allows 
GPS receivers to remove errors in the GNSS signal.  
● SBAS Uplink/Connexion Station – Uplink/Connexion station transmits the 
SBAS augmented messages to navigation payloads on the Geostationary 
communication satellite.   
● Geostationary Communication Satellite – Geostationary communication 
satellite rotate around the geostationary orbit thereby appearing motionless to 
observers on the ground. The navigation payloads broadcast the SBAS 
augmentation messages on a GNSS-like signal 
3.5.6 Air	Traffic	Weather	
Current Air Traffic Weather Service 
This architectural pattern represents the structure of air traffic weather service system 
that provides air traffic controllers up-to-date and accurate weather information 
necessary to allow safe air traffic flow in the national airspace. This pattern enables to 
enhance the safety, effectiveness and efficiency of the national airspace system, 
through distributing weather forecasts and weather-related products and services to 
air traffic controllers that ultimately improve the pilot’s awareness of weather conditions 
during flight in order to avoid adverse weather.  
 
The capabilities of this architecture are [83]: 
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● The structure enables the traffic management specialists located in ATSCC to 
collect meteorological information from various sources and devise a suitable 
plan with air traffic facilities and airspace users to minimize the impact of severe 
weather on the national airspace system.  
● The National Weather Service (NWS) specifically provides weather data, 
forecasts, advisories and warnings to support aviation community to reduce 
impact of adverse weather conditions. 
● Through the national information database, infrastructure and meteorologists 
as part of the NWS, it develops forecast products that used by air traffic 
managers and controllers to enhance safety and efficiency in the national 
airspace. 
 
 
Figure 3.14 Air Traffic Weather Service 
The various elements of the national weather service are [84]: 
● Severe weather unit – It has the responsibility of minimising the impact of 
severe weather on the national airspace system. The unit is part of a national 
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weather service structure, located inside the Air Traffic System Command 
Centre. A team of traffic management specialists collect meteorological 
information from a variety of sources, and devise a suitable plan with other Air 
Traffic facilities and system users for routing traffic around the bad weather.  
● Central Weather Service Unit – It is a part of the national weather service 
structure and is located inside each of the Air Route Traffic Control Centres. It 
has the responsibility of providing pertinent meteorological information for 
airports and airspace in the Air Route Traffic Control Centre’s area of 
responsibility. Each CSWU consists of onsite meteorologists to disseminate 
information to air traffic control area managers and occasionally to air traffic 
controllers directly on forecasts for weather front when it arrives in the ARTCC 
sectors. CSWU meteorologists also provide information directly to pilots of 
aircrafts in distress due to hazardous weather conditions. 
● Weather Forecast Office (WFO) – It is a multipurpose local weather forecast 
office that produces aviation weather-related products. Each area WFos has 
the responsibility for the issuance of Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAFs) for 
airports within its control. TAFs are coded, concise 24-hour forecasts for 
specific airports, reviewed every six hours and amended if needed. TAFs 
contain aviation related weather elements such as wind shear, wind, visibility 
level and cloud cover.  
● Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System -   It is a system to replace 
the obsolete and expensive-to-operate Automation of Field Operation and 
Services (AFOS), that provides forecasters a very effective and efficient means 
to prepare accurate weather predictions and issue timely, highly reliable 
advisories and warnings. AWIPS is a high-speed technologically advanced 
information processing, display and telecommunication network that is 
cornerstone of the National Weather Service (NWS) operations. It is an 
interactive computer system that integrates all meteorological, hydrological, 
satellite and radar data into a single computer workstation. It enables weather 
forecasters the interactive capability to view, analyse, combine and manipulate 
large amounts of graphical and alphanumeric weather data.  AWIPS is an 
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integral part of the National Weather Service enabling the provision of data and 
products that form a national information database and infrastructure. National 
Weather Service (NWS) provides weather data, forecasts and warning for the 
United States, its territories, coastal waters and ocean areas that can be used 
by public agencies, private sector, the public and the global community. The 
AWIPS is used by several offices of NWS to process and distribute weather 
products to support air traffic controllers and the national airspace system.    
● Aviation Weather Centre – It is a Meteorological Watch Office (MWO) for the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). It issues following products in 
support of air traffic controllers:  
● Airman’s Meteorological Information (AIRMETs) – Information on 
surface wind speed, surface visibility, thunderstorms, severe turbulence and 
icing.  
● Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMETs) – Information on 
thunderstorms, cyclones, dust or sand storms, volcanic ash, severe icing, 
severe mountain waves. 
● Flight Service Station (FSS) /Automated FSS – It provides pre-flight weather 
briefings for pilots, en-route weather, flight plan processing, relay ATC 
clearances and Notice to Airmen (NOTAMs). They also provide assistance to 
distressed pilots of aircraft and to lost aircraft, as well as conduct VFR search 
and rescue services.   
 
Future Air Traffic Weather Service 
This architectural pattern represents the future structure of air traffic weather service 
system that provides air traffic controllers up-to-date and accurate weather information 
necessary to allow safe air traffic flow in the national airspace. This pattern enables to 
enhance the safety, effectiveness and efficiency of the national airspace system, 
through distributing weather forecasts and weather-related products and services to 
air traffic controllers that ultimately improve the pilot’s awareness of weather conditions 
during flight in order to avoid adverse weather.  
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The capabilities of this architecture are: 
● The structure enables common weather situation awareness and a single 
authoritative source of NAS weather information. 
● A service oriented Architecture enterprise service provides dissemination of 
common weather observations and forecasts. 
● Through the use Weather Information Data Base (WIDB) containing constantly 
updated weather observation and forecast information delivers common 
weather operational picture. 
● It enables the direct integration of weather information into operational decision-
making process.  
● Weather information is translated into operational decisions for 
human/automated systems. 
● A concept of this structure is a network enabled capability of weather 
observational systems so that weather data ranges from raw, quality controlled 
data to processed data form a single authoritative source. 
 
 
Figure 3.15 Future Air Traffic Weather Service 
Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System II - It is a next-generation system 
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which will bring advanced functionality to weather forecasters [84]. It will also simplify 
code and consequently strengthen system performance while reducing the 
maintenance burden. All of this will be achieved while retaining a system look and feel 
that will make the AWIPS evolution appear similar to the user. The AWIPS II is built 
on service oriented architecture and based on evolution of AWIPS architecture. 
3.5.7 Future	Air	Traffic	Management	Structure	
The future air transportation system is based on transforming the way the National 
Airspace System (NAS) is managed, thereby increasing the capacity of the system to 
meet growing air traffic demand. The future air transport system aims to bring a 
transformative change in management and operation of national airspace system, 
through the integration of existing and new technologies, to reduce delays, save fuel 
and lower carbon emissions.  
The capabilities of this architecture are: 
● The ATC system is envisaged to change from a ground based system of air 
traffic to more air and space centric system that takes full advantage of 
advanced avionics and satellite based navigation.  
● A key aspect is the transition to a net-centric model for transferring information 
of all types. The transformation to future air traffic management involves moving 
away from systems interacting point-to-point to a system based on the idea of 
system wide information sharing bus [85].  
● Performance Based Navigation (PBN), which uses satellite-based guidance to 
route aircraft and improve approaches to aircrafts [86]. 
● Provide enhanced airborne and surface traffic management, which includes 
tools that help air traffic controllers merge and sequence planes in the air and 
on the ground.  
● Shift from clearance-based to trajectory-based air traffic control that will enable 
aircraft to fly negotiated flight paths, taking both operator preferences and 
optimal airspace system performance into consideration [87]. 
 
The main collaborators in this architecture are Aircraft, Air Traffic Control System 
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Command Centre, Air Route Traffic Control Centres, Terminal Radar Approach 
Control, Air Traffic Control Tower, Navigation aids, airspace surveillance, airport 
airlines and Distributed system services as shown in Figure 3.16. 
 
Distributed system services - The shared information service is implemented based 
on the principle of a service-oriented architecture. In the SOA model, a set of loosely 
coupled services that interact using standardized data models provide the basic 
building blocks for a modular, composable system that can be adapted over time to 
meet changing requirements [88].  
 
 
Figure 3.16 Future Air Traffic Management Structure [88] 
There are two major future air transportation system initiatives carried out in US 
and Europe which are namely NextGen by FAA and SESAR (Single European Sky 
ATM Research) by EUROCONTROL. The FAA's NextGen service-oriented 
architecture has three primary tiers. At the lowest level, a set of core services provides 
functionality that is shared by all services in the network, such as security and basic 
messaging capabilities. In the next tier, services that are common to specific 
communities of interest (COIs) exist, providing, for example, higher-level building 
blocks for the weather community. In the highest tier the services that exist are more 
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application specific. These tend to be highly specialized services that provide a 
customized end product for a small set of end users [88]. 
3.6 Summary	
This chapter has detailed the architecture patterns identified and extracted for ATM 
system to enable SoS architecting and analysis of integration of UAS into the ATM 
system. The key aspects to consider for the specific architecture pattern when UAS 
are an operational user in the ATM system. This will aid the systems architect when 
using the architecture patterns for SoS analysis of the ATM and integration of UAS 
into the national airspace system. The architecture patterns were verified by subject 
matter experts to ensure the key elements of the architecture were captured 
accurately. This chapter also gave a brief overview of what architecture patterns are, 
how they are captured and the validation and verification of the patterns extracted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  134 
Chapter	4: Integration	of	UAS	in	National	
Airspace	System	–	A	Complex	SoS	problem	
4.1 Introduction	
The use of Unmanned Aircrafts has increased in the last decade especially in the 
military domain. However, both military and civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
are currently subjected to restrictions that inhibit their operations in non-segregated 
airspace [1].  
 The current operations of UAS are allowed in certain segregated areas of the 
airspace only after they have acquired a Certificate of Authorization (COA) for their 
flight [2]. The COA is issued on a case-by-case basis and valid for a year. The COA 
is issued after the submission of required documentation and an analysis performed 
by the aviation authorities to determine whether an equivalent level of safety to a 
manned aircraft has been achieved [2].  
 Unmanned Aircrafts provide major benefits when compared to manned aircraft. 
Unmanned aircrafts provide typical operational abilities to perform missions that are 
considered “dull, dirty or dangerous” for manned aircraft [3]. The three most important 
capabilities achieved by operation of UA’s are; they can fly at high altitudes for several 
days, they can perform missions which are high risk or are considered to be dangerous 
to human operators, and finally they can perform the tasks at much lower costs 
compared to a fully piloted aircraft [4]. 
 Although the flexible and unique operational capabilities of unmanned aircrafts 
provide major benefits, however these characteristics also provide unique challenges 
for integrating them in the current airspace environment.  The whole range of sizes 
and shapes, different operating speeds and altitudes as well as payload carrying 
capability that UAS come in, will require airworthiness regulations and operating 
standards and procedures for ensuring safe operation of UAS in National Airspace 
System [5].  
 Apart from the certification standards and operating procedures, other major 
issues in the integration of UAS in non-segregated airspace that have been identified 
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are sense and avoid ability to avoid collisions with other aircrafts as well as obstacles 
in its vicinity i.e. buildings, terrain, power lines etc., UAS equipage with radios and 
transponders for flight in the airspace and finally pilot qualification requirements [5].  
Aviation is a risk-free and safety conscious domain. Hence introducing a new form of 
system into this domain is a slow and difficult process since it must be introduced in 
such a way that it does not have any detrimental effect on the safety of the ATM system 
and this must be proved before allowing uninterrupted access to the national airspace 
environment [6]. 
The history of introduction of new technology has shown that the greatest 
obstacles have not been technical in nature but are related to their integration and 
acceptance to society [7]. There are many issues related to political, economic and 
social in nature, which govern the integration and acceptance of new technology [7].  
The objective of this paper is to present that the problem of integration of UAS in non-
segregated airspace is a complex system-of-systems problem with challenges that are 
well beyond the technical and regulatory hurdles. The paper proposes that this 
complex and multi-faceted problem has many characteristics similar to a wicked 
problem. The phrase wicked problem refers to those problems that are difficult or 
impossible to solve because they are not understood until after the solution is found 
because of incomplete, contradictory and changing requirements of problem nature 
[8].  
The wicked problem as an analysis tool is used to perform further analysis of 
two-example case study in order to show approaches taken to solve the problem have 
not yet been adequate for such types of problems. Based on the analysis key aspects 
to focus on are proposed, which will support the process of integration of UAS in non-
segregated airspace as viewed from a wicked problem perspective.  
4.2 Wicked	Problem	
Even though large resources and funding have gone into solving the problem of UAS 
integration in civil airspace over the last decade, there has not been much progress 
made in terms of access of UAS into national airspace [4]. Although the actual problem 
seems to be one of a typical system-of-systems problem, however when looked at 
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closely the problem has similar characteristics to that of wicked problems. The wicked 
problem analogy is used to analyse the unique characteristics of the problem that 
make it a difficult problem to solve easily.  
A wicked problem is the phrase used to describe a problem that is difficult or 
impossible to solve because of contradictory, incomplete and changing requirements 
[8]. Hence such problems are not understood entirely until after the solution is found. 
Rittel and Webbers formulation provided ten characteristics that best described such 
problems in the area of social planning [8]. Jeff Conklin in order to generalize the 
concept of problem wickedness into other areas had identified six characteristics of 
wicked problems [8]. 
In the previous section the systems approach was used to describe the system-
of-systems view of the problem, where UAS would be part of a collection of systems 
operationally and managerially independent but are within the entire air transportation 
system. The systems approach also allows the author to analyse their competing 
requirements. However, beyond the competing requirements, a detailed analysis of 
the problem shows that the requirements are not only competing but are also 
contradictory and changing as well as in some instances they are incomplete. Thus, a 
closer look at the problem shows that the complexity involved is well beyond that for 
which the traditional systems engineering techniques could be used for developing a 
solution.   
The perspectives of the major stakeholders involved are widely varied. Hence 
to better understand the constraints and competing requirements, the research has 
used the analogy of a ‘wicked problem’ as an analysis tool to better understand the 
problem. As mentioned earlier wicked problems have six generic characteristics that 
can be used to classify them. The design, acceptance and integration of UAS in non-
segregated airspace have several common features to that of a wicked problem.  
 
1. Problem not understood until the formulation of a solution 
A characteristic of wicked problems is that every solution proposed to a wicked 
problem exposes new aspects of the problem, requiring further adjustments to the 
proposed solution. Moreover ‘what the problem is’ depends on who you ask – different 
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stakeholders have different views on what the problem is and what would be an 
acceptable solution [8].  
This can be readily noticed in the problem of UAS integration in national 
airspace system. One of the solutions to sense and avoid could be to use co-operative 
sensors on-board the UA to be able to detect all other transponder-equipped aircrafts. 
However, the problem would be that the UA’s would not be able to fly in VFR (Visual 
Flight Region), as not all aircraft are equipped with transponder in this airspace region 
[11]. Other problem that arises from UA required to carry transponders is that small 
UA’s would not be able to carry such transponder, as they would have to compromise 
on payload capability [11]. Thus, there is no single solution to the problem that fits all 
classes of airspace and all types of unmanned aircrafts [5].   
The UAS operators can learn and explore the various civil and state 
applications of UAS operations in the national airspace only when they are integrated 
in the national airspace. Only when UA’s are allowed access to operate alongside 
manned aircrafts with the full extent of safety and risk assessments would be well 
understood. Even though a comprehensive safety assessment would be carried out 
before the integration process, however the various risks to the airspace cannot be 
fully understood as long as UAS are segregated to restricted areas of the national 
airspace [7].  
 
2. Different stakeholders have different views of what the problem is and what 
constitutes an acceptable solution to the problem.  
This characteristic is evident from the different views on the airworthiness 
regulations of UAS from the different stakeholders [12]. Although there has been much 
effort that has gone into the definition of standards for UAS, the current proposal is to 
apply the similar airworthiness standards to that used for commercially piloted aircraft 
(CPA) [12]. This default view of the authorities has been based on fact that following 
equivalent level of airworthiness standards will lead to equivalent level of safety 
(ELOS) to CPA’s, despite UAS being described as having fundamentally different risk 
paradigm [13]. The current CPA safety regulations primarily aim to reduce risk to 
people on board and secondarily to those over-flown [13]. However, for UAS as there 
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are no people on-board, the primary risks are to those over-flown or those who are 
external to the system.  Hence this fundamental dissimilarity can lead to airworthiness 
regulations that do not result in effective management of risks across all types of UAS 
and their operations; potential over-regulation and thereby higher costs for the 
industry; or potentially worse effect of the airworthiness regulation not really ensuring 
to satisfy the objective of an equivalent level of safety [12].  
The perception of risk by the public is also much different to those of CPA’s. 
The perception of risk by society is quite different to other areas because the benefits 
of UAS operations are not directly visible [7]. However, the public are the primary 
individuals at risk due to the operation of UAS. 
 
3. Have no stopping rule 
As there is no one definitive stated problem due to different views from the 
stakeholders hence there is no definitive solution [8]. Hence the search for solution 
stops when resources, money or energy run out and not when optimal or ‘final correct’ 
solution emerges [8]. Thus, it has been referred to as a ‘satisficing’ solution – stopping 
when there is a solution that is ‘good enough’. 
These similar characteristics apply to the problem of UAS integration in national 
airspace. Firstly, the problem differs according to who the stakeholder is and therefore 
differing view on the problem definition means there is no definitive solution. According 
to the aviation authorities the major problem for integration of UAS has been the 
inability of UAS to demonstrate that they can operate similar to manned aircraft in all 
airspace classes, however the UAS operators believe the current view of authorities 
is that UAS must follow manned aircraft standards in all airspace classes is not justified 
and also not viable [12]. Also, there are several limitations of current manned aircraft 
operations in some airspace classes, thereby applying those principles for UA 
operations will lead to predictably less safe air traffic environment [7].  
It is difficult to attain a point where it can be said the UAS integration in non-
segregated airspace has become safe. There is a constant process of trade-off 
between the system safety, system performance aspects and cost benefits [12]. Even 
through exhaustive analysis of the trade-offs there is no definitive certainty at which 
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one can say all the safety related aspects have been identified, there may be some 
instances that could occur during operation of the system. Hence a decision has to be 
made at some point on the solution to the problem.   There is no stopping point for 
the goal of increasing safety. The process stops when resources such as time, money, 
energy etc. have been exhausted to a point that the process can no longer continue. 
The solution is said to be satisficing and it the best possible solution available at 
present. For example, the answer to make integration of UAS safe and efficient, there 
is no objective point at which one can say the UAS flight is now completely safe and 
efficient. There has to be a time when the solution seems to be ‘good enough’. This 
situation has come into force. 
 
4. Solutions are not right or wrong 
The solution to wicked problems cannot be measured objectively and there are 
no right or wrong solution but an ‘optimal’ solution [8]. The perception of benefits and 
risk to the problem of UAS integration in non-segregated airspace is varied among the 
stakeholders; hence a solution to the problem cannot be right or wrong, as the 
perception of risk is subjective. There can only be a solution that could be perceived 
as less or riskier as the other.  
 
5. They are unique and novel 
 A key characteristic of wicked problems is that the varying factors and 
conditions make no two wicked problems alike and solutions to them will always be 
custom designed and fitted.  Although one may use wisdom and experience acquired 
over time to approach a wicked problem however he/she is a beginner with regards to 
a specific wicked problem [8].  
Although the introduction of any new technology into aviation is a slow and 
difficult due to highly safety conscious nature of the domain, integration of UAS in non-
segregated airspace is unique and novel not only due to the technical complexity but 
the configuration of issues and stakeholders that make it so. The perception of a new 
technology such as pilotless aircraft by society, the practical and commercial limits of 
technology along with the political and social environment in which regulatory 
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decisions have to be made makes it different to other problems in the past [14]. 
 
6. No opportunity to perform trial and error  
As presently the operation of UAS is not allowed in non-segregated airspace, 
there is no way to gain operational data on safety and performance of Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) alongside manned aircrafts. The current restricted access has 
given only operational data from large UAS used for very few state applications. Hence 
the aviation authorities do not have a way to get a large amount of operational data to 
decide on the acceptance of these systems in the national airspace system [15]. 
Hence testing sites must be provided as well as phased entry into non-segregated 
airspace through entry initially by allowing access to UA’s in uncontrolled airspace [5], 
[16].  
 
7. Every solution to a wicked problem is a one-shot operation  
This characteristic of wicked problem is a typical “catch 22” situation, where 
learning about a problem can only be achieved by trying out solutions, but every 
solution to try is expensive and has lasting unintended consequences which may likely 
spawn new wicked problems [8]. The integration of UAS in national airspace also has 
such a situation wherein the necessary operational safety data required to prove 
reliability of UAS operations can only be obtained by operating UA’s in non-segregated 
airspace, however a single incident or accident involving a UA may actually derail the 
whole process due to the negative perception such an unintended consequence would 
portray [17]. Thus, the trying of solutions may lead to unintended consequences that 
may delay or curtail the process else the solution could lead to full integration thereby 
creating a paradigm shift in the industry.  
 
Hence any solution should ensure that there are no unintended consequences 
that may lead to accident or incident when the UAS are allowed access partially or 
fully into non-segregated airspace. Thus, solution to the problem is a one-shot 
operation whenever the operation of UAS is allowed in non-segregated airspace. 
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4.3 UAS	operations	in	ATM:	A	Wicked	Problem	Analogy	
Several previous works have outlined the technical issues and concerns involved with 
the integration of UAS in national airspace. However, among them there are a few 
major issues that are key barriers towards certification and finally achieving regulatory 
approval. Considering the problem as just a complex technical design issue has not 
yet been sufficient to resolve these issues. There appear to be much wider constraints 
that need to be understood from a broader stakeholder requirements perspective. 
Thus, in order to understand the wider stakeholder constraints, the research problem 
is defined in terms of a complex System of Systems problem. Well beyond just being 
a System of Systems problem from a technical design perspective, the wider 
constraints of other stakeholders lend itself to being mentioned as a complex system 
of systems problem.  
A system engineering approach is used to better understand the problem by 
analysing the different requirements and constraints imposed by the stakeholders that 
are impacting the major system design issues at present. Only the high-level 
stakeholders are considered here as lower level stakeholders views are represented 
through the primary stakeholders. The high-level stakeholders represented here are 
the aviation authorities, UAS end users, UAS manufacturers and operators. Each of 
the major issues and concerns, which at presently are hurdles towards allowing the 
integration of UAS in national airspace, are analysed from the point of view of main 
stakeholder’s requirements.  
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Figure 4.1 An overview of systems approach used to identify and analyse the key 
challenges of UAS Integration in ATM 
In the following discussions, the UAS end users point of view is captured here 
as commercial perspective, UAS manufacturers and operators view are captured 
through system developer’s perspective and the aviation authorities’ viewpoint is 
captured via the regulatory perspective. The regulatory perspective will also include 
the interests of other pressure groups such as general public, politics etc. Three views 
will be analysed in how they impose requirements and constraints on the major system 
design issues faced presently. A better understanding of the system constraints will 
help in building a solution for the integration of UAS that could be certified by the 
aviation regulators. The four major issues and analysis of the stakeholder’s constraints 
imposed on them is discussed here. 
 
❖ Sense and Avoid 
Among the many technical issues involved in the integration of UAS into non-
segregated airspace, collision avoidance is a major issue [34]. The current collision 
avoidance capabilities of UAS are not adequate for them to be allowed to operate 
alongside manned aircrafts [89]. 
A major part of operational concept of the air traffic services provision is conflict 
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management [34]. Conflict management functionality in the current ATM system is 
carried out in a three-layered approach namely strategic conflict management, 
separation provision and collision avoidance [34]. To be integrated into non-
segregated airspace, UAS operations must fit into this layered approach and be able 
to follow the procedures and standards in place as well as cooperate and participate 
with the separation provision rules followed by other manned aircrafts in the national 
airspace. In instances where the separation provision fails, the UAS must be able to 
employ a collision avoidance function, which will provide an acceptable level of safety 
[34].  
In the current context of manned aircraft, the pilot is central and ultimate 
authority responsible for the whole collision avoidance process in all categories of 
airspace. The primary means the pilot of manned aircraft discharges the collision 
avoidance responsibility is through the ‘see and avoid’ procedure [34]. However, the 
‘see and avoid’ procedure is not adequate due to many of its limitations and to aid the 
pilot in the collision avoidance process an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) 
has been developed. Currently in European airspace ACAS II is mandatory for all fixed 
wing aircraft above maximum take-off weight of 5700 kg or passenger approved 
seating configuration of over 19 [34]. However other light aircrafts are exempt from 
this rule and also in uncontrolled airspace these rules do not apply. Hence in these 
circumstances only means of collision avoidance is ‘see and avoid’. 
 
1) Regulator’s view  
According the current view of aviation authorities UAS operations in non-
segregated airspace should not in any way have a negative impact on the safety of 
the airspace [31]. This underlines the fact that, basic tenets for the deployment of UAS 
in non-segregated airspace must be based on UAS properties such as equivalence 
and transparency [31]. This means a UAS must behave like a manned aircraft.  
In terms of collision avoidance procedure for UAS, this means that UAS must be able 
to have a sense and avoid capability that is similar or better than a pilot of manned 
aircraft especially for detection and tracking of non-transponder equipped aircraft. And 
for detection of transponder equipped aircraft, the UAS collision avoidance function 
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should be able to generate avoidance manoeuvres that are as much or more effective 
than that of ACAS II in manned aircraft [34]. And there would be a size threshold for 
UAS above which those UAS will need to carry collision avoidance function equivalent 
to ACAS II or not [34]. Also, another important factor is that UAS collision avoidance 
function must be interoperable with ACAS II or consider the fact that ACAS II equipped 
aircraft will create coordinated avoidance manoeuvres with other similarly equipped 
threats.  
 
2) System Developer’s View 
Sense and avoid is a challenging complex design problem in itself. The design 
problem is further complicated by the fact that the UAS collision avoidance 
performance measures are not clearly defined yet. The performance measures that 
are available at this stage are more qualitative in nature [34]. The system developer’s 
currently having to work with the basic performance requirements that the UAS 
collision avoidance must be equivalent or more effective than collision avoidance 
function of manned aircrafts. The base level performance requirements seem 
straightforward; however, defining the performance metrics based on these baseline 
requirements is a challenge. 
The challenge arises due to several issues. Firstly, the human skills and ability 
vary from pilot to pilot [3]. The visual perception and processing varies significantly 
and all the pilots do not have the same visual scanning pattern. The frequency of 
scanning also varies from pilot to pilot. Apart from this the pilot’s see and avoid process 
is affected by physical and psychological issues [34]. The external environment 
especially the weather conditions have a considerable effect on the performance of 
the human visual range. The pilot’s view is also affected by the size of the cockpit and 
the aircraft type. In order to factor in the degradation caused due to each of these 
factors and develop equivalent performance metrics for sense and avoid for UAS is a 
complex task.  
There have been several working committees, which have been looking at the 
issue of collision avoidance. And the proposed solution so far has been based on 
ASTM (American Society for Testing and Materials) F-38 committee published 
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standard, which most of the system developers are following for developing sense and 
avoid system for UAS. The standard is based on the manned aircraft pilot maximum 
viewing angle of ±15° in elevation and ±110° in azimuth and also being able to respond 
to avoid a collision within 500 feet [3]. However, analysis of data available from mid-
air collisions shows that they occur near an airfield where traffic volume is high and 
mainly at lower closing speeds. Most mid-air collisions occurring at low speed happen 
when two aircrafts are travelling roughly in the same direction when a faster aircraft is 
overtaking a slower aircraft. This situation may arise in case of UAS as cruising speed 
of many UAS are less compared to other manned aircrafts. Hence considering this 
limitation the standards based on limited field of view may not be enough. However, 
in UAS the backward-looking capability is achievable by placing sensors is such a way 
that full 360 degrees is possible [90].  
The research on mid-air collisions also reveals that most of the collisions occur 
when visibility is normal during day and in uncontrolled airspace [90]. This also outlines 
the inherent limitation of the ‘see and avoid’ procedure and in the future with the 
increase in traffic of lighter aircrafts this might become a serious limitation. Hence to 
base the UAS collision avoidance performance on a standard that has many limitations 
may not guarantee certification of UAS sense and avoid systems.  
Systems engineers’ tend to follow the ‘V’ model of systems engineering, where 
at each stage the system concept is tested and validated [91]. However, the 
challenges that exist in translating the baseline performance measures to quantitative 
performance metrics make it difficult for the systems engineers to follow the systems 
engineering process during design and development of UAS sense and avoid 
systems. Hence the design problem is further complicated due to these challenges.  
 
3) Commercial viability view 
In providing a solution for the UAS sense and avoid system a major 
consideration would be cost apart from other factors such as weight and power 
consumption. If the sense and avoid system cost is high enough contributing to a major 
cost of the UAS, then the UAS manufacturers would not be able to justify the business 
case of civil UAS operations to the UAS end users.  
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To improve the reliability of UAS sense and avoid system there would have to 
be redundant systems on board the UAS and this means more additional cost [90]. 
However, the costs could be lowered in case the sense and avoid system was placed 
on the ground. But according to the current standards of the aviation authorities it 
appears that airborne collision avoidance would be needed for last ditch attempts to 
avoid collisions when other collision avoidance provisions fail [34]. Hence an 
acceptable collision avoidance solution will have cost as an important issue.  
 
❖ UAS autonomy  
An autonomous system unlike an automatic system has various choices 
available to it to perform a particular task and it has the capability to reason on the 
alternative choices available to it before it makes a decision [31]. It has the ability to 
constantly perceive the outside environment and take action according to the effect of 
current state of environment on its ultimate and in making this action it ensures that its 
actions are safe enough while achieving its goal. Hence autonomy range from the 
capability of system to be fully autonomous that is a system without any human 
oversight, to semi-autonomous where there is sharing of decision making between the 
humans and system and finally those with no autonomy that is the system is just able 
to provide information to the operator on a timely basis and all decision making is left 
to the operator [31].  
The level of autonomy in a system also gives rise to many human factor issues. 
For a system where human-UAS collaborative decision-making is necessary, there 
are several human factor issues that are safety critical. Some of these issues are UAS 
pilot skill levels, UAS pilots and ATC controller situational awareness and also their 
workloads.  Hence providing the right kind of information and at right time is crucial for 
safe operation of UAS [3]. Also, considerable analysis has to be done to determine 
how this information has to be presented in raw or processed form so that the UAS 
operator has the correct amount of information so as not to increase workload of the 
UAS pilot.  
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1) Regulator’s view 
The first and foremost requirement for the aviation authorities in terms of UAS 
autonomy is that the system must be fully deterministic in nature [31]. That is the 
decisions made by the system must be on a rational basis. An autonomous system 
must also be consistent and repeatable. By ensuring consistent behaviour at all times 
the system will in turn encourage human trust. Consistent behaviour can be achieved 
by making decisions that are repeatable. That is, the system should not in any 
circumstance exhibit unexpected or emergent behaviour. Without these 
characteristics, the system would not be able to be certified.  
Another major factor to consider when certificating autonomous system is data 
integrity. In a manned aircraft, the pilot is presented with sensor data (altitude, air 
pressure, airspeed etc.), which he then interprets for its validity before taking any 
action [31]. An autonomous system also perceives its environment through a large 
amount of sensor data on board, databases or messages; however, there is no human 
oversight provided by the pilot. Hence UAS are prone to incorrect or erroneous data 
[31]. Thus, ensuring that the data on which the UAS bases its reasoning and makes 
decisions is of high integrity is necessary to ensure system certification. 
 
2) System developer’s view 
The issue of UAS autonomy is a complex design problem. An autonomous 
system with higher level of autonomy will be very difficult to design, verify and finally 
to certify. The decision making in an autonomous system should be collaborative, that 
is the human and UAS must together work as a team with however the human having 
the ultimate authority [34]. 
One of the ways of sharing the decision-making would be by determining the 
time criticality of making the decision. That is decisions, which are safety critical and 
require immediate action, in those instances the UAS could act autonomously without 
much human oversight. Example of such instances are the UAS making a last-ditch 
attempt to avoid a collision in case the other collision aversion provision fails and also 
during a loss of communication link between the UAS pilot and the UAV, the UAS must 
be able to follow contingency plans and reason independently of the UAS.  However, 
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in other occasions the UAS could share decision making with the UAS pilot but with 
human oversight and UAS pilot having ultimate authority. By using these methods, the 
UAV system could become more deterministic for most part of its flight. This will 
significantly ease the difficulty in certification of these non-deterministic systems. The 
control algorithms of the UAS should be robust and provide consistent behaviour. The 
UAS health should be monitored at all times and in case of any malfunction with the 
major flight systems the control algorithms should be able to revert to emergency 
conditions and land the flight to safety without causing any detrimental effect on the 
safety of the airspace.  
In a human and UAS collaborative decision-making system, two concerns that 
have to be addressed are data fusion and UAS pilot interface. To determine what all 
information available from sensor data need to be processed and reasoned on the air 
vehicle and also which information have to communicated to the UAS pilot in a form 
so that decision making processing of those data takes place on the ground. This also 
impacts the situational awareness of the UAS operator. As the unmanned aircraft has 
a better situational awareness as compared to the UAS pilot far away on the ground, 
it will be necessary to provide on-board sensor information as well as other systems 
on the ground in a form that increases the situation awareness of the human [3]. Also, 
the system should be careful not to overload information on to the UAS operator, which 
may lead to mistakes by the human pilot. 
Apart from these challenges, the biggest issue to consider for certificating UAS 
is the verification and validation of these systems. To prove that UAS are able to 
operate without any emergent behaviour and make decisions that are consistent and 
repeatable at all times is difficult. The more and more decisions are taken by the UAS 
without human oversight, the less predictable will be the UAS behaviour. Hence 
ensuring human oversight during all phases of flight will be vital to proving the system 
consistency.  
 
3) Commercial viability view 
In terms of commercial viability, the costs have to be compared for UAS having 
varying levels of autonomy. In a system where UAS is highly autonomous, it would 
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mean more complex software process on board and also increase in hardware to 
ensure high degree of reliability. This in turn will lead to higher cost of UAS. It is 
envisaged that lower cost could be achieved where the decision-making is shared 
between the UAS and UAS pilot working as a team [31].  
 
❖ System safety  
In civil aviation, safety is paramount and it is a highly risk averse domain. So, 
the introduction of any new form of technology should be such that it does not have a 
negative impact on the safety and efficiency of the overall Air Traffic Management 
System [4]. For successful integration, UAS should prove that they can operate safely, 
i.e. they must not pose any undue hazards to other aircrafts or to persons on the 
ground under any circumstances [31].  
Although UAS have been operating in the military domain for a long time, there 
are major concerns regarding their safety. From the UAS use in military sphere over 
the years, the reliability analysis study shows that UAS have a poor safety record. 
According to a 2002 US congressional service report the current UAV accident rates 
were 100 times more than that of manned aircrafts [27].  
In the past several years the US government agencies have been using UAS 
increasingly for a few state civil applications. These UAS are restricted to certain 
segregated areas of the airspace and they do not have jurisdiction to operate beyond 
those areas. The US Customs and Border protection agency has been using 
unmanned aircrafts for monitoring illegal border activity.  A recent figure reported by 
them on the accident rate of unmanned aircrafts suggests that they are 353 times 
more accident prone than manned commercial aircrafts [27].  
 
1) Regulator’s view 
According to the aviation authorities, the limited operational and safety data that 
is currently available from use of UAS in state civil applications do not support their full 
integration into the national airspace [3].  The UAS accident rates are very high 
compared to that of manned aircrafts. A huge improvement in safety and reliability is 
required to be able to allow unmanned aircraft to operate alongside manned aircraft.  
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In view of the current safety record the UAS operation in non-segregated airspace is 
not possible.  
A key to ensuring system safety of UAS would be effective collision avoidance 
and terrain warning systems. Apart from this other highly safety critical factor to 
consider for certification would be ensuring data security of UAS. A highly secure 
communications link between the unmanned aircraft and UAS pilot would be 
necessary to prevent any intentional data manipulations [7]. The major threats are 
unauthorised commands, false or misleading data. Although UAS would have certain 
ability to reason on misleading data, however they are highly dependent on a secure 
communications link [31].  
Human factors are a very important safety issue as far as the UAS operations 
in national airspace is concerned. Thus, ensuring that the UAS pilot has the right 
amount of skill level and also adequate situational awareness for operating unmanned 
aircrafts will be important from an overall system safety point of view [3].   
 
2) System developer’s view 
The safety criteria for UAS may vary based on unmanned aircraft 
characteristics and its operational capabilities. Some of the characteristics that may 
affect safety are size of UAV, maximum cruising speed, category of airspace it’s 
operating in and kind of applications it’s used for [3].  
It would be inappropriate to compare safety record of unmanned aircraft to 
those of its manned counterparts at this stage [3]. UAS use in the military domain 
started with the idea of saving human lives in battle space and was primary developed 
as expendable vehicles. The systems were not developed with reliability or safety in 
mind; other functionalities such as cost, payload capacity and performance were major 
criteria’s in mind during their development. As the system size and power 
requirements varied for different type of unmanned aircrafts, the UAS manufacturers 
tended to use commercially available components which are not certified according to 
aviation standard [3]. These were some of the reasons for high degree of unreliability 
of UAS operated in the military domain. 
In case of deployment of state UAS in a few civil applications, the UAS used 
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were a spin off from UAS technologies and flight systems form the military domain. 
Hence that may also have been a contributing factor in UAS operations for state civil 
applications.  
System safety has to be improved not only by improving reliability of individual 
system components but also by ensuring human-UAS interactions are safe and build 
enough safety nest in order to prevent failure events occurring due to inadequate UAS 
operator actions.  
Most of the safety metrics for the UAS safety critical systems are not clearly defined 
yet. The system developer has to rely on baseline performance requirements that have 
been outlined by the aviation authorities. Hence this situation also makes the design 
for safety more technically complex.  
 
3) Commercial viability view 
Usually two methods are possible for improving system reliability, which are 
increasing reliability of individual components/systems and build in redundancy or 
duplication [3]. However, improving reliability using these methods will invariably lead 
to higher costs. These costs could be justified by the fact that system unreliability can 
lead to high costs as well when UAS crashes to ground or during any other 
catastrophic event. Along with the air vehicle platform, the payload could also be 
damaged which in some instances may cost more that damage only to the UAV 
platform itself [3].  
From the UAS manufacturers point of view, as various technologies in UAS 
evolve they could also be used in manned aircrafts to improve safety. For example, 
development of a cost effective UAS sense and avoid system could be very useful in 
improving situational awareness of pilots and also avoiding collisions in light aircrafts. 
Hence a wider customer base could compensate for higher costs involved with 
improving system reliability.   
Ensuring safety standard for small UAS would be difficult to balance against the 
cost benefit in their operation. However, by sharing of decision-making processing on 
board unmanned aircraft and the ground control station, few of the systems 
redundancy can be placed on the ground. Thus, using the new business models, the 
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cost could be shared between the UAS operators and the UAS end user.  
 
❖ Socio-political factors  
Socio-political issues will play a major role in deciding whether to allow or 
restrain access of UAS in non-segregated airspace [3]. The shaping of public 
perception towards UAS will be a crucial factor for UAS acceptance in national 
airspace. Depending on how the public perceives UAS operational as being beneficial 
when compared to the potential costs of developing these systems. This perception is 
also shaped by any catastrophic events that occur or may happen in the future that 
may be reported by the media [3]. Public and media perception in turn most probably 
shape the political will on such issues.  
According to several surveys conducted, the primary reason for public anxiety 
towards UAS has been job loss that will arise due to increased automation and other 
main factor is the uncertainty with regards to the technology itself [3].  However, a 
majority of the respondents were happy for use of UAS in cargo and civil applications 
[3].  
 
1) Regulator’s view 
However safe the UAS become; eventually the decision of aviation authorities 
to allow UAS integration in national airspace will be swayed by public acceptance of 
autonomous systems.  
Public trust in UAS can be built in several ways. Firstly, by comprehensively 
demonstrating that UAS are safe, cost effective and act in a responsible way. This will 
take a lot of time and effort [3]. Secondly by changing the taxonomy of the term used 
to refer to these systems. Also educating the people about the fact that human is the 
ultimate control authority in UAS operations.  
The aviation authorities have already been using the taxonomy of Remotely 
Piloted Aircrafts (RPA) instead of the term UAS to provide the public with clarity. Also, 
to allay the fear of job losses, the military have been trying to educate the public that 
RPA fleets also requires a considerably high manpower to operate and maintain [92].    
However, with these entire efforts one stray incident where an accident involving UAS 
  153 
occurs that may lead to loss of human lives, can have detrimental impact on public 
perception. Hence it is envisaged that for the civil UAS market to open up, the UAS 
may have to prove a high level of safety as compared to manned aircrafts.  
 
2) System developer’s view 
UAS industry has to provide confidence to the public by ensuring they are acting 
credibly in every step [3].  Build technologies that will have least environmental impact 
and also demonstrate socially responsible actions of UAS. The dilemma in the mind 
of the system developer’s is when full integration could be achieved. This will postpone 
several new product development initiatives for the civil UAS market. There may be a 
need to prove that UAS is more reliable and safe than manned aircraft will be difficult 
and consume more resources as well as effort.  
4.4 Discussion	on	ways	to	address	airspace	integration	
Presently, the perspectives of the major stakeholders on the most important issues 
involved with the integration of UAS into civil airspace are varied. A stakeholder 
analysis of the problem has shown that the stakeholders have a wide range of views 
and also seem to have different frames for understanding the problem. As has been 
discussed earlier, such problems cannot be tackled through the traditional engineering 
approach in which problems are defined, analysed and solved in sequential steps.  
There have been several strategies proposed in the past for tackling wicked 
problems in different subject areas. Generic sets of strategies to cope with wicked 
problems are identified in Roberts (2000) [8]. Among these proposed strategies there 
are a few which are suitable and need to be applied to the problem of UAS integration 
into national airspace. A set of strategies are identified and discussed here which are 
well suited and tailored towards tackling the problem of allowing routine operation of 
UAS in non-segregated airspace.  
 
❑ Collaboration 
This approach is aimed at achieving closer collaboration by engaging all the 
major stakeholders in order to find the best possible solution for all stakeholders. As 
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indicated in Rittel (1972) and in Roberts (2000) [8], the collaborative approach 
attempts to make all major stakeholders along with those who are being affected as 
participants in the process of formulation of a solution to the problem [8].   
The greatest impediment to the routine flight of UAS in non-segregated 
airspace has been the regulatory environment in the countries, which have the 
greatest interest for using UAS for civil and state applications as well as R&D activities. 
There has been more demand for UAS in scientific missions and monitoring of natural 
disasters.   
A recent example for the use of UAS in monitoring scene of disasters was when 
unmanned aircrafts were used above the failed nuclear power station in Fukushima, 
Japan to assess the damage to the reactor buildings [33]. Another example of UAS 
applications is, the British Antarctic Survey have been using hand-held small UAS for 
conducting scientific studies and are keen to use them in place of manned aircrafts in 
several scientific purposes widely [33].  
However as with the national airspace, the international airspace regions are 
also bound by the rules and regulations. Hence to carry out mission in international 
airspace regions, the users have to comply with the ICAO (International Civil Aviation 
Organisation) rules and regulations, which are enforced by the nation states along with 
their national regulations when flying under their airspace regions. This also creates a 
large degree of hurdles for the UAS operators, as they have to navigate through the 
regulations of each states under which they are operating. Even the limited access to 
UAS operations by some countries as an initial entry level for UAS developers has 
also been inconsistent from country to country along with the overall regulatory 
approach adopted for UAS access [17]. Apart from common regulatory approach 
between countries, there has been a lack of global initiative for an approach to develop 
a harmonised regulatory framework [17]. 
A UAS working group was established within ICAO with the goal of supporting 
the regulation and guidance development based on the work of rulemaking 
committees such as RTCA, EUROCAE and other similar bodies in 2007. However 
there needs to be greater integration among the several aviation authorities [33].  
In order to tackle wicked problems there needs to be more collaboration and 
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engagement among the various stakeholders. There has been lot of co-operation with 
the various stakeholders and airspace regulators in the process of solution formulation 
in countries that have seen great demand for operating UAS in non-segregated 
airspace. But the solution also involves co-operation at the intra-regulatory level [34].  
It is also necessary to leverage UAS standards and airspace integration work from 
other countries in order to develop further set of performance requirements and 
standards at a global level. For instance, the future ATM architecture framework 
initiative in Europe and US represented by NextGen and SESAR, have now been 
actively involved in establishing UAS operational environment in future ATM 
architectural goals.  The process would lead to a determination of the airspace 
classes, ATM systems and Air traffic services units that the UAS will interact/interface 
with in the future ATM. These activities could be better harmonized at a global level to 
truly achieve a seamless integration of UAS in non-segregated airspace across 
boundaries, nations and oceans.  
 
❑ Change in Mindset  
A problem whose solution requires a great number of people to change their 
mind-set and behaviour is likely to be a wicked problem [8]. As has been noticed in 
many standard examples of wicked problems in the area of public planning and policy, 
such as global climate change, natural hazards, nuclear energy, healthcare etc. [8].  
 Similarly, UAS are transformational and thereby requires a large number of 
people to change their mind-set to be able to integrate them in civil airspace by 
managing safely. Over the last several years there have been huge sums of money 
invested in research and development for solving the problem of UAS airspace 
integration; however, the progress so far has been limited. [1]. The analysis of the 
challenges and issues involved with the problem in the context of wicked problem 
analogy has shown that there is a need for change in the mind-set of the major 
stakeholders. The wide viewpoints of the various stakeholders on the solution to the 
problem and also having a default position have meant that there has not been much 
progress until now [12]. 
 One of the key areas where this change is needed is in the perception of UAS 
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operational risk by the aviation authorities [12].  Operation in non-segregated will 
require an ELOS to that of civilian piloted aircrafts operating in the same airspace. The 
efforts involved so far in the definition of standards. The current view of the aviation 
regulators is that the standards specific to UAS has given little considerations on how 
these standards and regulations will be applied across diverse UAS types, their 
operational capabilities and various mitigation strategies deployed [12]. The proposed 
approach has been to apply regulatory framework for civilian manned aircraft to that 
of UAS [4]. The fundamental basis behind such an “off the shelf” approach has been 
that applying equivalent regulations leads to an ELOS, despite UAS having a different 
risk paradigm [13]. The underlying principle of the civilian piloted aircraft regulatory is 
based on the primary risk to people on-board the aircraft, however the primary risks 
governing the development of UAS regulatory framework is different as they are 
external to the aircraft [7].   
 One of the main principles of regulations is to ensure that the safety objectives 
can be met but at the same time minimising the regulatory costs to meet the standards 
by the industry [14]. The approach to the definition of part 1309 regulations for UAS 
has been to assign system failure probabilities as used for the civilian manned aircraft 
except the JARUS group which has proposed a draft kinetic-energy based approach 
[34]. Hence the approach to assign average system failure probability similar to 
manned aircraft could lead to a situation in which the safety metrics could not be 
achieved for small UAS where the greatest demand for integration in non-segregated 
airspace is present.  And also, the principle of using equivalence failure probability 
may not lead to equivalent level of safety. In view of these factors, there needs to be 
a major shift in thinking on the way the regulations and standards defined for UAS so 
that the unique operational capabilities and diversity of UAS are considered along with 
the fundamental difference in the nature of risks associated with UAS from civilian 
piloted aircrafts [12].  
An alternative approach for UAS could be risk based models that relate the 
safety metrics to the potential for a flight critical failure event.  There has been research 
work on model based approach to assess the risks associated due to the operation of 
UAS in non-segregated.  Example model-based approach is presented by Weibel 
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McGeer et al. (1999), Grimsley (2004), Weibel and Hansman [37], Clothier and Walker 
[13], Clothier et al. (2007), and Dalamagkidis et al. [4]. Clothier and Walker [12] 
propose a framework for defining airworthiness regulations for UAS using a risk matrix 
based approach. They point out that the quantifiable specification of the framework 
makes it possible to establish a transparent and justifiable basis in terms of the 
overarching requirement for an ELOS [12].  A risk matrix model is used to determine 
an airworthiness certification matrix. The airworthiness certification matrix is a 
systematic method for partitioning the numerous possible types of UAS and operations 
into a finite number of scenarios [12].  
Also, there have been other research studies in statistical modelling of 
encounters of conventional and unconventional aircraft, which provide a basis for 
rigorous analysis of the risks associated and also risk mitigation effects with the 
introduction of UAS in non-segregated airspace [36]. These statistical models provide 
a collection of tools and methodologies for risk assessment that could provide a basis 
for a fundamental shift in the approach taken by the aviation regulators and rulemaking 
bodies to assess the demand for operating UAS in non-segregated airspace safely 
and routinely [36].  
The process of integration of UAS in non-segregated airspace has to be on a 
step-by-step basis providing incremental access.  A step-by-step approach will enable 
restricted access initially which would lead to more learning and information on the 
operational performance of the UAS [16]. This operational data could be useful in 
providing further access to the UAS or plug any loopholes in the safety aspects of their 
operations in the restricted airspace.  This procedure of providing incremental access 
from very low risk airspace to a high-risk airspace where safety systems have to be 
precise and efficient to avoid collisions will enable in breaking down the catch 22 
situation that exists at the moment between the regulators and potential UAS 
operators.  
4.5 Summary	
The integration of UAS into the national airspace system brings a fundamentally new 
aviation technology which has several benefits to society. However Unmanned 
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Aircrafts also introduce a risk paradigm that has to be managed to ensure safe 
operations in non-segregated airspace. The varied requirements and perspectives of 
different stakeholders make the problem more complex that can also be defined in 
terms of a wicked problem.  
There are several limitations in the current with regards to solving the major 
issues of UAS integration. Hence an analysis of the whole problem as a wicked 
problem lends itself to suggest few techniques of tacking such problems need to be 
adopted in case of UAS integration also. Primarily a key aspect is the fundamentally 
new technology of UAS means there needs to be a paradigm shift in the mind-set of 
the aviation authorities in terms of development of regulations and standards for UAS 
operations in non-segregated airspace. Also, other aspect which is lacking is the high 
level of collaboration between the major stakeholders to an international regulatory 
framework that would lead to similar rules across national boundaries.  
The systematic approach to analysis of the problem and suggestion of different 
approaches proposed in the paper will aid in further discussions on the integration of 
civil unmanned aircraft in non-segregated airspace.   
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Chapter	5: UAS	Sense	and	Avoid	Overview	
In an Unmanned Aircraft (UA), the pilot is not on-board the aircraft to perform the task 
of seeing and avoiding aircrafts which is the case in a manned aircraft [9]. Hence this 
becomes a significant issue when the cockpit and the pilot are placed remotely on the 
ground away from the flight deck of the aircraft.  
ICAO Annex 2 [10] lays out the ‘Rules of the Air’, and within which it states that: 
“An aircraft shall not be operated in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a 
collision hazard and the statement that It is important that vigilance for the purpose of 
detecting potential collisions be exercised on board an aircraft, regardless of the type 
of flight or the class of airspace in which the aircraft is operating…” 
The exercise of this vigilance, for the purpose of seeing and avoiding collision 
hazards, is referred to as the ‘See and Avoid’ principle [10]. In manned aircraft, the 
pilot in the cockpit exercises the ‘see and avoid’. The corresponding function in UAS 
as coined by the UAS community is the analogous principle of ‘Sense and Avoid’ 
[9,10]. Thus UAS ‘Sense and Avoid’ system is the technical capability to be developed 
in order to mitigate the lack of an on-board see and avoid capability for UAS [10].  
There are no formal definitions of the term ‘sense and avoid’ apart from the 
high-level requirement as mentioned in the quote above. There is no particular 
method, technology, functionality or performance that is required for the Sense and 
Avoid principle apart from the high-level requirements. In manned aircrafts, the pilot 
exercises the ‘see and avoid’ other aircrafts that is inherently independent of the 
avionics systems providing both separation provision and collision avoidance 
capability [10]. As a high-level requirement, Sense and Avoid is ‘the capability of UAS 
to stay well clear from and avoid collisions with other airborne traffic’ [9]. It consists of 
two parts [9], [10], as shown in Figure 5.1: 
 
Separation provision: Separation provision is a second layer of conflict management 
as per the ICAO ATM concept. Separation provision is the process of keeping well 
away from other aircrafts and also other fixed obstacles, by at least a certain 
separation minima, by way of tactical intervention. The separation provision function 
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takes into effect when just the first layer of strategic conflict management can no longer 
avert the separation conflict and the responsibility may be of the ATM service provider 
or airspace user or both. And the rules, procedures and roles of the actors are clearly 
decided before the separation provision process needs to take over.  
In the case of non-cooperative aircraft or in regions where there is no separation 
provision service provided, the separation has to be maintained by the airspace user 
alone and is referred to as self-separation. Similarly, a UAS sense and avoid system 
should be able to keep well clear of other aircrafts so as to maintain a safe separation.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Airspace Conflict Management 
Collision avoidance: Collision avoidance process takes over only when the other two 
layers in the conflict management layer have failed to remove conflict to a point where 
the flight crew or on-board systems perceive there is a risk of collision. The collision 
avoidance manoeuvres are taken on-board the aircraft in response to alerts and 
advisory from on-board system i.e. ACAS, instructions from controllers (based on 
alerts from ground based safety nets such as STCA) and finally the pilot’s visual 
acquisition resulting from constant visual scanning or by voice communication on 
traffic information by ATC or via cockpit display of traffic information.    
The pilot carries out the responsibility of maintaining vigilance at all times by 
exercising the see and avoid procedure. However, see and avoid procedure has many 
limitations related mainly to the flight crew and the weather conditions prevailing. 
Therefore, to aid the pilot to perform collision avoidance process an Airborne Collision 
  162 
Avoidance System (ACAS) safety net has been developed [10]. Currently in European 
airspace ACAS II is mandatory for all fixed wing aircraft above maximum take-off 
weight of 5700 kg or passenger approved seating configuration of over 19 [10].  
 
However other light aircrafts are exempt from this rule and also in uncontrolled 
airspace where transponder carriage for airspace users is not mandatory. Hence in 
these circumstances only means of collision avoidance is see and avoid. Thus, see 
and avoid procedure is a very important function and UAS sense and avoid must have 
a similar ability to ‘see and avoid’ capability of manned aircraft for them to carry out 
collision avoidance manoeuvres. 
Thus, the two components function of self-separation and collision avoidance 
together provide the UAS sense and avoid capability. These component functions 
operate in a layered approach to maintain safety and efficiency of the airspace. 
According to the ICAO concept, the conflict management process is applied in three 
layers: strategic conflict management, separation provision and collision avoidance. 
The layered approach ensures that only when failures occur in all the three layers 
would result in a collision [10]. The layered approach to safe and efficient ATM is as 
shown in Figure 5.1.  
5.1 Current	Progress	
The UAS ‘sense and avoid’ is an important factor for the integration of UAS in national 
airspace system. There are many organisations and programs around the world 
working on this important technology.  
In manned aircrafts, the pilot on-board are able to ensure self-separation and 
see and avoid other aircraft. However, for unmanned aircraft pilot is remotely located 
thus an alternative means of compliance is necessary. There are several alternative 
approaches that are possible which could in a phased manner reduce the restrictions 
on the operations of UAS in non-segregated airspace from the current situation.  
According to the current rules of CAA, If the UAS does not have sense and 
avoid system, the UAS could be flown outside segregated airspace only in 
uncontrolled airspace and within visual line of sight of the UA operator. And other 
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restrictions include that the maximum height of operation should be less than 400 feet 
and they should not be operated near aerodromes or within 150 metres of any 
congested area of a densely populated region [11]. A small aircraft (20 kg or less) as 
defined in the defined in air navigational order can operate under the above-mentioned 
operational procedures without complying with any airworthiness or flight crew 
licensing requirements.  However, a special permission from the CAA is necessary 
when flight is used for purposes of aerial work.  
Currently it appears that the introduction of UAS will be through a step-by-step 
approach, as the technology needs the time to mature and also to learn from the 
restricted access to the UAS.  
5.1.1 Airborne	Sense	and	Avoid	(ABSAA)	
Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA) is the approach to locate sensors on-board the 
unmanned aircraft to sense and detect other aircraft in the vicinity of its flight [9]. Most 
of the research in the UAS community has been mainly focussed on the ABSAA 
approach to gain routine access of UAS in the airspace system. 
An ABSAA solution development must have the ability to sense and detect both 
co-operative and non-cooperative air traffic type in the airspace. A significant concern 
is the development of an ABSAA system that will sense and detect non-cooperative 
aircraft in the vicinity of the UA. However, the complexity would be minimised if all the 
air traffic were co-operative, which is not the case [9]. 
The implementation of an ABSAA solution for UAS sense and avoid requires a 
major-architectural trade-off. This trade-off involves the role of the pilot in performing 
sense and avoid function.  There are two possible implementations with regards to the 
role of the pilot: pilot-in-the loop and autonomous operation. The two of the 
architecture differ in the decision-making role for sensing and avoiding functions [9]. 
A pilot-in-the-loop operation involves the use of sensor on-board the aircraft to 
send all the traffic information to the pilot on the ground to make decisions and take 
manoeuvre action of the unmanned aircraft if necessary. The pilot may be warned by 
an automated alert or conflict also may suggest manoeuvres to be taken to avoid 
conflicts, similar to ACAS today. This architecture is heavily dependent on 
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characteristics of the command and control link between the UA and UCS such as the 
latency, availability, integrity, reliability etc. [9].  
In autonomous S&A operations, still the sensors on-board the aircraft collect 
the traffic information and autonomously detect a conflict and determine a manoeuvre 
execute the manoeuvre and determine when to return to the original flight path. The 
action or manoeuvre to be taken may be informed to the pilot and he/she could over-
ride a manoeuvre if necessary. This architecture will be least affected by the 
vulnerabilities of the command and control link between UA and UCS.   
An airborne sense and avoid ability must be developed for detecting and 
avoiding both co-operative and non-cooperative type of air traffic. Although the 
implementation of cooperative sensors for sense and avoid is less complex to develop 
and certify, not all air traffic is cooperative thereby making non-cooperative sensors 
necessary [9]. In the following section advantages and disadvantages of both 
cooperative and non-cooperative ABSAA are described along with their approximate 
implementation timeline.  
 
Cooperative ABSAA: In a cooperative ABSAA, the sensors on board the aircraft 
receive information about the relative or absolute location of other aircraft carrying 
similar sensors. Thus aircraft, which carry such transponders for transponding or 
reporting location information, are called cooperative aircraft. Currently there are two 
cooperative capabilities namely the Mode-C transponders or Automatic Dependant 
Surveillance Broadcast (ADSB) [10].  
However, the Mode-C transponders and ADSB-OUT capability are not 
mandated for use on all types of aircraft and in all categories of airspace. Although the 
Mode-C transponders are mandated for certain areas of the airspace, they not directly 
appropriate for use on unmanned aircrafts. However, an adequate sense and avoid 
capability could be developed by using ADBS as the surveillance information source.  
It appears that Mode-C interrogation would not have the adequate position 
accuracy for an ABSAA; hence an ADSB-OUT capability will be required for ABSAA 
[9]. However, ADSB-OUT capability in the process of being rolled out and the aviation 
authorities in Europe and US have mandated the deployment of ADSB-OUT capability 
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in all regions of airspace where the Mode-C transponders are required today.  
The cooperative capability of ADSB-out is not planned to be mandatory for non-
commercial aircraft intending to operate in uncontrolled airspace (class E and G 
airspace). However cooperative ABSAA brings many advantages over a non-
cooperative solution [9]. Firstly, cooperative ABSAA would work on a surveillance 
technology whose integrity, accuracy and failure rate are already known. Secondly, 
the conflict detection and resolution algorithms are inherently simpler compared to 
non-cooperative sensors due to known accuracy and integrity of information. Thirdly, 
there is no need for multi-sensor fusion algorithms and associated processing thereby 
leading to lower power consumption that has an impact on the weight, power and size 
constraints of an unmanned aircraft [9]. Finally, the development and certification risks 
for the cooperative ABSAA are less due reduced complexity of the system. 
It is widely estimated the cooperative ABSAA solution would be operationally 
viable in the next ten years emerging through existing research, current deployment 
timeline for mandatory ADSB-out equipage and ongoing efforts on the development 
of standards for UAS operations [9]. Although the development and validation costs 
are less compared to non-cooperative ABSAA due to reduced complexity of detecting 
and sensing operation, there would be a cost in equipping the aircraft potentially 
operating in regions where UAS will be operating.  
The implementation of ADSB-out would enhance the safety of the airspace; it 
is unlikely all the airspace users can be mandated in equipping their aircrafts. There 
may be resistance from some of the user community. The development of a successful 
cooperative ABSAA for unmanned aircraft may also lead to technology transfer to 
manned aircraft operation to improve the overall safety of the airspace system.   
 
Non-cooperative ABSAA: The non-cooperative ABSAA principle of operation is similar 
to cooperative ABSAA, however the difference is that apart from detecting cooperative 
traffic (carrying Mode-C or ADSB transponders) they should also detect those aircrafts 
which do not report their position information via transponders. The detecting of such 
aircraft called as non-cooperative aircraft provide many complexities due their several 
attributes such as detecting in visual or Instrument Meteorological conditions; at all 
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time of the day; through ground clutter; varying dimensions, sizes, speeds and 
climbing rates; using multi-sensor processing and at a sufficient range so as to avoid 
collisions [9,12].  
The non-cooperative ABSAA solution has added complexity in view of 
development and certification due to the complex nature of avoidance and resolution 
algorithms, lack of know accuracy and integrity of sensor information and need for 
multi-sensor fusion algorithms on such kind of information [9]. There has been much 
research in the area of non-cooperative ABSAA many of which were analysed in detail 
in the second-year annual report, however much of the technology is at relatively low 
maturity levels.  It is envisaged that the development of a commercially viable non-
cooperative ABSAA capability is 12 years or more away [9].  
The added sensor and processing capabilities required on-board the aircraft 
give rise to increased cost as well as other constraints such as larger size and higher 
power consumption. The complexity of a non-cooperative ABSAA is significantly 
greater and the overall costs for development and certification are set be much more 
expensive than a cooperative ABSAA solution [9]. The development and 
implementation of a successful non-cooperative ABSAA could potentially be used in 
manned aircraft that may reduce the number of mid-air collisions leading to a safer 
national airspace system [9,10].  
5.1.2 Ground	Based	Sense	and	Avoid	(GBSAA)	
As has been described in the above section, the development and validation of a non-
cooperative ABSAA solution is at least ten years away [9]. Other drawback of such an 
ABSAA could be their usage in small UA (less than 30 kg) due to their much larger 
size and high-power requirements that may not be available on small UA [12].  Hence 
to enable operations of UAS beyond line of sight of a pilot on the ground, in the near 
to medium by providing a capability to detect air targets in the vicinity of UAS is 
needed. Thus, providing this capability by means of using off board sensors on the 
ground as an alternative approach to UAS sense and avoid is widely referred in the 
UAS community as ground based sense and avoid (GBSAA) system [8,12].  
GBSAA is seen as a near term solution which would become element of an 
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integrated sense and avoid system finally to enable uninterrupted access to entire 
national airspace [8]. An integrated sense and avoid system consisting of both the 
ground and airborne S&A elements is seen as the eventual solution. Hence GBSAA 
system will form a key part of the entire sense and avoid function [9].  
The FAA has provided an interim guidance for the operations of UAS through 
an alternate acceptable means of compliance which states that “If special types of 
radar or other sensors are utilized to mitigate risk, the applicant must provide 
supporting data which demonstrates that: both cooperative and non-cooperative 
aircraft, including targets with low radar reflectivity, such as gliders and balloons, can 
be consistently identified at all operational altitudes and ranges, and, the proposed 
system can effectively de-conflict a potential collision.”  [12] 
Hence alternate means of complying can be achieved by using already mature 
technologies such as 3D surveillance radars, other primary radars.  
 
Dedicated sensors: Dedicated ground based sensors, which can provide surveillance 
coverage over an area where the UAS operations are carried out. The air traffic 
information can be presented to the UAS pilot who can take any manoeuvring action 
if necessary. Although the technology exists, still research work has to be carried out 
to develop operational concepts, procedures, separation criteria and decision support 
tools for UAS pilot to ensure that the UA remains well clear of any intruding aircrafts 
that may cause potential conflict situation. As the sensor technologies already exist 
this kind of a solution could be implemented in the next one or two years [9]. The UAS 
operations have to be restricted to the areas of airspace where the surveillance 
coverage exists, hence limiting the operational flexibility of the UAS operations. 
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Figure 5.2 Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSA) dedicated sensor 
Repurposed sensors: However, a way to increase the operational flexibility could be 
look at existing air surveillance radars and other air traffic control radars for potential 
use as GBSAA. Existing surveillance radars are developed with signal processing 
techniques to reduce the clutter on the primary targets displayed. However, in order 
to ensure that all non-cooperative aircrafts are detected modifications have to be made 
in the signal processing aspect. Primary radars are normally two-dimensional radars 
providing no altitude information of the detected targets, thus post-processing 
algorithms would have to be used in order to provide a better estimate of the altitude 
of the primary radar targets. Repurposing the sensors would lead to additional 
development risks thereby delaying the operational implementation by further one or 
two years as compare to those for dedicated sensors [9]. While the operation of UAS 
is more extensive and the long-term lifecycle costs are low by opting for repurposed 
sensors, however the development risks associated with radar processing make this 
  169 
alternative less desirable as compared to using dedicated sensors for GBSAA 
operation [9].   
 
The GBSAA is a relatively unexplored concept in the UAS community and there 
are only a few locations in the world, which are currently close to performing a basic 
version of GBSAA in non-segregated airspace [9,12]. However, GBSAA is widely seen 
as a short to medium term certifiable solution for UAS integration in national airspace 
[8]. The GBSAA concept has also been approved by the US congress for technology 
development and validation as a near term solution for the UAS access needs in 
national airspace system.  
The US army has successfully tested and certified a ground based sense and 
avoid system at one of the army sites in order for UAS operations to take place during 
night times especially for training purposes [13]. This is a basic GBSAA 
implementation in which two ground based radar systems were connected and the 
traffic information provided to UAS observers who were responsible for landing the 
aircraft in case of any intruding aircraft entering the monitored airspace [13]. This effort 
is part of ongoing development that will lead to an eventual demonstration of an 
integrated ground based and airborne S&A system. 
Apart from this major development program, there is also a major research 
collaboration project in Australia called Smart Skies where one of the research areas 
for demonstration has been a Mobile Aircraft Tracking System (MATS) similar to the 
GBSAA concept [12]. The primary objective of MATS is to detect and track all airborne 
targets in the local airspace and provide this traffic information to the UAS operator. 
The MATS use low cost portable radar sensor to provide air traffic information of the 
local airspace in order to enable safe operation of UAS [12].  
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Chapter	6: Ground	Based	Sense	and	Avoid	
(GBSAA)	System	Concept	Overview	
6.1 Introduction	
The civil UAV market has been difficult to develop in the National Airspace System 
(NAS), this is primarily due to the restriction on the routine flight of UA.  UAS can be 
flown only in certain segregated areas on a ‘file and fly’ basis, which requires a prior 
permission from the aviation authority for operating UAS. There are number of factors 
which are responsible for the restriction of UAV operation in the national airspace and 
they vary depending on the size of UAV concerned: 
 
• For Large UA (above 150 kgs), integration into national airspace requires that 
they are highly reliable and follow the same rules as manned aircraft. 
• For smaller UA (between 15 to 150 kgs) different rules and regulations apply. 
• Even smaller UA (below 15 kgs), have to follow regulations and standards that 
are more aligned to radio controlled aircraft models rather than complex 
commercial aircraft. 
 
This idea concentrates on the small UA part of the UAS market and should 
allow them to be practically used by a broad range of end-users. It will allow small 
UAVs to be flown at relatively low altitudes, out of line of sight, outside controlled 
airspace (in fact one of the main product features is the ability to ensure that the UA 
does not fly in controlled airspace). The one important thing to consider is that the 
range of operation will be limited by the system performance and conditions, likely to 
be 10 to 15 miles radius of the system. This should not be a major limitation as small 
UA have short ranges at low altitudes. The system would not be restricted only to small 
UAS operation but it could be extended for operation of larger UAS if a number of 
systems were daisy chained together. 
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Problem 
The major issue to resolve for small UAS is collision avoidance, which mainly focuses 
on collisions with manned aircrafts and incursion into the controlled airspace. This 
product will ensure that small UAVs stay within a predefined area well clear of 
controlled airspace and if any air vehicle fly into the predefined area then the UAV 
could be redirected. 
 
Small UAVs are inherently safe due to their low mass and kinetic energy. However 
this gives them two major drawbacks: 
• The UAV cannot carry significant avionics suite including for example a radar 
altimeter and collision avoidance systems. 
• It is difficult to duplicate or triplicate the systems that are on-board a small UA. 
This is also driven by the requirement to make them simple and affordable. 
 
The small payload means that two major safety aims cannot robustly be met, that is 
to avoidance of the ground and other air vehicle. 
 
Solution 
The solution to the problem is to place the collision avoidance and terrain avoidance 
system on the ground. At its simplest level a UA developed collision avoidance system 
could merely be used on the ground. The placement of the equipment on the ground 
however would afford a number of advantages in the design of the equipment as mass 
and power would not be considerations. The system design would also allow in 
operational calibration of the sensors. Therefore a more tailored solution could be 
developed. Additionally the decision-making aspects of the system could bring human 
into the loop and use other ground based surveillance systems such as primary and 
secondary radar.  
The idea of the system is to monitor an area of airspace and give to the UA 
operator an area, which is safe to fly in. If another vehicle is detected then the UA flight 
path can be altered if any condition is anticipated.  
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The system has an added benefit of increasing the overall integrity of the air 
vehicle, as the system will monitor the position of the UA independently of the UA GPS 
system. By correlating the positions from the GBSAA and UA GPS it will be possible 
to assess the condition of the overall system. As the number of UAVs deployed is 
increased so the integrity level will increase, as more sources of position will be 
available. It will also place the system in a good position to manage the overall 
operation of the UA, especially if a number of CA ground stations are networked 
together. 
6.2 GBSAA	System	Concept	
6.2.1 System	Requirements	
Given below are some of the system requirements that have been identified at this 
stage: 
 
• Primary requirement of the system is to provide aerial surveillance capability.  
• It should be able to detect aerial obstacles such as UA, balloons, parachutes, 
birds, light aircrafts and also big commercial aircrafts. 
• Typical range of the system would be 15 to 20 miles radius of the system. This 
is limited by the system performance and conditions. 
• Provide operational calibration of the sensors by correlating the positions of UA 
from the GBSAA and UA GPS. 
• Many GBSAA ground stations to be networked to maintain overall operation of 
UAS. 
• Allow flight of UAS only in uncontrolled airspace and ensure they do not enter 
controlled airspace. 
• Small UAVs to be flown beyond line of sight 
• Allow small UAVs to be flown at low altitudes 
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6.2.2 Stakeholders		
An initial stakeholder analysis has been carried out in order to capture the potential 
stakeholders of the system and also to determine the basic interactions/influences that 
exist between each of them. The stakeholders have been identified and grouped as 
show in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Potential Stakeholders and their Grouping 
Between the stakeholders many interactions occur which affect the successful 
development of the system and its entry into the market. The main stakeholder’s 
influences have been identified in Figure 6.2. 
There are many influences taking place between the stakeholders and it is 
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important to identify the level of influence that each of the stakeholders will have on 
the development of the system, which has a profound effect on the success/failure of 
the project. Stakeholders can be further categorised into their degree of importance 
(i.e. the degree to which the stakeholder is to gain/loose with the success/failure of the 
project) and the degree of influence (i.e. the ability of the stakeholder to affect the 
project) according to a binary scale. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Stakeholder Influence Map 
6.2.3 System	Definition	
6.2.3.1 System	Description	
A ground based UAV collision avoidance system comprises of a ground-based sensor 
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or combination of sensors, the output of which is then signal processed to detect the 
presence of targets in a confined area scanned by the sensors. The detected targets 
are then tracked continuously with the continuous scanning of the sensors. Overall 
integrity of the system can be improved by correlating the location of UAV from the 
ground-based sensor and the GPS location from the UAV. The calibrated tracks and 
the original tracks are fused to display on to a monitor, which can be used by the UAV 
controller to monitor the airspace where the UAV is operating in. The system could be 
programmed to trigger warnings in order to inform UAV pilot in case of potential 
conflicts with other airborne targets.  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Ground based UAV Collision Avoidance System 
6.2.3.2 Use	Case	
The use cases represent the functionality of the actors in the system. The users of the 
Ground based UAV collision avoidance system are UAV operator, ATM system and 
the Weather monitoring system as shown in fig 5. UAV operator utilises the ground 
based UAV CAS to perform tasks, such as monitor area of airspace, detect potential 
conflicts and also monitor weather and ATC information. ATM system performs the 
task of providing the ATC information to the UAV operator. And the Weather 
Monitoring system performs the task of providing weather information to the UAV 
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operator. The Figure 6.4 also shows the dependencies between the various 
functionalities of the UAV CAS system. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Ground based UAV CAS use case diagram 
6.2.3.3 System	Overview	
The current position of the CAA is that sense and avoid system developed for UAV 
must be able to achieve the same level of capability and safety which is equivalent to 
the existing ‘see and avoid’ concept for manned aircrafts. In view of this requirement, 
the UAVs must show adequate capability to avoid non-cooperative targets in 
uncontrolled airspace. The obvious way to achieve a solution is by placing airborne 
sensor on the UAV, which can sense and avoid other air obstacles. However, in the 
near term i.e. in the next several years the technologies that will enable the UAVs to 
sense and avoid similar to manned aircrafts does not seem to be available in the 
foreseeable future. Hence the other possibility to develop a reliable sense and avoid 
system is by looking at a ground based collision detection solution. In order for the 
sense and avoid mechanism to meet the safety standards as required by the CAA, 
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developing a sense and avoid system, that is only based on the ground would not be 
sufficient.  
 
One of the major drawbacks of using only a ground based collision avoidance system 
means that the air surveillance information has to be available to the UAV at all times 
to autonomously avoid other airborne targets. This in turn implies the dependence of 
the ground based sense and avoid system on the communication link between the 
UAV and ground control station to be highly reliable. Hence it would not be possible 
to a guarantee a highly reliable communication link; there might be instances where 
the communication link might be lost due to technical malfunction or weather 
conditions etc. Therefore in case of a failure of the communication, the UAV flight in 
non-segregated airspace will affect the safety of other aircrafts in the airspace even if 
contingency plans have been put in place. During the period when communication link 
is down between the ground control station and UAV, the UAV would have to operate 
without any form of a sense and avoid system. This situation would lead to the non-
compliance of the safety standards as per the requirement of the CAA.  
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Figure 6.5 System level interactions of Ground based CAS 
Other drawback of the ground-based system is that the safety of the airspace would 
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be severely hampered due to the lack of local situational awareness of other air 
obstacles around it that is available to the UAV. Thus in the instance of ground sensor 
sending incorrect information to the UAV, the UAV does not have the ability to check 
the integrity of the data available from the ground system. Hence apart from a ground 
based collision avoidance system there is a need for an airborne system, which acts 
as a last line of defence for the UAV to avoid it from colliding into other aerial obstacles 
especially manned aircrafts.  
The airborne sense and avoid system, would be used only as a secondary 
system that would be complementing the ground based collision avoidance system. 
Hence the requirements and performance specifications of the airborne sensors would 
be less demanding compared to the ground based sensors. In this way, the use of 
airborne proximity warning system will greatly improve the integrity of the UAS sense 
and avoid system.  
The overall system for the operation of small UAS in uncontrolled airspace is 
as shown in Figure 6.6. The ground based sense and avoid system interacts with other 
systems in order to provide the efficient and safe flow of air traffic in the uncontrolled 
airspace. Apart from interacting with the UAV ground control station, the sense and 
avoid system gathers information form the weather monitoring system in order to 
represent the areas of severe weather conditions on the sense and avoid display. This 
will help the UAV pilot to steer clear of harsh weather conditions that could affect the 
operation of the UAV.  The UAV ground control station should also be able to 
communicate with Air Traffic Control (ATC) in order to provide information on system 
failure of any UAV. Also, the ATC could provide information on any commercial aircraft 
that might be heading towards the uncontrolled airspace where the UAV is operating 
due to a system flaw or error. Figure 6.6 also shows the additional uplink data that has 
to be transmitted to the UAV when sense and avoid system is based on the ground.  
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Figure 6.6 Overall system Overview 
6.2.3.4 System	Operational	Aspects	
The air target information obtained by the ground based CAS could be used in several 
ways by the UAV ground control station. The operational requirement of the collision 
avoidance system should be able to adapt its operational aspects depending on the 
mission of the UAV or if the situation of the UAV flight demands be in case of failure 
of other UAV systems. The ground CAS could be used for providing the following 
primary system operational requirements: 
 
Strategic Collision Avoidance System (CAS): (verification of navigation accuracy) this 
is one of the most important and primary operational aspects to be provided by the 
ground CAS. The air surveillance data obtained from the ground-based sensor would 
be available on a display in the UAV ground control station.  The sense and avoid 
system will not only fuse the air surveillance data and display it but it will fuse the 
position of the UAV obtained from the ground based sensor and the corresponding 
location obtained from the GPS placed in the UAV. Hence the comparison of the 
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location from two different sensor sources will improve the integrity of the data. Also 
the necessary correction can be made and fused with the airborne target data, which 
would provide more accurate information display to the UAV ground control station. 
Thus the strategic CAS could also improve the data integrity of the GPS obtained 
information that is vital part of the navigational system in a UAV. 
 
Pure Navigational System (Duplicate or secondary system): In small UAVs the primary 
system used for navigation is a GPS. But the disadvantage is that they cannot carry 
redundant systems to improve reliability as is done by the larger UAVs. In the event of 
failure of the GPS or instances where the satellite constellations are invisible to the 
UAV (due to terrain or weather conditions prevalent), the navigational capability of the 
UAV could be severely hampered. This produces a massive risk to the safety of the 
airspace and may well lead to the UAV colliding into other airspace users. In such an 
instance, the ground based CAS could act as a secondary navigational system by 
transmitting the current UAV location to the aerial system. The air vehicle data 
obtained from the ground-based sensor could be transmitted to the UAV via the air 
surveillance data uplink. The UAV location data messaged could be updated very 
frequently in such a case so that UAV could use this information as a pure navigational 
system. Hence this would act as a redundant navigation system for the UAS flight in 
non-segregated airspace.  
 
Tactical Mobile Sensor: Another operational use of the CAS could be as mobile sense 
and avoid system for rapid deployment of UAVs. If the sensor could be such that it 
could be configured for use on mobile platforms, this would provide a great advantage 
especially in search and rescue operation where rapid deployment is imperative. The 
sensor placed on a vehicle could be driven to any location as when the need arises or 
it could place on a temporary basis anticipating any incident may occur that may need 
quick deployment.  
 
Covert Operation:  For the military use of UAVs, it is necessary that UAV flight in UK 
airspace must be conducted in a covert manner. Under normal operation, the military 
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UAVs use transponders to broadcast their location information every few seconds for 
their entire flight in the UK airspace. Hence without the transponder, the ground 
controllers would not have any idea of the location of the UAV in the airspace. In such 
circumstance, the ground based CAS could provide the UAV operator with the position 
of the UAV. 
 
Integrated Surveillance Architecture: The passive sensor could be part of future 
integrated surveillance architecture for the non-cooperative air traffic users. In several 
years air travel is projected to rise steadily and this means a crowded airspace. Hence 
to allow all the aircrafts to efficiently fly in a crowded airspace, there would be a huge 
requirement for reducing the separation distance between the aircrafts. In order to 
operate these aircrafts close together without compromising on safety and efficiency 
of airspace would be a major challenge to address in the future. One of the ways to 
address such concerns is by using technologies that will improve situational 
awareness of the aircrafts in the airspace. Also enabling the ATC operator to better 
understand the nature of airspace in which the aircraft is operating. Passive sensor 
technology is one such system, which would help the UAV operator to identify the non-
cooperative targets in the airspace. With the ability for the ATC operator to see both 
cooperative and non-cooperative technologies, it provides a better situational 
awareness for the ground operator.  
 
Portable air traffic control sensor system: The ground based sense and avoid system 
when integrated with other surveillance mechanisms such as ADSB (Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast) and other flight information services broadcasts, 
could provide a better situational awareness of the air traffic in the local airspace. In 
this way, the information on position and heading of the airspace users could be used 
to maintain the separation between the manned and unmanned aircrafts as well as 
between all other airspace users. Hence the capability to detect both cooperative and 
non-cooperative air targets the portable system could be used in providing aerial 
surveillance in several applications involving both manned and unmanned aircrafts. 
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Integrated Portable Collision Avoidance System: An integrated solution could be 
developed for coastal surveillance applications. The existing costal radar infrastructure 
could be used as illuminators of opportunity for a passive collision avoidance system 
on the air. When the UAV is operating in an area with radar coverage, the passive 
sensor on the UAV could receive the reflected signals from nearby air targets to 
determine the characteristics of air obstacles around the UAV. The air traffic data could 
be used by the UAV itself to make decisions or it could be sent to the UAV ground 
operator who may then direct the UAV on possible actions to be taken. 
6.2.4 GBSAA	Functional	Overview	
The USAS functions can be divided into two categories as pre-flight functions and 
flight operational functions. A brief description of the USAS functionalities is as given 
below: 
1. Pre-flight functions: The various functions, which are carried before the unmanned 
aircraft starts its flight procedure, are referred to as pre-flight functions. Below are 
the pre-flight functions of the GBSAA: 
● Deployment planning: This is an important pre-flight function, which provides a 
profile of the sensor coverage and communications link availability for a 
requested flight path. It validates that the system integrity will be maintained 
throughout the flight operations by being within the coverage area of the 
GBSAA and thereby able to maintain separation standards at all times except 
during situation of loss of communication link. 
● Flight plan validation: Flight plan validation function checks the flight intentions 
against the existing airspace structure resolves any inconsistencies and 
authorises the flight plan. It uses information from the ATC centres to get latest 
updates on any restriction for the area of uncontrolled airspace currently under 
surveillance by the GBSAA. The flight plan validation functionality is somewhat 
similar to the flight plan processing performed in the current ATM environment.  
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Figure 6.7 GBSAA functional block diagram 
2. Flight operational functions: These functions are carried out during the flight 
operations of the unmanned aircrafts and they are all safety critical in nature that 
is any failure in their performance can be detrimental to the safety of the airspace. 
● Sensor validation: Sensor validation is the most important functionality for the 
UAS operation and it is highly safety critical in nature. The sensor validation 
system compares the position data received from the on-board air vehicle to 
the location information coming in from the ground-based sensor. It checks the 
deviation in correlated data between them is above a certain standard required 
navigation performance level, the system can be shutdown to avoid further 
degradation of the overall system. 
● Contingency planning: The contingency planning function consists of a set of 
possible emergency landing points that are closest to the UAV when it goes 
into an emergency mode. Depending on the flight plan of the UAV, a set of 
contingency plans is generated before pre-flight and during an emergency 
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situation the contingency planner provides a set of options to the UAS operator. 
● Flight following: This function is real time flight path validation system that is it 
checks the flight intentions in the original flight plan against the actual flight path 
taken and confirms that the flight is following its original flight plan or it alerts 
the UAS operator of the violation of the flight plan of the aircraft.  
● Conflict detection: Conflict detection is a key function of GBSAA as it is 
responsible for maintaining safe separation between the unmanned aircraft and 
other airspace users. The de-separation algorithm receives the air surveillance 
picture data from the ground based sensor and determines the potential 
aircrafts that may led to violation of separation. It then computes a safe 
manoeuvre to be taken or area where the unmanned aircraft can operate in 
order to maintain the safe separation distance from the threat aircrafts. This 
way any possible conflicts with other airspace users in the monitored area is 
avoided and ensured that unmanned aircraft stay well clear of threat aircrafts 
so that there is no possibility of a near mid-air collision.  
● Decision-making: The decision-making function is a support tool which enables 
the UAS operator to make the decision on the overall condition of the system 
and perform actions if the system performance is below a certain required level. 
It integrates the system performance across all the GBSAA flight operation 
functions and presents an overview of the overall condition of the system. This 
whole system condition-monitoring picture aids the UAS operator to making 
critical decisions on operating the system at the current performance levels. 
6.2.5 GBSAA	System	Elements	
The architecture of GBSAA concept of operations consists of several key elements. 
Several aspects of these elements are interdependent and have an impact on the 
operations of the whole system. The elements also vary depending on the several 
factors such as the location of sensor, operating airspace and a given unmanned 
platform. Hence it is important to determine the how the GBSAA system aspects vary 
based on these various factors.  There are five main elements that will impact the 
overall operation of the GBSAA system. 
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The first element is a ground-based surveillance sensor. It provides a local 
capability for the detection of cooperative and non-cooperative aircrafts flying in the 
surveillance region in order to support UAS operations in the operating airspace. The 
surveillance sensor will form a key element of the sense and avoid architecture as it 
determines the time required to detect and track a target.  The detection and track 
times of the surveillance sensor are highly dependent on the probability of detection 
of the sensor at the target intrusion point. The probability of detection in turn depends 
on several factors such as terrain obstacles in the local environment, target 
characteristics and its location. It is important to determine the site-specific factors of 
the surveillance radar that impact the detection and track acquisition times of the radar. 
For safe operation of UAS in non-segregated airspace, the UAS must operate at a 
safe separation distance above the bottom of radar coverage and also within the 
horizontal coverage area of radar, such that the intruding aircraft can be detected and 
tracked in time to avoid the collision risk.  
The second element is the separation strategy. Separation strategy refers to 
the separation procedures and margin of separation from the traffic encountered. The 
margin of separation aspect is determined by evaluating the time take to evaluate all 
the stages involved in the sense and avoid encounter process. A typical sense and 
avoid encounter consists of following stages: detect and track, evaluate collision 
potential, prioritize threat to raise alert, evaluate avoidance manoeuvre and finally 
execute the manoeuvre. Currently, the separation measure used by the ATC (Air 
Traffic Control) for manned aircraft separation conflict alerting is based on a vertical 
separation of 1000 feet and a lateral separation of 1 nautical mile [11]. However, these 
are for manned aircraft operation as well as in regions where there is ATC control. 
Thus, these measures would not be suited for UAS and especially those operating in 
uncontrolled airspace. In order for UAS operations in uncontrolled airspace supported 
by USAS on the ground, there is need to understand and examine the margin of 
separation for various traffic situations. 
The third element is the GBSAA display. The GBSAA display acts as an 
interface that provides the air traffic information to the UAS operator. The primary 
objective of the GBSAA display is to provide the UAS operator with an air situation 
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picture, so that the operator has the situational awareness information to ensure safe 
UAS operations. The GBSAA system will provide level 2 situational awareness to the 
UAS operator. Hence the pilots need to be presented with the information in an 
effective way so that they take evasive action when separation violation is predicted.   
The final element is the crew workload level. Depending on the several variations of 
the locating the GBSAA display (in GCS or separate ground observer station for 
GBSAA operator) a UAS pilot/observer will have the task of monitoring the GBSAA 
display and taking manoeuvring actions in the event of a potential collision. The 
separation procedures will have an impact on the crew workload level and it is critical 
to determine a set of separation procedures that will be able to manage the crew 
workload to an acceptable level.  
6.3 GBSAA	Systems	Operation	
6.3.1 GBSAA	Concept	of	Operation	
The primary objectives of the GBSAA system are; firstly, to be able to detect and track 
both cooperative as well as non-cooperative aircrafts that may intrude in the 
operational area of the UAS, and secondly the ability of the GBSAA system to 
effectively de-conflict a potential collision.  
In a GBSAA system operation, a ground-based sensor continuously detects 
and tracks the UA under the control of GCS and also other aircrafts within the sensor 
surveillance region. The detected air targets are then displayed to the UAS operator 
present on the ground. In case of a loss of separation between the UA and any other 
intruding aircraft that may lead to a potential collision, an alert is generated and 
displayed. Based on the alert the UAS operator decides the necessary manoeuvre to 
be taken and executes it so that UA moves to a safe location. Hence the GBSAA 
sensor continuously provides situational awareness information to the UAS operator. 
Apart from detection of UA by sensor, the UA position information is also available at 
the GCS as it tracks the UA through its GPS position received via the telemetry link 
continuously. 
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Figure 6.8 Concept of using GBSAA for operations of UAS in non-segregated airspace 
The initial GBSAA implementation is envisaged for UAS operations in the non-
segregated airspace and an incremental access procedure would be followed. Hence 
the GBSAA system being discussed here is aimed at UAS operations in uncontrolled 
airspace. However, the concept of operations does not change when the operations 
are carried out in controlled airspace and for different operational scenarios to access 
the airspace in the future. 
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Figure 6.9 GBSAA service level view 
6.3.2 Operational	Level	Description	
At the service level, the GBSAA acts as a stand-alone system that provides a service 
to the users (in this case UAS pilot). In order to provide the service, GBSAA has to 
interact with the users as well as with external systems in the overall system-of 
systems and its external environment. The several interactions of the GBSAA with the 
outside environment to provide the service are shown below through the external view. 
 
Operational Scenarios 
The operational concept of GBSAA has been developed by using scenario-based 
analysis of the operational needs of GBSAA from UAS pilot’s perspective in case of 
an intruding aircraft about to enter or within a defined threat volume. 
There are two proposed scenarios that are as follows: 
● Air traffic situation display  
● Intruder alert 
 
Scenario 1: Infringement of intruder aircraft  
Context   
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GBSAA provides air traffic situation awareness all the air targets both cooperative and 
non-cooperative aircraft in a surveillance region. The surveillance region covers an 
area for air traffic from the ground level up to 3000-4000 ft. and a radial distance from 
the radar of approximately 15 –20 nautical miles. 
Trigger Event  
An intruding aircraft enters the threat volume that may result in separation violation 
between the UA and the intruding aircraft. 
UAS operator Actions 
The actions taken by the UAS operator provided with the GBSAA are following: 
● Determine the position, speed and altitude of the intruding aircraft 
● Initiate a landing of the UA or a separation manoeuvre depending on the current 
position of intruding aircraft. 
Impact on UAS Operator  
The impact of the UAS operator actions for an infringement in the surveillance area is 
as follows: 
● Loss of critical oversight of UA monitoring  
● Workload of UAS operator increases: situation monitoring 
 
Scenario 2: Track quality or uncertainty information  
Context 
Similar to Scenario 1 
Trigger Event 
The uncertainty in the position of UA is above a specified threshold. The uncertainty 
information is obtained by correlation of position of UA form its radar track information 
and GPS position on board the UA. 
UAS Operator Actions 
The actions taken by the UAS operator with the GBSAA are as follows: 
● Wait for 5 seconds or until next refresh time of radar 
● If uncertainty still above allowed threshold, then land the UA as soon as 
possible  
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Impact on UAS operator  
The impact of the UAS operator actions for an uncertainty threshold warning: 
● Increase workload – situation monitoring for more than normal time 
● Loss of critical oversight of UA monitoring  
 
Operational Services  
This section provides a description of the services provided by the GBSAA from a user 
perspective using the operational scenarios presented in the previous section. 
Air Traffic Situation Display 
Through the detection of all air targets it is aimed to provide the traffic situation picture 
to UAS operator for adequate monitoring of aircrafts within the surveillance zone. 
Service Description   
Definition: Provision of position reports of CT and NCT targets in a pre-defined 
surveillance zone. 
Operational range: The service shall be available in a pre-defined surveillance zone, 
in all traffic densities and primarily for uncontrolled traffic region. 
Dependencies:  The performance of the radar will be affected by surrounding 
environment and prevailing weather conditions. 
 
Quality of service parameters Details Performance characteristics 
Detection range Effective range of radar based on 
local constraints 
Typical values: 
Horizontal: 15 to 20 NM radius 
Vertical: from ground to 5000ft. 
Probability of detection Probability of target detection 
based on target characteristics 
(mainly RCS) 
>99% for targets greater than RCS 
of 2m2  
>96% for targets less than RCS of 
2m2 
Probability of false alarms Probability of false alarms raised 
against total number of target 
detections 
 
Position accuracy Horizontal  
Vertical 
 
Speed vector accuracy Horizontal speed 
Vertical speed 
 
Update rate  Maximum time allowed between 
two position reports 
Between 1s and 5s 
Table 8: Quality of Service Aspects [15] 
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Threat area infringement warning  
The threat area infringement warning service provides warning to UAS operator in the 
event of a target aircraft entering the threat area. 
Service Description   
Definition: Provision of warnings to UAS operator for airspace infringements caused 
by target aircraft. The warnings are provided with a parameter time to infringement or 
after entering the threat area (selected by the user). 
Operational range: The service shall be available in the entire threat area and in 
uncontrolled airspace under all traffic densities. 
Responsibilities: Significant change in responsibility of UAS operators as they have to 
react to warning.  
Dependencies:  The service depends on the target detection to obtain target position 
and state vectors. 
 
Quality of service parameters Details Performance characteristics 
Warning response time Time delay between a target 
infringement situation occurring at 
the input to the warning being 
generated at its output  
<1s 
Probability of false infringement 
warning 
Probability that the service reports 
infringement when there may not 
be any  
**No more than 3 per week of 
operations 
Probability of nuisance warning  Probability that the service reports 
a short-living target infringement 
situation (duration is below pre-
defined value) 
 
Table 9: Quality of Service Aspects [15] 
Track uncertainty warning 
The track uncertainty warning service provides warning to UAS operator about track 
quality below a pre-defined threshold. 
Service Description   
Definition: Provision of warnings to UAS operator for track quality below the pre-
defined threshold level.  
Operational range: The service shall be available in the entire surveillance area and 
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in uncontrolled airspace under all traffic densities. 
Responsibilities: Significant change in responsibility of UAS operators as they have to 
react to warning.  
Dependencies:  
The service depends on the target detection to obtain target position and state vectors. 
Correlation of radar UA position report and UA position report from GCS required 
accessing the GPS data for UA communicated via telemetry link to GCS. 
 
Quality of service parameters Details Performance characteristics 
Warning response time Time delay between a track 
quality uncertainty situation 
occurring at the input to the 
warning being generated at its 
output  
<1s 
Probability of false infringement 
warning 
Probability that the service reports 
track uncertainty when there may 
not be any  
No more than 3 per week of 
operations 
Probability of nuisance warning  Probability that the service reports 
a short-living track uncertainty 
situation (duration is below pre-
defined value) 
 
Table 10: Quality of Service Aspects [14], [15] 
6.3.3 GBSAA	system	Analysis	
Placing a UAV collision avoidance system on ground provides for many distinct 
advantages. The primary advantage of placement of equipment on the ground is that 
in the design of equipment, mass and power would no longer be considerations. Other 
benefit of a ground based sense and avoid system is, it provides a complete 360 
degrees view of the approaching air traffic and a large detection range compared to 
airborne collision avoidance system which provide only the frontal view of the air 
targets within a short range.  Finally, this system keeps the human in the loop for 
decision-making aspects involved with UAS operation.  
As the sense and avoid system is for use primarily in uncontrolled airspace and 
replaces the human pilots eyes in the sky, only the non-cooperative technologies are 
being investigated.  Non-cooperative technologies are those that do not rely on other 
aircrafts carrying a similar device to detect them in the shared airspace. Another 
  193 
advantage of non-cooperative technology is the fact that it can used to detect both 
airborne targets as well as ground-based obstacles. These non-cooperative 
technologies can be divided into two basic systems: active and passive. Active 
systems are those that transmit a particular kind of signal and wait for reflections form 
the surrounding environment to detect the presence of nearby obstacles. Some 
examples of which are radar, sonar and lidar. On the other hand, passive systems, 
listen to the signals transmitted or reflected from other obstacles in the vicinity for their 
detection.  A few examples of this type of system are acoustic, passive radar, EO 
(Electro-optic) and IR (Infra-Red) systems. 
 
Boat Radars 
Boat radar is used for avoiding collisions with other ships or obstacles at sea and is 
extremely important under adverse weather conditions such as fog or heavy rain when 
the visible horizon is very low. The range of the radar is highly dependent on the 
frequency as well as the clutter environment that exists around the radar. Generally, 
the horizontal beam width of marine radars is much less compared to the vertical beam 
width to provide better accuracy and resolution between targets.  
 
Range 
 From 20 nm to approximately 100 nm 
(Dependant on operating wavelength & existing environmental conditions) 
 
Antenna types 
Radome  
  Approximate 20” in size 
  Range up to 40 nm 
  Price range – 2500 to 3000 (in dollars) 
 Planar Array 
  Approximately 4’ in size 
  Range up to 100 nm 
  Price range – 5000 – 8000 (in dollars) 
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During navigation in turbulent weather a variation in the roll of between 10 to 15 
degrees (without use of a radar levelling system) one side of radar can detect 
underwater vessels such as submarines whereas other side can detect aircrafts. This 
is due to the tilting of the radar antenna towards the side of the rolling of the boat.  
This phenomenon may be useful to investigate further and look into whether 
boat radars can provide a low-cost solution for detecting low flying aircrafts in the 
coastal areas. 
If a boat radar were fixed above a lighthouse structure in a tilted manner, such 
that it is able to detect low flying aircrafts, a disadvantage is that during half of the scan 
period radar coverage is towards the ground and during the other half the coverage is 
on the airspace above. Hence by using one of these a portion of the airspace can only 
be covered in a single scan period of the radar. Thereby many radar sensors have to 
employ to cover airspace if a complete circular region around single radar has to be 
covered. Although this could be done, a major limitation in the installation in the 
network of lighthouses is that each lighthouse is scattered at various locations. Thus 
the whole airspace would be difficult to cover by just installing the radars on top of 
each lighthouse in the lighthouse network. Hence it would not be appropriate to use 
commercially available boat radars in an arrangement to satisfy the system 
requirements. 
 
Thales Coastal Radar family 
The new coast watcher family of radars consists of a portfolio of three variations for 
providing a capability for any coastal surveillance application.  
The coast watcher 10 is medium range coastal surveillance radar, covering 
distances of about 42 nm from the radar.  The kinds of mission capabilities of this radar 
are site surveillance (ports, platforms etc.), anti- intrusion detection and territorial 
waters surveillance. Some of its features are that it can detect small targets (wooden 
boats, jet-skis etc.) under all weather conditions. The radar is well suited in terms of 
the range available but it does not provide any aerial surveillance capability for 
detecting low flying aircrafts. 
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The Coast Watcher 100 is long-range coastal surveillance radar that also 
provides a low altitude surveillance capability apart from the ability to detect surface 
targets. Surface targets up to range of 100 nm can be detected and aerially it can 
detect small aircrafts flying at about 1500 ft. Some of its mission capabilities are to 
provide site surveillance, territorial waters monitoring and coastal policing. Automatic 
detection of all targets under all weather conditions is possible with this radar. Although 
it serves the aerial surveillance capability, however it is limited in coverage and other 
disadvantage is that the antenna size is large compared to coast watcher 10. One 
other problem would be the higher cost associated with a bigger radar. The cost of the 
radar and its inability to satisfy the complete set of features required would be a major 
driver towards inability of choosing this product to provide a solution.  
 
 
Finally, the third radar is Coast Watcher 200, which is a very long-range surveillance 
and early warning system operating at distances of over 200 nm. It uses over the 
horizon technology to detect targets at very long distances. Some of the missions 
performed by the coast watcher 200 are fisheries protection, territorial waters 
surveillance and coastal defence. One of the major drawbacks towards the 
implementation of this system is the cost as it would be expensive to install and 
maintain the radar during its period of operation. The cost of acquiring and running 
radar would be much more than cost of a UAV. Hence the cost factor would be a major 
hurdle towards the deployment of this system.  
 
Thales Homeland Alerter 100 
Homeland Alerter is a passive coherent location sensor, which uses the transmissions 
from FM radio broadcasts. The transmission signals could be extended to include 
analogue as well as digital TV. It has been developed to offer capabilities mainly for 
homeland security such as coastal surveillance, airport protection and sensitive site 
protection. The sensor provides all day surveillance with the ability to track real time 
air targets and having a detection range of nearly 100 km. It could be configurable for 
mobile platforms or fixed sites. A further set of specifications for the product is not 
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available at the moment. And also, an approximate estimate of the cost of the product 
is not available yet. The cost will be a major factor for use of this radar into the system. 
The cost of the product can be justified if the sensor could be used for dual purpose. 
That is if it could provide a capability for the detection of surface and aerial targets. 
Although this a potentially cheaper mean compared to a conventional radar. And they 
could be used as part of a network of sensors that when deployed can provide a 
detection capability throughout an area of uncontrolled airspace.  
In the next stage, the technical specifications of the Homeland Alerter has to be 
looked into and an assessment of whether it is able to detect small targets such as 
UAVs as well as surface targets such as jet-skies or small wooden boats. It is very 
important that the radar sensor is able to detect these types of targets.  
 
ThalesRaytheonSystems Improved Sentinel Radar Sense and Avoid Display 
System 
The Improved Sentinel Sense and Avoid system utilises Sentinel Radar which is a 
highly mobile, three-dimensional phased array systems operating at X band frequency 
range. The Radar automatically detects, tracks and identifies other airborne objects 
including helicopters, UAVs, gliders, small aircrafts and balloons. The air surveillance 
coverage of the radar has an elevation angle of 55 degrees and azimuth coverage of 
360 degrees with a search range of more than 75 Km.  
 
The improved Sentinel Radar coupled with the SAVDS software from SAVDS Inc., 
provides a high level of safety for UAVs flying in global airspace. The software system 
fuses the UAV GPS position data with target data from the ground-based radar on to 
a display co-located with the UAV ground control station. Any air conflict data could 
be available for immediate viewing by the UAV pilot. 
 
SAVDS Inc. and TRS are actively involved in a validation program, the aim of which 
is to systematically demonstrating and documenting the functionality of the SAVDS. 
Currently the validation testing is at phase 3 which involves the actual UAS flight   with 
the live data form sentinel sense and avoid system for flight de-confliction with all 
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airborne obstacles compared to de-confliction recommendation from a chase aircraft. 
The next phase would involve compiling and analysing the results obtained from the 
previous phases and providing the necessary documentation of the validation testing 
as well as further demonstrations to the FAA achieve full system certification.  
 
Table 11: Comparison of radar sensors 
Alternative Sensor Technologies 
 
LIDAR 
LIDAR technology is a new emerging technology and it is being used mostly in aerial 
platform for terrain mapping and other geological survey applications. The lower cost 
Radar 
sensors 
Detection 
range 
(nm) 
3D air 
surveillance 
Cost Beamwidth Multiple 
Targets 
Maximum 
Altitude 
Boat 
radars 
20 - 100 No Very 
Low 
Very 
narrow 
(1.5o 
azimuth 
& 22o 
vertical) 
Yes Low 
Thales 
coastal 
radars 
40 - 200 No High Narrow & 
broad 
Yes Low and 
High 
Homeland 
Alerter 
60 Yes Low - Yes Low & 
Medium 
(Up to 
16000ft) 
Sentinel 
radar S&A 
system 
50 Yes High - Yes Low & 
Medium 
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of the technology and a day/night operation it offers several advantages compared to 
other sensor systems in use. The use of LIDAR is predominant in coastal zones and 
forest areas where it is more accurate as compared to other regions of surveillance. It 
is also fast emerging as a superior data collection tool as compared to 
photogrammetric tools.  But for use in this project the need is to provide a superior 
surveillance capability as compared to a radar system or other senor systems for that 
matter.  
This technology has several disadvantages as well. Firstly, the lower cost of the 
technology is on the lifecycle of the technology use, but initially the cost of the 
acquisition of the equipment is very high which are more than for radars. Secondly, 
although LIDAR can be used for 24 hours a day but it does not perform well under 
harsh weather conditions such as rain, snowstorm, cloud cover, fog and other extreme 
weather. The technology relies upon the collection of large amounts of data for 
providing an accurate measure of the terrain maps. Additionally, high winds and 
turbulence can cause problems with the inertial system. However, this problem will not 
be present in a ground based LIDAR system because the scanner is in a static position 
all the time. 
Hence in the coastal regions of UK, the requirements are such that the system 
has to perform accurately and efficiently under extreme weather conditions, which 
change very frequently. Hence a LIDAR system is ruled out from the list of sensors 
that could be used for the implementation in this system. 
 
SONAR  
Sonar technology is not the best suited for use as ground based UAV collision 
detection system. This technology was originally developed for use as underwater 
detection system. In an active sonar system, sound waves are transmitted underwater 
and the reflected waves are then used to create an image of the obstacles or other 
enemy targets. There are also passive sonar systems that only listen to the various 
sounds originating or reflected by the obstacles to provide the stealth capability.  
However, the disadvantages of using Sonar as a UAV sense and avoid system 
is that sound waves travels slower in air than water. Also, the UAV has to be in close 
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proximity to the sonar for it to be detected. Another disadvantage is that the speed of 
sound changes greatly with temperature variations, and atmospheric temperature 
variation is much more than the variations in water.  
 
Non-cooperative 
technologies 
All weather 
operation 
Day/Night Detection 
range 
3D aerial 
surveillance 
Cost 
Radar Yes Yes High Yes High 
Lidar No Yes Low No Low 
Sonar No No Very Low No ? 
EO No No Low No Low 
IR No No Low No Low 
Table 12: Alternative Sensor Technologies 
Potential Solution 
Among the candidate technologies that were investigated, radar based systems seem 
to be the best suited form of technology for use as a ground based collision avoidance 
system. As mentioned above radars have an all-weather capability and can see 
through cloud at comparatively far off distances as compared to other sensor systems. 
And with the collision avoidance system based on the ground, one of the major 
disadvantages of radar being heavy, bulky and power consuming would not be of 
considerations.  
Radar based sensors seem to provide many advantages for implementation as 
ground based UAV collision avoidance system. Among the ground based radar 
systems that were investigated, a set of criteria were used to assess the systems and 
select the radar system that could be best suited for use as a ground based sense and 
avoid system.  
 
System Performance Model 
In the basic GBSAA model the parameters, which are necessary for analysing the 
whole feasibility of the system is:  
• Target Radar Cross Section (measure of how detectable the target is with a 
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radar)  
• Time taken to detect target  
• Time taken to return to safe state  
 
Surveillance radius = 10 nmi (same as radar detection range) [18.52 km] 
Threat radius = 8.63 nmi (As small aircraft threat must be detected 16 km away from 
landing site) 
Operational radius = 5.39 nmi  (As given in timeline model as 10 km operating radius) 
 
Time required for UAS with an average speed of 80 knots and at a distance of 10 km 
and a height below 300ft to land to a safe point is = 4 min 40 sec 
 
Hence the UAS should start moving to landing site when the target is at least 5 min 
away from landing point.  
 
Commercial aircraft at 5 min 40 sec (at 250 knots) = 36 km from landing point  
Small aircraft at 5 min 57 sec (at 120 knots) = 16 km away from landing point 
Unmanned aircraft at 5 min 60 sec (at 80 knots) = 11 km from landing point 
 
Approximate detection range for the targets using Thales Coast watcher 10: 
 
*Keeping Power aperture product at 15915.5 for the unknown parameters in the 
datasheet. 
Commercial aircraft (RCS = 3 m2): [13 nmi] 
  Detection range, RD = 11.87 nmi (Calculated from model) [17.09 nmi] 
Small aircraft (RCS = 2 m2): 
  Detection range, RD = 9.5 nmi (from performance model)  [12.46 nmi] 
Unmanned aircraft (RCS = 1 m2): 
  Detection range, RD = 8.752 nmi              [11.43 nmi] 
     Aperture area = 3.67 m2             [10.46 nmi] 
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Effective aperture area: - Calculated on the basis of a rectangular aperture with a width 
of 1.2 ft and antenna length approximately 10 ft.  
 
Calculated based on the antenna height and target altitude taking into account 
spherical earth model  
RCS = 1 m2 : Radar antenna height = 1 m ASL  ;  Detection range = 16 nmi 
RCS = 10 m2 : Radar antenna height = 2 m ASL  ;  Detection range = 26 
nmi 
 
The Basic system performance model parameters are shown in Figure 6.10.  
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Figure 6.10 GBSAA System Performance Model 
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6.4 GBSAA:	Proving	the	Safety	Case	
In order to develop a safety case for the GBSAA system for unmanned aircraft 
operations in unsegregated airspace, it is necessary to prove that the sense and avoid 
capability of the system for unmanned aircrafts is better than the current equivalent 
‘see and avoid’ method used by the manned aircraft pilot’s in the type of airspace 
under consideration [10] 
According to the aviation authorities, the UAS operations in non-segregated 
should not in any way have a negative impact on the safety of the airspace [11]. This 
underlines the fact that, basic tenets for the deployment of UAS in non-segregated 
airspace must be based on UAS properties such as equivalence and transparency. 
This in turn means a UAS must behave like a manned aircraft [10]. In terms of collision 
avoidance procedure for UAS, this means that UAS must be able to a sense and avoid 
capability that is similar or better than a pilot of manned aircraft especially for detection 
and tracking of non-transponder equipped aircraft. The UAS collision avoidance 
performance measures are not clearly defined yet. The performance measures that 
are available at this stage are more qualitative in nature [10]. The system developer’s 
currently having to work with the basic performance requirements that the UAS 
collision avoidance must be equivalent or more effective than collision avoidance 
function of manned aircrafts.  
The challenge arises due to several issues. Firstly, the human skills and ability 
vary from pilot to pilot. The visual perception and processing varies significantly and 
all the pilots do not have the same visual scanning pattern. The frequency of scanning 
also varies from pilot to pilot. Apart from this the pilot’s see and avoid process is 
affected by physical and psychological issues [10]. The external environment 
especially the weather conditions have a considerable effect on the performance of 
the human visual range. The pilot’s view is also affected by the size of the cockpit and 
the aircraft type. In order to factor in the degradation caused due to each of these 
factors and develop equivalent performance metrics for sense and avoid for UAS is a 
complex task. 
There have been several working committees, which have been looking at the 
issue of collision avoidance. And the proposed solution so far has been based on 
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ASTM F-38 committee published standard, which most the system developers are 
following for developing sense and avoid system for UAS. The standard is based on 
the manned aircraft pilot maximum viewing angle of ±15° in elevation and ±110° in 
azimuth and also being able to respond to avoid a collision within 500 feet [2]. 
However, analysis of data available from mid-air collisions shows that they occur near 
an airfield where traffic volume is high and mainly at lower closing speeds. Most mid-
air collisions occurring at low speed happen when two aircrafts are travelling roughly 
in the same direction when a faster aircraft is overtaking a slower aircraft. This situation 
may arise in case of UAS as cruising speed of many UAS are less compared to other 
manned aircrafts. Hence considering this limitation the standards based on limited field 
of view may not be enough. However, in UAS the backward-looking capability is 
achievable by placing sensors is such a way that full 360 degrees is possible [2]. 
The research on mid-air collisions also reveals that most of the collisions occur 
when visibility is normal during day and in uncontrolled airspace [2]. This also outlines 
the inherent limitation of the ‘see and avoid’ procedure and in the future with the 
increase in traffic of lighter aircrafts this might become a serious limitation. Hence to 
base the UAS collision avoidance performance on a standard that has many limitations 
may not guarantee certification of UAS sense and avoid systems.  
Although the challenges do exist in terms of defining the performance measures for 
UAS sense and avoid, a set of agreed upon performance parameters and assessment 
methodologies is a key factor to understanding and moving towards a viable 
implementation strategy for SAA for UAS. The GBSAA initiative will provide a way to 
gather, test and verify data along with several modelling and simulation activities that 
will enable to define the system requirements and to support the development of a 
safety case.   
In exploring the UAS SAA system requirements and performance measures, 
one of the key areas is to gain a thorough understanding of the manned aviation SAA 
regulatory framework and studying the performance of the human pilots in terms of 
the current SAA processes used. Hence this provides a basis for further understanding 
the system requirements for developing a safety case for a UAS SAA system (i.e. 
GBSAA). 
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This section examines the existing research in the effectiveness of visual 
performance of the human see and avoid. The many limitations of the pilot’s see and 
avoid and why it is not the best means to SAA will also be mentioned. It also examines 
the pilot see and avoid encounter timeline that is the time required for the approaching 
aircraft to be detected and avoided successfully averting a collision and whether these 
parameters could be used as one of the performance measures to compare with the 
GBSAA system. This section also provides an overview of the various methods that 
could be used for validating the safety case. And finally, this section also mentions the 
contribution of the GBSAA demonstration platform that is proposed here towards the 
safety case development efforts for GBSAA system.   
6.4.1 See	and	Avoid	
See and avoid is a primary means for separation assurance in uncontrolled airspace 
and also it is the last resort for avoiding any near mid-air collisions in all types of 
airspace [16]. The fact that not all aircrafts are transponder equipped and also other 
small non-cooperative targets could be encountered in non-segregated airspace 
underlines the importance of See and Avoid. The effectiveness of see and avoid 
depends on various parameters that are based on characteristics such as target 
characteristics and the pilot performance level [17]. 
There has been research conducted in the past to determine the effectiveness 
of visual performance of the see and avoid compared to alerted search method. In this 
section, the visual acquisition model developed and validated by Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory for human see and avoid will be 
stated and suggest that this model could be used for measuring probability of 
acquisition for small targets such as UA’s and other small airspace users in different 
encounter scenarios [17].  
6.4.2 Visual	Acquisition	Model		
The visual acquisition mathematical model developed at MIT Lincoln Laboratory is 
based on modelling the visual acquisition rate as a continuous process and it is 
assumed a time-averaged acquisition effort is required to characterise performance. 
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The cumulative probability of acquisition distribution is estimated by evaluating 
acquisition rate at a given instant and following the process for every instant of time 
as the intruder aircraft approaches.   
The cumulative probability of visual acquisition is given by [16]: 
 
Where, (t) is the visual acquisition per given instant. 
Also from various trials performed by using numerous data collected it has been 
established that the visual acquisition rate is directly proportional to the angular size 
of the target [16].  
 
The cumulative probability of visual acquisition can be determined by inserting 
the value of lambda into the first equation. The resulting equation can then be 
evaluated using numerical integration. The expression can be simplified for a special 
case where the visual range is infinite (on a clear day) and the equation then is reduced 
to the following [16]: 
 
In the above expression, the basic characteristics of the visual target such as 
closing rate, target cross section are or visual range can all be determined from a 
knowledge of the actual search conditions.  However, the model parameter cannot be 
determined in this way but by evaluating the performance of the pilots in the flight trials. 
The test flights were conducted with an aim to determine optimal value of the model 
parameter that best outlines the performance of the pilot during unaltered search 
flights [16].  
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6.4.3 Visual	Acquisition	Performance	
With the support of the FAA, the flight tests were performed with 24 general aviation 
pilots each flying the Beech Bonanza on triangular cross-country flight for a 45-minute 
duration. During their flight time, a Cessna 21 aircraft made three intercepts, flying 
both above and below the test route to provide the pilots with a visual acquisition target 
[16].    
The data was collected for all the 64 encounters during the flight tests. The 
acquisition was achieved in only 36 of the encounters and the median acquisition 
range in those encounters was 0.99 NMI. From the plot of the visual acquisition 
probability as a function of Q (opportunity integral), the value of B that best fits the data 
was approximately 17,000 /steradian/sec [16, 17].   
 
Figure 6.11 Observed acquisition probability and modelled visual acquisition 
probability for both unalerted and alerted search [16] 
When the same estimation model was used for the alerted search scenario, in 
which the aircraft is equipped with a transponder that provides the pilot with the 
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necessary traffic details of the airspace. The model parameter value B was estimated 
to be approximately 14,0000 /steradian/sec. Hence the alerted search flight has a B 
value that is 8.2 times the unalerted search flight data. This means that the pilot in an 
alerted search mode requires one-eighth of the time required for a pilot to visually 
acquire the target in an unalerted search flight mode [16].  
The visual acquisition model has been calibrated to reproduce the results of the 
flight so that using the model important insights into how the see and avoid will perform 
under real world conditions. The model can be used to extend its applications to other 
encounter scenarios as well as different type of flight and its characteristics.  However, 
the model may not be applicable to evaluating visual performance of see and avoid 
under other modes of flight such as landing and take-off phases.  
The acquisition model used for the un-alerted search pattern could also be 
extended to calculate the visual acquisition range for detecting small airspace users 
such as unmanned aircrafts. The Figure 6.12 shows the relative airspeed frequency 
distribution for different types of aircraft in airspace where there are no air traffic 
services. It is seen from the graph that the frequency of aircraft at lower speeds (less 
than 70 knots) is quite high compared to other having higher airspeeds [19]. Hence it 
is necessary to accurately predict the visual acquisition probability of such airspace, 
as it will enable in comparing the results with acquisition probability for alerted search 
(using a GBSAA system). 
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Figure 6.12 Relative airspeed frequency distribution of several types  
of aircraft in uncontrolled airspace [19] 
6.4.4 Sense	and	Avoid	Encounter	Timeline	
According to the FAA advisory (circular 90-48-C) which provides military derived data 
on the time required to see an approaching aircraft and execute a collision-averting 
manoeuvre, the pilot should be able to spot the aircraft at least 12.5 seconds to the 
time of impact [18]. The total reaction time involves, the sense and avoid processing 
time (includes time to see, recognise threat, decide on action), execute the manoeuvre 
and allow the aircraft to respond to the action [18].  
 Hence for GBSAA operation, the sense and avoid processing timeline would 
require the target to be detected at least 10.1 seconds to the time of impact, so that 
the UAS pilot is able to perform the necessary manoeuvre to keep a safe separation 
between the UA and the intruding aircraft. For GBSAA operation other aspect to keep 
in mind is that the pilot is executing the command from the ground and thus there will 
be a very small-time lag in the communication to the UA. 
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Figure 6.13 Time to react to collision threats [18] 
6.5 Summary	
This chapter provided a basis for the research into the GBSAA system. The system 
design concept and system operational description were described. This chapter also 
presented GBSAA system performance analysis performed. Further the safety case 
concept was detailed, and an approach towards presenting a safety case was outlined. 
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Chapter	7: Ground	Based	Sense	and	Avoid	
Experiment	Design	
7.1 Introduction	
This chapter describes the methodology and approach taken in the research to 
address the research questions outlined in Section 1.3.2. Along with the need to 
address research objectives, the inputs from Chapter 7 regarding the technical, 
operational and safety case aspects of a UAS Ground Based Sense and Avoid 
(GBSAA) system were used to initially define the underlying concepts and issues for 
the experiment design. Following this a detailed description of the experiment design 
and the procedures used are provided. Finally, concluding with the tools and statistical 
techniques used to analyse the results.  
7.2 Background	
One of the most important challenges to be addressed for the routine operation of UAS 
in non-segregated airspace is the ability of the UAS to ‘Sense and Avoid’. A key aspect 
of addressing that challenge is a mitigation strategy for the lack of on-board capability 
to ‘see and avoid’ in an UAS. Thus, UAS flight operations in non-segregated airspace 
will require maintaining safe separation distance from other air traffic which is 
challenging, as outlined in the UAS Sense and Avoid literature review, Chapter 6, 
especially when operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) conditions where most of 
the air traffic users may not be carrying transponders. In recent years, the aviation 
community is moving towards exploring concepts associated with Ground Based 
Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) as a short term to medium term strategy for effective self-
separation and mitigating risk of potential conflict of UAS, so that they can be 
integrated safely and efficiently in the national airspace system. The previous chapter 
has focussed specifically on the technology, operational and safety case aspects 
involved with Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) System and their effective 
implementation.  
 The aims of the research outlined in section 1.3.2, gaps in the academic 
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research and the industrial nature of this doctorate influenced the next stage of this 
research. As outlined in section 2.10.1, the industrial needs guided the research to the 
specific issue of UAS Sense and Avoid and further into Ground Based Sense and 
Avoid (GBSAA) system. The gaps in the academic literature that emerged from 
literature review of UAS Sense and Avoid (Chapter 6) and also the fact that another 
business line of the company (Thales) were working on the development of an 
Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA) for UAS, led to pursuing further research and 
development in concepts related with Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) for 
UAS. Apart from the literature review on UAS Sense and Avoid presented in Chapter 
6 and detailed examination of all aspects related to Ground Based Sense and Avoid 
(GBSAA) presented in Chapter 7, the research also involved a detailed business case 
study of GBSAA concept and presented to project managers at the company (Thales) 
on the ways to further pursue the design and development of the concept into a 
commercial product. The study analysed the feasibility of using ground based sensors 
for providing separation assurance capability to UAS pilot/operator, both technically 
and economically. It also looked into various sensors that could be used for this 
purpose and specific application areas where the product could be used. Based on 
the study, a radar sensor ideally suited for the specific application of the product was 
finalised and further development of all the elements of the GBSAA concept was being 
undertaken with the objective of developing a fully integrated GBSAA system for 
performing field trails. The various elements involved the sensors, sensor data fusion 
and the information display system. However due to changes in the priority of the 
company, the further development of the GBSAA concept was not continued and 
thereby the resources available to develop the various elements of the GBSAA system 
were no longer available. This was one of the major challenges faced during the 
research. In view of this the research focus shifted to exploring one of the key aspects 
of the GBSAA system that also fulfilled the aims of the research.  
 One of the key elements of a GBSAA for UAS operations is the display system. 
The display provides situation awareness of the air traffic surrounding the vicinity of 
Unmanned Aircraft (UA) to the UAS pilot/observer. The literature review on GBSAA 
display system in the previous chapter revealed there is not a single standard concept 
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for the design of information display systems. There is no specific model to follow for 
the design of a traffic information display system for GBSAA. Hence the next stage of 
the research focussed on design of GBSAA display concept and evaluating the display 
system using a simulation environment. The research focus on GBSAA display system 
was necessarily due to three factors firstly that it fulfils the research objectives outlined 
in section 1.3.2, secondly the gaps in the academic literature and finally to leverage 
the existing display systems within the company (Thales) so that it could be part of 
integrated system for providing GBSAA capability in case the company decided to 
develop GBSAA system as a commercial product in the future.   
7.2.1 GBSAA	Overview	
7.2.1.1 GBSAA	Information	Display	
The GBSAA information display acts as an interface that provides the air traffic 
information to the UAS operator. The primary objective of the GBSAA display is to 
provide the UAS operator with an air situation picture, so that the operator has the 
situational awareness information to ensure safe UAS operations. To fulfil this 
objective, the GBSAA interface has to achieve the following goals: populate and 
update the tracks information on the display, determine if any danger of an impending 
or actual loss of separation by an intruding aircraft and finally generate an alert if there 
is loss of separation margin or any impending ones. 
Several variations are possible based on where the GBSAA interface could be 
located in the operational architecture of the UAS operations using a GBSAA system. 
First scenario is when the GBSAA display is located in the GCS from where the UA is 
controlled by the UAS pilot. The flight crew of the UAS now become responsible for 
ensuring they sufficiently recognise and resolve the conflict by way of an extra 
instrument that is the GBSAA display. However, the GBSAA display information can 
also be provided to the UAS pilot by integrating the situation awareness information 
with the pilot Head-up display [23]. But there are several aspects to be addressed 
while employing this method such as the impact of pilot workload level on introducing 
this new functionality on HUD and whether it will be easier to achieve certification by 
not integrating the sense and avoid display functionality into the existing UAS pilot 
  214 
display.  
The second scenario involves the GBSAA display located at the GBSAA traffic 
operator/observer who may be at a different location to the GCS [23]. A dedicated 
GBSAA traffic operator observes the air traffic situation data and in case of a potential 
collision the observer effectively de-conflicts the situation by informing the co-
ordinating between ATC and UAS pilot apart from providing information to UAS pilot 
to take an appropriate manoeuvre. This scenario is effective when surveillance 
coverage of a larger region is available through the deployment of a network of ground-
based sensors, in which many UA’s can operate simultaneously.  
In the third scenario, the GBSAA display could be located in the ATC centre. The 
GBSAA traffic operator observes the separation alerts and co-ordinated with the UAS 
pilot to de-conflict a potential collision.   
There are several key questions that need to be addressed with regards to the 
GBSAA display. Firstly, if the UAS pilot will be able to safely and accurately perform 
UAS operations using the situational awareness information to mitigate the risk of 
collision [20]. Secondly, how the air situation picture is presented to the UAS operator 
[23]. And finally, the decision support tools that will be required by the UAS pilot for 
performing UAS operations in the national airspace [20].   
The information-received from the GBSAA sensor is to be presented to the UAS 
operator in order to improve the situational awareness. There are several ways in 
which this information can be presented to the UAS operator.  A multi-perspective view 
of this information would be a better way to go about designing the user interface of 
the GBSAA display and from the UAS literature present it also suggests that 
implementation of multiple viewpoints with a smooth transition could be an asset [24, 
20].  
In this section one of the ways of differentiating the design of the display is 
presented by means of multiple viewpoints. The two viewpoints discussed are as given 
below: 
 
Airspace view:  The airspace view of the GBSAA display is similar to an Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) display used in the current ATM system. This kind of display provides 
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the operator with a view of the air traffic in the entire airspace. The radar tracks of the 
ownship aircraft along with the tracks of the other targets are presented to the UAS 
operator over a static electronic map of the area in and around the surveillance region 
of the radar.   
The implementation of the airspace view will enable the UAS operator to view 
all the traffic in the surveillance region and also act in order to perform a manoeuvre 
when there is an infringement into the zero-conflict area or there is a loss in separation 
between the UA and the intruding aircraft. 
 
Pilot’s view: The pilot’s view in the GBSAA display is similar to the TCAS display used 
by aircraft pilots in the current scenario. Although the normal TCAS display for manned 
aircraft is integrated into the head-up display of the pilot inside the cockpit. However, 
in the case of a GBSAA display, the implementation of the TCAS type display would 
be as a separate display to the GCS display and eventually the TCAS type display 
could be integrated into the GCS display of the UAS operator thereby providing a 
single display that can also providing the air traffic situation picture. 
The implementation of the pilot’s view as GBSAA display will enable the UAS 
pilot to able to receive alerts in the event of an infringement into the zero-conflict area 
or if a separation violation has occurred between the UA and the intruding aircraft.  
7.2.1.2 Separation	Strategy	
The margin of separation is one of the criteria’s, which will determine the effectiveness 
of the system. The optimum separation margin will ensure the balance between the 
numbers of nuisance alarms and number of missed detections. Currently, the 
separation measure used by the ATC for manned aircraft separation conflict alerting 
is based on a vertical separation of 1000 feet and a lateral separation of 1 nautical 
mile [11]. However, these are for manned aircraft operation as well as in regions where 
there is ATC control. Thus, these measures would not be suited for UAS and especially 
those operating in uncontrolled airspace. In order for UAS operations in uncontrolled 
airspace supported by USAS on the ground, there is need to understand and examine 
the margin of separation for various traffic situations. 
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The separation margin for USAS depends on various other interrelated system 
aspects. In the following section, some of the interrelated elements identified are 
discussed briefly.   
 
Time to separation violation 
Time is an important concept in the system effectiveness measure of the GBSAA. The 
time to loss of separation is an important parameter for separation assurance in a 
GBSAA system. Thus, ensuring an optimum time to separation will enable in reducing 
the number of false alarms thereby increasing the system effectiveness. 
 
Target characteristics 
The ability to detect the target depends largely on the target cross-section and for a 
smaller target the less likely it is to be detected at large distances. Hence the detection 
distance largely depends on the target characteristics. Depending on the ability of the 
sensor certain targets are detected more easily than the others based on the 
parameter of the sensor system. 
 
Weather 
Weather is one of the aspects that affect the effectiveness of the system. Especially, 
for the operation of the radar on the ground as it be adversely affected by the weather. 
 
Manoeuvring capability  
The velocity changes and the climb rate of the target are also necessary criteria upon 
which an effective separation manoeuvre of the UAS is based on. 
 
Level of autonomy 
With the GBSAA concept, the human-in- the-loop is a major underlying principle. At 
the lowest level of the system, the pilot can derive manoeuvring decisions based on 
the traffic awareness and conflict alerts. However, as the system matures and the 
complexities associated with automatic separation manoeuvre are well understood 
the, an automated separation manoeuvre selection and execution can be performed. 
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HMI presentation 
The GBSAA system primarily provides an air traffic situation display, which improves 
the situational awareness of the UAS operator compared to the current level of 
situational awareness mechanism available to the UAS pilot. The GBSAA system will 
provide level 2 situational awareness to the UAS operator. It is envisaged in the short 
term; the UA will be remotely piloted by an operator i.e. operating at lower levels of 
autonomy. Hence the pilots need to be presented with the information in an efficient 
way so that they take evasive action when separation violation is predicted.  The way 
the information has to be presented is important because at lower levels of autonomy, 
the UAS operator has a large amount of responsibility in operating the UA.  
 
Number of intruding targets 
The number of aircrafts within the surveillance region affects the margin of separation 
between the UA operating region and the traffic. An increased level of traffic in the 
region would mean an increased margin of separation thereby lower operating area 
for the UA. 
7.2.2 GBSAA	Display	Concept	
The in-depth analysis of the technical and operational aspects of GBSAA system in 
the previous chapter, outlined (section 7.4.3) the basic functions and requirements to 
consider for the design of GBSAA information display. The intent of the traffic 
information display is to provide an overall view of the airspace in order to assess the 
level of risk to the unmanned aircraft (UA) from other aircraft in the vicinity or in the 
operational area of the ground based sensor. The air traffic information system 
leverages the existing radar sensor technology to provide a wide surveillance area 
thereby providing the next step for UAS operation in non-segregated airspace to 
beyond line of sight of the UAS pilot/observer [93].  
The GBSAA information display system should enable the UAS pilot/observer 
to have a greatly expanded field of view. It should also provide the UAS observer a 
top down two-dimension view of the airspace providing a clear view of the UA position 
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in relation to other aircrafts in the surrounding airspace. The position information of the 
UA from the ground based radar and the GPS information of the UA received from 
telemetry data provides greater level of position data integrity and also can be 
correlated to ensure that the ground based sensor is operating normally.  
The design of an air traffic information display is not straightforward as there is 
no specified model to follow [93]. There is not a single standard concept for the design 
of traffic information display systems [93]. Many different types of air traffic information 
display systems exist though various facilities of the civil aviation authorities. The 
varied types of traffic displays are based on the different set of tasks each facility is 
expected to perform [93]. Even if a single design standard exists it has been the case 
that identical traffic information display systems have different interfaces depending 
on the system contractor who developed it. Previous works by Nielsen [94] and 
Alhstrom & Kudrick [95] have shown that a single design standard cannot specify a 
complete user interface and that the same design standard can be implemented in a 
variety of ways. There is no uniform traffic information display model that is present 
and the design of an information display system for the specific requirements of the 
display system must be based on the first principles using a spiral model (first 
described by Barry Boehm in 1986) [96]. The spiral model is primarily used as a 
standard user interface design model in software engineering, where the design 
process enables the display system designers to work directly with those designers 
developing the other aspects of the system and the users that would be the end users 
of the display system [97].  
 As there is no specified design standard for a GBSAA display system available, 
for providing situation awareness information to UAS pilot/observer in a UAS Ground 
Control Station (GCS), the research focussed further on exploring the use of existing 
air traffic display concepts as GBSAA information display system. The key aspects 
from this investigation are detailed in the next section below. Based on this, the 
research emphasis was on developing a GBSAA traffic information display concept 
and evaluating this using simulation exercises. Hence, the research work focussed on 
exploring the different display concepts and human factors aspects involved with their 
design. This work was used as a basis for outlining the key features and characteristics 
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of a USAS display and implementing these in on the prototype GBSAA information 
display system. However, the research work was not to define the requirements and   
standards for the design of UAS separation assurance display. 
7.2.3 Existing	Air	Traffic	Display	Systems	for	use	as	GBSAA	display	
Cockpit Display 
There has been a growing demand for the use of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance 
System (TCAS) on UAS. TCAS is an airborne system that functions independently of 
the ground-based Air Traffic Control (ATC) system and provides collision avoidance 
capability to a wide array of aircraft types [98]. The airborne system monitors the 
surrounding airspace for other transponder equipped aircraft that may present a threat 
of mid-air collision. The situational awareness information is then presented on a 
cockpit display for pilot to act to avoid a potential collision [99]. The cockpit awareness 
information acts as a last line of defence among a multi-layered defence against mid-
air collisions.  
The first-generation technology TCAS I, monitors the traffic situation around the 
aircraft and provide bearing and altitude details of nearby air traffic to pilot. It can 
generate warnings of an impending danger of collision known as “Traffic Advisory” 
(TA) to alert the pilot, but do not provide any collision avoidance manoeuvre procedure 
to avoid impending collision threat [99]. However, TCAS II provides specific 
instructions to pilot on how to avoid the conflict with the air traffic. These instructions 
are known as “Resolution Advisory” (RA) and the instructions to pilot may vary from 
climbing, descending or adjusting vertical speed [99]. TCAS II system also enables 
the transponders of two aircrafts with impending collision threat to communicate with 
each other to ensure the RA provided to each aircraft maximizes separation.   
TCAS concept utilises the radio beacon transponders installed on aircraft to 
enable surveillance by ground-based ATC radars. TCAS is mandated on all large 
transport aircraft in all airspace regions worldwide [100]. In the European airspace, the 
current mandated rule suggests carrying TCAS II by all civil aeroplanes with Maximum 
Take-Off Mass (MTOM) exceeding 5700 kg or authorised to carry more than 19 
passengers [101]. TCAS has been in operation for nearly two decades now and its 
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wide deployment as a decision support system has prevented several catastrophic 
accidents [100].  
The advocates of the deployment of TCAS on UAS have proposed that the 
system will provide information to the UAS pilot to manoeuvre around potentially 
conflicting aircraft.  The TCAS display was also envisaged to provide the generic 
situation awareness of the air traffic environment to the UAS pilot as the remote pilot 
lacks the ability to visually acquire and monitor aircraft in the vicinity of the UA. A recent 
FAA study was conducted for the use of TCAS on UAS and it concluded that the use 
of TCAS should not be allowed as it provides a compelling opportunity for the misuse 
of displayed information [102]. 
According to the study, TCAS display has several design limitations when used 
as a means for providing information for the pilot to estimate the current intruder state 
and also the pilot’s projection of the intruder state in the near future [102]. The study 
also lists the information that is not provided on the display but is necessary to 
ascertain an accurate air traffic situation picture, but these are not limited to this set of 
information [102].  
● No intruder speed information indicated on the display 
● No intruder heading information present on the display 
● All aircraft in the proximity of the display may not be depicted 
● Aircraft location indicated on the display may not be true locations  
● Displayed information may be a snapshot and may be delayed by a several 
seconds 
● Intruder distance from ownship are not provided directly on the display 
● Other aircraft may be responding to a TCAS RA 
● Other aircraft may be manoeuvring based on visual acquisition 
● Other aircraft may be manoeuvring in response to ATC clearances or 
instructions. 
● TCAS data inaccuracies increase when in turns, climbs or descents. 
● Potential drawbacks of a moving reference display 
 
The several factors mentioned above render the use of TCAS display for providing 
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air traffic information to the UAS pilot not appropriate.  
 
Air Traffic Control (ATC) Display  
ATC display provides surveillance information on all aircrafts on the ground and 
through controlled airspace to air traffic controllers, to enable separation of aircrafts 
and maintain efficient flow of air traffic. The primary purpose of the air traffic controllers 
is to prevent aircraft collisions. The ATC display system provided for a continuously 
updated presentation of surveillance information, including aircraft track position 
indicators. The surveillance information provided to the controllers at the least includes 
position indicators, map information required to provide ATC surveillance services 
and, where available, information concerning the identity and aircraft level of the 
aircraft. The surveillance information may be obtained from single or multiple ground-
based radars (primary or secondary) as well as other surveillance systems such as 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADSB).  
Similar to the TCAS display, there are several design limitations of the ATC 
display for providing air traffic information to UA pilot.  Some of the information that is 
not provided by an ATC display that is necessary to obtain an accurate situation 
awareness picture is as given below: 
● ATC display does not provide a moving reference type display. 
● UA track centric view of the airspace is not provided. 
● Intruder distance from ownship is not provided directly on the display. 
● Displayed information may be delayed by a several seconds. 
● Other aircraft may be manoeuvring based on visual acquisition. 
● Other aircraft may be manoeuvring in response to ATC clearances or 
instructions. 
● Does not provide a decision support aid for making separation conflict 
avoidance manoeuvres.  
● Current intruder state information is not displayed in a list. 
● Aircraft location indicated on the display may not be true locations.  
 
Thus, due to the factors mentioned above, the ATC display for providing 
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situation awareness information to the UA pilot is not the best suited interface. Hence 
a GBSAA information display system for UA operations in non-segregated airspace 
has to address these limitations in both TCAS and ATC display to provide a robust 
GBSAA display interface design.   
The traffic information display system that is developed is a modification of ATM 
system for use as USAS/GBSAA display. The user interface concepts that will be 
evaluated in the human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulation can be categorised based on the 
viewpoints and orientations they provide to the user. Through the research carried out 
previously, it emerged that the existing displays such as TCAS or ATC are not suitable 
for use as GBSAA display. 
These two concepts of traffic display design depict the two categories of 
displays that are used in terms of airborne and ground based operations in the current 
ATM system. The airborne cockpit display systems are the Cockpit Display of Traffic 
Information (CDTI) or TCAS display that provides traffic information to the pilot and 
also resolution manoeuvres. The ground-based interface is the ATC display which 
provides the controllers with air traffic picture over a vast coverage region.  
The presumption that a TCAS or ATC display could be directly used as a 
separation assurance display for supporting self-separation operation of UAS is 
incorrect. The use of the two display types could cause a misinterpretation of 
information thereby leading to catastrophic accidents and thus they should not be used 
for GSBAA purposes. However, the research looks at the concepts of a generic 
GBSAA display and its characteristics, based on which it tries to incorporate these 
aspects by modifying the interface of an ATC display system 
7.2.4 Separation	Assurance	
Area infringement alerting: - The initial step in GBSAA system deployment for UAS 
operations is an alerting system that alerts the UAS pilot/operator in the event of an 
intruding aircraft that infringes into the separation violation area of the UA operations.  
Once the alert is issued the UA pilot/operator can then decide to land the UA safely 
well before the intruding aircraft entering its operational area.  
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Safe state operations: - In the event of an aircraft entering the surveillance area, similar 
to the infringement alerting the GBSAA system alerts the UA of an impending 
separation violation. Based on the state of intruding aircraft and its heading, the UA 
pilot/operator would be able to manoeuvre the UA pilot/operator to a safe state. As the 
intruder aircraft moves through the operational volume, the operational area of the UA 
shrinks and there must be a safe state option available to the UA through its operation. 
The safe state could be a restricted area (similar to danger area) where operations are 
limited to UA only or to land the UA safely at the nearest landing site.  
 
Safe separation: - When an intruder aircraft is predicted to led to a separation conflict 
situation, the UA pilot/operator manoeuvres the UA in the air to a safe separation 
distance from the threat aircraft without the need to land the UA or to return the UA to 
a restricted area.  
7.3 Experiment	Method	
After the initial study on the system concept and requirements, next stage of research 
looks at developing a pre-operational prototype of a GBSAA system to prove the 
application of concept. The developed prototype will enable to assess the inter-related 
system aspects such as separation strategy, procedures, display characteristics and 
UAS operator responsibilities. The research project proposes to prove the application 
of concept using a commercially available Air Traffic Management (ATM) system as 
the GBSAA display. The Thales TopSky ATM system would be used as the GBSAA 
display.  
The benefits of proving the concept using commercial off-the shelf software are 
many folds. Firstly, once concept is proved on a fully certified system, then the 
implementation from an operational prototype to a fully operational system can be 
much faster and easier. Secondly, the usage of TopSky for a new application would 
be useful in showing its flexible operational capabilities. Thirdly, if TopSky is eventually 
used for GBSAA display in the operational system it could open up new market and 
future possible applications in that area. Especially if the military could use the system 
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for training UAS in civil airspace, the GBSAA system could be a possible solution in 
the near term.  
7.3.1 Display	Concepts	
Airspace Centric  
The Airspace centric display has similar characteristics to an ATC display in that it 
covers the whole surveillance region and it’s a North-up type of display. And the 
Unmanned Aircraft (UA) is not centred on the display and the absolute heading of the 
tracks is presented. 
 
Aircraft Centric 
The Aircraft centric view has a few similar attributes to a TCAS display in that it is UA 
is centred on the display and it’s a track-up display. All the headings and other track 
parameters are presented as relative measure from the UA track measures.  
 
The null hypothesis for the experiment is the assumption that the two display concepts 
have similar effect on the performance of the participant.  
7.3.2 Design	and	Selection	of	Scenarios	
The choice of the scenarios must be based on an assessment of the main aim and 
fulfilling the various objectives of the USAS/GBSAA experiment. As the key goal of the 
experiment is not to evaluate the separation resolution algorithm or to compare various 
separations alerting system, the need is to test for all possible scenarios is not 
required. Hence keeping with the goal of the experiment, which is to assess the 
decision-making aspects of UA observer/operator when in a separation conflict 
situation with other aircrafts, a set of scenarios can be selected which will provide a 
range of conflict scenarios that may occur in class G or class F airspace. 
 
The scenarios have been selected based on following criteria’s.: 
Firstly, the separation conflict situation that enhances the human factors issues 
of the ATC and TCAS displays in terms of providing situation awareness information 
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to the UA pilot.  Hence some of the encounter scenarios have been selected through 
the research done on previous studies about the human factor issues involved with 
the different types of displays.  
Secondly, the encounter situations have been chosen from the data on aircraft 
encounters in uncontrolled airspace. A standard set of scenarios are provided in the 
general rules of air that give guidance to the pilot on the type of manoeuvre to be taken 
in order to resolve a potential collision conflict situation. Hence these scenarios were 
included in the experiment to assess how the participants interpreted the rules of the 
air when encountered with a separation conflict situation while operating as a remote 
pilot without using the visual eyesight for intruder aircraft detection. 
7.3.3 Participants	
The participants in the experiment are envisaged to be largely novices to the 
information display system and who are not aviation knowledgeable. However, there 
are a few participants who would be aviation knowledgeable and also are involved in 
the field of UAS. One of the main reasons for choosing such an array of participants 
as the experiment is aimed at evaluating and understanding the decision-making 
aspects of the human (UAS observer/pilot), hence the involvement of novices to such 
a system may be beneficial due to the lack of their past learning and experience that 
might affect the outcomes in case of aviation or UAS experts. Thus, in this way the 
bias introduced by experience is eliminated from the experiment.  
Although the removal of learning bias is beneficial, there are other downsides 
that may arise due to it. One of them may be the lack of testing or assessment by 
controllers or UAS operators who will be the primary users of the system. The main 
aims of the experiment are two folds: Firstly, to examine the intuitiveness of the display 
and secondly to assess the impact of the decision support tools on the decision-
making aspects of the UA observer/operator. 
7.3.4 Experiment	Set-up	
As this is a proof of concept demonstration system, a system was developed to 
simulate the expected environment so that a related fully functional sense and avoid 
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system can be developed as part of future work to validate and certify a GBSAA 
system for UAS operations. The experiment set-up consists of several simulations that 
were developed as shown in Figure 7.1 and also has been described below. 
7.3.4.1 UAS	simulation	Environment	
The UAS simulation should be able to model the flight characteristics of the UA and 
generate an environment similar to a UAS Ground Control Station (GCS). The existing 
UAS simulation environment located at the Systems Laboratory at Loughborough 
University was used so as to generate the UA flight characteristics as well as various 
tasks performed by the UA operator/pilot during the experiment. The simulator was 
developed in conjunction with other colleagues (My. L.Le-Ngoc, Mr.C. Wrigtht and 
Mr.G. Bedford) based in Advanced VR Research Centre (AVRRC) at Loughborough 
University. This included the hardware and software set ups for undertaking the flight 
simulator development task. The simulation package that was used in UAS simulation 
environment to generate UAS flights was X-plane. The simulation package provides a 
cost-effective way to simulate the UA flights. The simulation environment also included 
a VFR flight planning tool in the form of Plan G which is a standard flight planner used 
with X-plane. Apart from the UA flight simulations, the surveillance tasks oriented 
towards engaging the UA pilot/operator to look at the UAS pilot display rather that the 
Traffic information display, which is envisaged to be used in the event of a separation 
violation situation to resolve the separation conflict.  
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Figure 7.1 GBSAA Simulation Architecture 
 
Figure 7.2 GBSAA System Experiment Set-Up 
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7.3.4.2 Airspace	Simulation	
The airspace simulation consists of the intruder aircraft and other aircrafts in the 
surrounding airspace present in the scenarios conducted during the experiment. The 
aircrafts tracks in the various scenarios are simulated and recorded on a plot track 
generator (PTG) software simulation located at Thales ATM. The PTG machine is 
used to simulate radar system tracks for testing and validation of the ATC Display 
software.  
All the aircrafts in airspace simulation are generated as radar tracks and recorded 
into a file which is then replayed on the GBSAA display during the running of 
experiment scenarios. The surrounding aircraft tracks information in the airspace is 
sent every five seconds unlike the UA information which is sent every second (as it is 
the GPS derived data made available at the GCS in a fully operational GBSAA 
system).  
 
7.3.4.3 Prototype	GBSAA	Display	
One of the key aspects to certify the system is to ensure enhanced level of system 
reliability. As the display is a safety critical part of the USAS/GBSAA system the 
system must adhere to high level of safety standards in terms of the software and 
hardware components. Hence instead of developing an information display system for 
USAS from scratch, the approach of using a commercially available air traffic 
information system was explored. The air traffic display was modified as there are 
several functions and settings that are not required for application to a USAS/GBSAA 
display system. Also, the display of air traffic information to the air traffic controllers is 
slightly different human factors consideration compared to that of UAS operator. 
However, the separation function provided by the UA pilot for GBSAA system provision 
could have some similarities to the separation of aircrafts performed by the air traffic 
controllers in ATC controlled airspace. Thus, the air traffic display was changed or 
reduced in terms of its display functions and also a few other functions added to form 
a basic USAS/GBSAA display for use in UA operations. 
  229 
 
Figure 7.3 Prototype GBSAA display 
The traffic information display system that was developed is a modification of 
ATM system for use as USAS/GBSAA display. Through the research carried out 
previously, it emerged that the existing displays such as TCAS or ATC are not suitable 
for use as GBSAA display.    
The TopSky display has been modified to develop an air traffic information 
display for the proof of concept GBSAA display system. The features of the ATC 
display have been modified so as the 2D information from the GBSAA radar is 
presented on the information display taking into consideration the need to develop 
intuitive and robust display. During the experiment, the GBSAA display is to be used 
by the UAS operator/pilot in a separation violation situation to assess the surrounding 
air traffic and decide on a separation manoeuvre to be undertaken at a certain time 
instant. The UA pilot/observes performs the task or mission similar to a remotely 
piloted aircraft pilot. The UA pilot navigates the UA through a pre-determined path for 
a set of several mission scenarios and when an intruding aircraft comes within the 
surveillance range of the radar the traffic information display alerts the UA pilot of an 
intruder. The UA pilot then has to assess the situation of the UA from the information 
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available on the GBSAA display and decide on whether to perform a manoeuvre or 
not. If a manoeuvre has to be performed the UA pilot has to specify which type of 
manoeuvre would be best suited according to him/her. 
 
System Modifications 
There are a few key differences in the system requirements of the USAS as compared 
to the current usage of TopSky; therefore a few modifications would be required before 
using the TopSky system for USAS implementation.  These modifications are 
necessary to develop a system that is similar to the GBSAA system concept and would 
enable in accurately determining the performance measures as envisaged in the 
concept stage.  
The TopSky system uses a distributed computing architecture that is capable 
of integrating geographically spread air traffic control centres within a flight information 
region into a single system for airspace control and management. TopSKy has a large 
variety of functions required for smooth operation air traffic control. ATC is a safety 
critical system and software design The software itself was originally developed using 
Ada and C programming language.  
The modifications that were made in the Eurocat-C software package: 
 
Separation criteria – The USAS provides separation assurance based on algorithms 
that use only two-dimensional position of the aircrafts. At this stage it is assumed that 
the ground-based sensor provides primary radar tracks that do not have any target 
altitude information. Hence an alert would be raised when an intruder aircraft 
penetrates the separation area. However in the Eurocat-C, the separation alerts and 
infringement warnings are raised based on the geometries, speed and the altitude of 
the two conflicting aircrafts. And the separation criteria are based on the current ATM 
standards.  
Two warning messages that are to be used for the purpose of USAS concept 
are the AIW (Airspace Infringement Warning) and STCA (Short-Term Conflict Alert). 
In the current Eurocat-C ATM system, both aircraft lateral position and height are 
necessary pre-requisites to perform the STCA processing. Hence for implementing 
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USAS, the STCA process has to be modified to operate on lateral position of aircrafts 
alone without the height information. Conversely, the AIW process can be used as it 
is without making any changes in the Eurocat-C software, as the changes are easily 
configurable from the AIW settings. 
 
HMI presentation – The presentation of track information and alert messages will be 
investigated for a USAS display. This would involve varying the colour format of certain 
tracks and also generated alerts being displayed. Investigate the best way to present 
information from a UA pilot/observer perspective, based on previous studies 
conducted on human factors design of cockpit displays and also leveraging some 
existing research in the field of ground based sense and avoid display system.  
 
Display design characteristics 
Track Information Display – The traffic label for the USAS display requires an 
additional data to be displayed as compared to a normal ATC display. Track label of 
USAS display has to present separation distance field information for each aircraft 
track that is not the UA track. The separation distance field is the distance in nautical 
miles of the aircraft track relative to the UA track data.  
 
Separation conflict Alerting - STCA function is a safety net in the Eurocat-C system, 
which alerts the controllers of short-term conflicts. The STCA is normally defined over 
an area and an altitude level within which it applies and for the entire region where 
STCA is enabled all aircraft pairs inside it are checked for conflicts. STCA processing 
essentially requires both the lateral position and a valid height as pre-requisites. 
The principle of operation of separation conflict alerting will be similar to the 
STCA function. However, the difference is that the STCA process must determine 
conflict based on the lateral position of targets without having valid altitude information.  
Also, the STCA function must operate on track pairs between the UA and other 
intruding targets.  
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7.4 Experiment	Design		
A repeated measures study will be used to conduct the study of UAS pilot/operator 
performance and situation awareness while flying two kinds of mission scenarios; 
costal patrol and a land surveillance missions. The repeated task scenario tasks were 
used to compare two traffic display concepts against varying traffic densities and 
intruder encounter conditions.   
 
Traffic Display: - The two traffic display concepts were used to run the same set of 
scenarios with each participant. The two display concepts present the air traffic 
information to the UAS pilot with varying characteristics in terms of their orientation, 
viewpoint and perspectives. The UAS pilot were able to set an autopilot navigation 
option after taking-off and also adjust the viewing angle of the sensor payload to assist 
them in performing the patrol mission scenarios. While flying the missions, if any other 
aircraft in the vicinity of the UA violates a safe separation lateral distance a separation 
alert is displayed on the GBSAA display. The display also provided several aircraft 
parameters of all the air traffic data in the surveillance coverage area of the GBSAA 
radar. 
 
Traffic Density: - The levels of traffic densities were varied for each of the scenarios. 
The high traffic density condition in the mission scenarios consists of a maximum 
number of seven aircrafts. As the operational airspace is the uncontrolled regions of 
the airspace where ATC separation services do not exist, the traffic density condition 
experienced in VFR regions away from aerodromes is generally low. Hence the 
highest traffic density condition in the mission scenarios only consists of 7 aircrafts.   
Mission Scenarios: - A training session and six scenarios have been developed for 
this experiment. The training session was approximately 20 – 30 minutes long and 
provided familiarity with the two display concepts as well as the UAS flight simulator. 
As during the mission scenarios the majority of the time the UA is flying in the autopilot 
mode, the skill and training on the use of UAS flight simulator will not be important 
criteria affecting the outcome of the experiment scenarios. Experiment scenarios are 
each approximately 4-5 minutes long and included autopilot UA flight with UAS pilot 
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performing surveillance tasks and also importantly deciding on a separation 
manoeuvre in the event of a separation violation situation.  
 
Mission Objectives: - The participants were instructed to fly a mission scenario with 
two mission objectives: 1) to perform surveillance tasks such as surveying the coast 
for any vehicle traffic or spotting land vehicles nears an airport/place of interest; and 
2) to assess and decide on a loss of separation avoidance manoeuvre in response to 
a separation violation situation when alerted by the GBSAA display system. The first 
objective requires the participants to fly the UA in a pre-programmed flight path using 
the autopilot option while monitoring or surveying a target of interest (ships, cars, 
people) in a coastal patrol or land surveillance. Upon spotting the target of interest, the 
UAS pilot then surveys the object closely to monitor it. The second objective will 
require the UAS pilot to respond to a loss of separation situation by assessing the air 
traffic information on the GBSAA display and decide on a separation manoeuvre that 
would resolve the violation condition.  
7.5 Experiment	Procedure	
7.5.1 Training	
The pre-experiment briefing text is provided to the participant’s prior to start of the 
experiment in order to give detailed explanation of the experiment and the role of the 
participant in the experiment. A set of rules and advisories that need to be followed 
during the experiment will also be clarified to the participant through the briefing text.  
Each participant will initially be given approximately 20 – 30 minutes of   individual 
instruction and training prior to start of the evaluation. Training will consist of a tutorial 
session were the participant was given explanation on the UAS pilot interface, GBSAA 
display, rules of air and airspace operations. They will also be briefed on the 
manoeuvres they can select and where they could be selected from during the 
experiment. The participants will view static screen shots from the UAS pilot display 
and GBSAA display scenarios and several videos of the same. This is done to 
familiarise them with the interfaces they will be using in the experiment. The tutorial 
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session will be preceded by providing the participant with a briefing text material, which 
gives a brief explanation of the experimental set-up and the role of the participant in 
the experiment.  
During the training session, the participants can request explanation and 
clarification from the researcher when necessary. Towards the end of the training 
session, the participant is given a brief test run in order to ensure that they understood 
the displays and their role to be performed during the scenarios. If the participants are 
clear of their task and they are comfortable with the display, they are now ready to 
proceed to the evaluation phase.  
7.5.2 Experiment	Scenarios	
The experiment will involve twelve scenarios, which would be carried out in two 
different display concepts. (The order of running of scenarios will be a random 
selection and a reversed order will be used for the two displays). The duration of each 
of the scenarios will be approximately four-five minutes and the entire duration of the 
experiment would be approximately 75 minutes.  
  The experimental sessions will be conducted in a phased manner with first 
phase consisting of running all the six scenarios on Airspace centric display concept 
and second phase with the Aircraft centric display present. In-between the two phases 
the participants will be provided with questionnaire for evaluating situation awareness 
measures as well as the display functionalities. And finally at the end of the experiment 
participants completed a post-simulation questionnaire. Also between the two phases 
of experiment, a distraction task (i.e. mathematical task) will be given to the participant.  
 
Scenario 1 (Head-on approach):   
The scenario is designed so as to test the ability of the operator to assess the air traffic 
situation and take the right manoeuvre decision. In the scenario envisaged there are 
three aircrafts in the surveillance area including the Unmanned Aircraft (UA).  
 
The UA and another track are approaching on a flight path course that is head-on. The 
other aircraft in the scenario is diagonally heading on a near crossing path to the UA. 
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The approaching head-on intruder aircraft to the UA initially causes an impending 
separation violation alert. The flight path of the other intruding aircraft is designed in 
such a way that if the UA takes a right manoeuvre immediately after impending 
separation loss is issued, the UA movement will cause a loss of separation violation 
with the other intruding aircraft that is on a crossing path with UA. However if the 
operator makes a decision to manoeuvre the UA after several seconds, there is a 
possibility of separation alert not taking place due to the speed and flight path of the 
other intruding aircraft in a near diagonal flight path with the UA. The scenario is 
assessing the ability of the operator to assess the complete air picture thoroughly and 
remain vigilant about another intruding aircraft in a crossing path before performing 
any manoeuvre.  
 
Scenario parameters 
 
Number of aircrafts: - 3 (including Unmanned Aircraft (UA)) 
Surveillance area: 20 nautical miles 
GBSAA radar position: - 
Based at centre having geographic position of       50 30 46 North 02 27 24 West 
 
Aircraft type Starting position Speed (knots) Heading 
UA  X = 2.0; Y = 10.0 80  297.49 
Lat:       50 40 58 N 
Long:    02 26 52 W 
 
 
 
Aircraft 1 
Intruding aircraft 
(head-on) 
X = -8.64; Y = 15.53 150 117.49 
Lat:        50 48 31 N 
Long:     02 28 35 W  
 
 
 
Aircraft 2 X = 8.86; Y = 18.61 190 262.49 
Lat:        50 51 22 N 
Long:     02 26 07 W 
 
 
 
Table 13: Aircraft Flight Information  
(On the two-dimensional system grid 1 unit = I Nautical Mile for both X and Y axis) 
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Simulation time: Approximately 3 - 4 minutes 
Note: Callsign of UA must be sent in the CAT 48 messages (Callsign: ‘UAV’) 
 
Scenario 2 (converging intruder aircraft right-angled approach): 
This scenario is designed to highlight the misinterpretations of information, which may 
arise due to a moving reference display. Two significant instances where this situation 
is likely to arise are when two aircrafts are converging at 90 degrees and also when 
an aircraft is catching up with a slower aircraft flying in the same direction.  
 
Scenario 3 (Overtaking Aircraft): 
This scenario is designed to highlight the misinterpretations of information, which may 
arise due to a moving reference display. Two significant instances where this situation 
is likely to arise are when two aircrafts are converging at 90 degrees and also when 
an aircraft is catching up with a slower aircraft flying in the same direction. In this 
scenario, the situation where the UA is catching up with a slower aircraft flying in the 
same direction is generated.  
 
Scenario 4 (Converging Aircraft):  
This scenario is designed to assess the situational awareness of the UAS operator 
and his ability to make a correct manoeuvre decision so as to avoid a loss of separation 
event with other aircrafts in the vicinity. In this scenario five aircrafts are approaching 
or flying away from each other, the operator must assess the situation and follow the 
rules of the air, which says the aircraft that has the intruding aircraft on its right must 
give way.  
In this scenario five aircrafts are approaching or flying away from each other, 
the operator must assess the situation and follow the rules of the air, which says that 
the aircraft that has the intruding aircraft on its right must give way.  
 
Scenario 5 (Converging Aircraft with UAS having right-of-way): 
This scenario is a combination of the two instances of a near loss of separation that 
were used separately in the earlier scenarios. The reason for including two such 
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peculiar situations is to assess increase the level of difficulty in the task by having 
aircrafts close together and also those may cause a loss of separation in the future.  
 
Scenario 6 (Overtaking Aircraft dual conflict): 
This scenario is a combination of the two instances of a near loss of separation that 
were used separately in the earlier scenarios. The two-close separation loss situation 
that are considered here are an UA overtaking a slower aircraft and another aircraft 
approaching UA on a head-on direction simultaneously. The use of two such 
encounters, which may both seem that they may led to an impending loss of separation 
is to increase the uncertainty in turn the difficulty level on the decision to be made by 
the UA operator for a performing a manoeuvre.  
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Chapter	8: Ground	Based	Sense	and	Avoid	
Experiment	Results	and	Discussion	
8.1 Introduction	
This chapter presents the results of the experiments carried out with the GBSAA 
simulation environment developed, after performing the statistical analysis methods. 
The results obtained provide insight into the benefits obtained with modified Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) display that incorporates some of the advantages of Traffic Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS) displays, as compared to a standard ATC display for use 
as traffic information display by UAS pilot. Further the results obtained are discussed 
within the context of answering the experiment objectives. 
8.2 Results	
Eighteen participants both male and female were recruited to participate in this 
experiment. There were 16 males and 2 female participants between the ages of 20 
to 32. All the participants recruited were current engineering students or research staff 
with no prior experience of aviation domain. A few of the participants were gamers 
(categorised as playing once a fortnight) but the rest were non-gamers or had not been 
gaming for years.  There were three participants who had seen an Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) or Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) display but not used them. The 
rest of the participants had not seen/used either ATC/TCAS display before. All the 
participants were given similar time duration of 30 minutes for training on the 
simulation environment for them to familiarise with the flight simulator and GBSAA 
information display system. One of the benefits of participants not having prior 
experience of using these types of displays is learning or experience bias is removed 
from the evaluation of the information display system. However a drawback is that the 
display system is not evaluated by primary users of the system. The participants rated 
a high level of motivation to participate in the experiment. On a rating scale from 1 to 
10, with 1 being low and 10 high level of motivation, the mean motivation level was 
8.4 with a standard deviation of 1.3. The level of tiredness among the participants 
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indicated a medium to high level of fatigue before starting the experiment. A rating 
scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being low and 10 high fatigue levels, the mean tiredness level 
was 5.7 with a standard deviation of 2.5. 
 With a single group of participants and two independent variables (Display 
configuration and scenario levels), a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was utilized 
for statistical analysis of decision time (time taken to decide on manoeuvre by 
participant where the assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance was met. 
Each participant participated in two display configurations (Airspace view, Aircraft 
view) and across six scenarios. The participants generated a total of (9 × 12 =) 108 
measurement runs. Normality of the dependent variables was tested using the 
Shapiro-Wilks (S-W) test rather than the Kilmolgorov-Smirnoff test, as the S-W is a 
better method to assess whether data are well-described by a normal distribution for 
small data sets (less than 100 samples). If the p-value is less than 0.05 then the data 
does not show normal distribution, the skewness in the data is corrected through 
transformation to comply with the normal distribution. However for some dependent 
variables normally distributed and homogeneity of variance had been violated and it 
was not possible to transform the data in order to validate the parametric assumptions, 
therefore non-parametric tests was applied for their analysis.  
8.2.1 Technical	Performance	Measures	
Decision	Processing	Timeline	
Further a two way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with display 
configuration and scenario levels as the two factors, to investigate the interaction effect 
of these two on the time taken to decide manoeuvre within subjects. The results 
showed there were no significant effects of the display configuration used on the 
decision processing time, F (1, 17) = 0.007, p = 0.936. On the contrary there was 
significant effect of the scenario level on the total decision processing time, F (5, 85) 
= 5.730, p = 0.001. This implies that the total decision processing time for different 
scenario levels was varied. There was also a significant interaction between the 
display configuration used and the scenario level encountered, on the total decision-
making timeline of the participant, F (5, 85) = 8.062, p = 0.001. This implies that the 
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total decision processing time for different scenario levels was different for Airspace 
and Aircraft view display configurations. The overall repeated measures ANOVA result 
is displayed in Table 14. The near equivalence in the means of the two display 
configurations, Airspace view (Mean = 9.256, SD = 3.84) and Aircraft view (Mean = 
9.379, SD = 3.80) is shown in Figure 8.1 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Boxplot of total decision processing time for the display configuration used 
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Table 14: Overall repeated measures ANOVA result 
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Accuracy	of	Manoeuvre		
This is a measure that relates to accuracy of the manoeuvre performed by the 
participant in each measurement run. As this is a categorical dependent variable a 
Chi-Square distribution test was used to test whether there is any association with 
each of the independent variables.  If there was any significant association between 
the two categorical variables the Phi and Cramer’s V test was used to further test the 
strengths of association.  
 The Chi-Square distribution results indicated that there is no statistically 
significant association between display configuration used and the accuracy of 
manoeuvre performed, χ(1) = 0.487, p = .485. The assumptions of the Chi-Square 
were not violated. The near equivalence in the frequency of correct and incorrect 
manoeuvres performed for the two-display configuration is shown in Figure 8.2 and 
further substantiates the insignificant association between the two categorical 
variables.  
 
 
Figure 8.2 Clustered bar chart of number of correct manoeuvres performed 
against the display configuration used 
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 A further investigation into all scenarios and their association with accuracy of 
manoeuvres was looked at. There was significant association indicated when the Chi-
Square test was performed between the scenario level and the accuracy of 
manoeuvre, χ(5) = 26.636, p < 0.01. The size of the effect was determined by the Phi 
and Cramer’s V test which showed a strong correlation between the scenario level 
and the accuracy of manoeuvre selected, Phi = 0.497, p < 0.01.  
 
 
Figure 8.3 Clustered bar chart of frequency of correct manoeuvres performed against 
the scenario level 
8.2.2 Workload	Measurement	Results	
NASA-TLX Score 
NASA-TLX score was not testable through ANOVA due to non-normality and it 
was not possible to transform the data in order to validate the parametric assumptions, 
hence a non-parametric test namely Kruskal-Wallis test was used to perform the 
analysis of NASA-TLX workload scores. Multiple Kruskal-Wallis tests were then 
applied for the individual workload scales. 
 There was no significant difference found between the two display 
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configurations for the NASA-TLX scores, χ2 (1) = 0.093, p = .761. Multiple Kruskal-
Wallis for the individual workload scores also revealed that mental demand (χ2 (1) = 
0.129, p = .719), physical demand (χ2 (1) = 0.629, p = .428), temporal demand (χ2 (1) 
= 0.030, p = .863), performance (χ2 (1) = 0.218, p = .640), effort (χ2 (1) = 0.035, p = 
.851) and frustration (χ2 (1) = 0.673, p = .412) are all not significantly different.   
 
 
Figure 8.4 Boxplot of NASA-TLX workload rating 
Spotting Task  
The object spotting scores were not normally distributed due to which parametric 
Mann-Whitney test was used. The test results showed that there was no significant 
difference in the spotting scores across the two-display configuration used, p = 0.442. 
This was expected as this was a secondary task performed on the flight simulator.  
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Figure 8.5 Box plot of Spotting scores 
8.2.3 Scenario	Specific	Results	
A further investigation of the individual scenarios was conducted to examine any 
inferences that can be drawn from the evaluation of performance measures across the 
display configurations for individual scenarios.   The results of the decision processing 
time and the accuracy of the manoeuvre across the two display configurations for 
individual scenarios are provided here.  
 The plot for the average time taken by the subject to decide on manoeuvre 
versus the display type for the individual scenarios is provided in Figure 8.6. The figure 
shows that there is no inference to be drawn on the preference for a particular display 
configuration in which the subjects performed better in terms of decision processing 
time across all the scenarios. There were only three scenarios (scenario 2, scenario 3 
and scenario 6), where there was predominant variation in the average time taken to 
manoeuvre across the two display configurations. The decision time for scenario 3 
(overtake situation) on Airspace view (Mean = 12.714, SD = 4.28) and Aircraft view 
(Mean = 9.831. SD= 9.831) were predominantly different. Similarly for scenario 6 
(Overtake situation dual conflict) the decision time on Airspace view (Mean = 11.311, 
SD = 3.561) and Aircraft view (Mean = 8.768. SD= 3.89) were also predominantly 
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different. There is a strong indication that the subjects performed better in terms of the 
average time taken to decide on manoeuvre on the aircraft view than the airspace 
view display configuration across two specific scenarios having the same conflict 
situations (overtaking aircraft). The variation in the mean decision time for scenario 3 
and scenario 6 across two display configurations is indicated also in box plot for the 
individual scenarios in Figures 8.7 and 8.8.  
 
 
Figure 8.6 Bar chart of average time taken to decide manoeuvre 
  247 
 
Figure 8.7 Box plot of total time taken to decide manoeuvre (Scenario 3) 
 
Figure 8.8 Box plot of total time taken to decide manoeuvre (Scenario 6) 
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Figure 8.9 Bar chart of Average time taken to decide manoeuvre for correct 
manoeuvre selected 
The plot for the average time taken to decide on manoeuvre and the accuracy 
of the manoeuvre (correct manoeuvre performed) versus the display type for the 
individual scenarios is provided in Figure 8.9. The figure shows that the average 
decision time across the individual scenarios (except scenario 3 and scenario 5) 
performed slightly better (took less time to decide on manoeuvre) on Airspace view 
compared to the Aircraft view display configuration. However, the performance 
differential is not large enough to infer a strong preference towards one display 
configuration or the other across the entire population. 
8.2.4 Final	Questionnaire	Results	
Subjective display ratings were scored by the participants by a comparison 
questionnaire generally used in Analytic Hierarchy Process. The participant display 
preference question used a five-level format which were ‘same’ or ‘slightly better’ or 
‘better’ or ‘much better’ or absolutely better’. The overall ratings for participant display 
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preference are provided in Figure 8.10. It shows that the participants greatly preferred 
the Aircraft view display configuration compared to the Airspace view. Four 
participants had a very strong preference for the Aircraft view display configuration 
(approx. 22%). Only one participant had a preference for Airspace view display 
configuration.  
 
 
Figure 8.10 Participant Display preference 
 In addition to rating the displays, the participants were also asked to indicate 
the value of information that was used by them to resolve the conflict situation. The 
information varied from intent information to visual cues on the display. The ‘highlight 
of UAV track’ to differentiate from other aircrafts in the display, was found to be very 
valuable by 10 out of 18 participants (approx. 56 %), as shown in Figure 8.11. The 
‘prediction vectors’ which provided intent information relating to heading of the aircraft 
tracks was also rated very valuable by the participants, with 15 out of 18 participants 
rating it very useful (approx. 83%), as shown in Figure 8.12. The ‘highlight of intruder 
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track’ information which highlighted the conflicting aircraft when there was a conflict 
alert with the UAV track, also was valuable to the participants. Around half of the 
participants (9 out of 18) rated it as being very valuable, as shown in Figure 8.13. The 
usefulness of the colour format for aircraft tracks surrounding the UAV track was also 
rated by the participants. They found it useful but not as much as the others. Most of 
the participants (8 out of 18) rated it as being somewhat valuable, two participants 
found it very valuable and only one participant gave a somewhat detrimental score, as 
shown in Figure 8.14. Finally, the usefulness of track list window that provided sensor 
obtained values of heading, altitude and separation distance from UAV track was 
assessed. All the participants indicated that they did not use them during the 
experiment and had a neutral rating, as shown in Figure 8.15.   
 
 
Figure 8.11 Value of ‘highlight of UAV track’ information 
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Figure 8.12 Value of ‘prediction vectors’ information 
 
Figure 8.13 Value of ‘Highlight of intruder track’ information 
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Figure 8.14 Value of ‘Surrounding aircrafts colour format’ information 
 
Figure 8.15 Value of ‘Track list window’ information 
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8.3 Discussion	
They key objective of the GBSAA system simulation experiment was to assess the 
effects of two display configurations (airspace and aircraft view) on the situation 
awareness and decision-making ability of participants to resolve aircraft separation 
violation situations. Airspace view uses a standard ATC display (with few track symbol 
and colour changes) which presented a north-up top-down view of the UA and 
surrounding aircraft tracks. Whereas the Aircraft view uses a modified ATC display 
(incorporating the benefits of TCAS and ATC displays) which presented UA heading 
up view on a moving map display with UA always centred on the display. The 
experiment was made possible by performing human-in-the-loop simulator trials with 
these two display configurations across several traffic situations (six scenarios).   
 One of the key performance measures for proving the safety case for any sense 
and avoid system for UAS is the processing timeline. The total reaction time involves, 
the sense and avoid processing time (includes time to see, recognise threat, decide 
on action), execute the manoeuvre and allow the aircraft to respond to the action. 
According to FAA, any sense and avoid processing time would require the target to be 
detected at least 10.1 seconds to the time of impact, so that the UAS pilot is able to 
perform the necessary manoeuvre to keep a safe separation between the UA and the 
intruding aircraft. The decision processing time (time taken to decide on manoeuvre) 
results from the experiment indicate that across both the display configurations 
(Airspace view: Mean = 9.718, Aircraft view (Mean = 9.656) were below the 10.1 
seconds level. This is significant as this will be an important measure to present to the 
aviation authorities when the safety case for a GBSAA system is presented. As this 
result has been obtained in a human-in-the-loop simulation context, this would need 
to be further tested by integrating the radar sensor to the GBSAA system and 
performing field trails. In the real-world conditions there are external factors such as 
weather and intruder aircraft types which may cause variation in detection ability of the 
ground based sensor and thereby affect the decision processing timeline. However 
once the aerial object has been detected by the ground based sensor, the 
performance of the GBSAA system in terms of processing sensor data and displaying 
the aircraft location information would not differ much between simulation environment 
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and real-time operation of fully integrated GBSAA system.  
 The results indicated there was no signification effect of display configurations 
on the time taken to decide on manoeuvre. Similarly there was no significant effect of 
scenario levels (different aircraft encounter situation) on the decision processing time. 
However the results indicated there was a significant interaction between the display 
configuration used and the scenario level encountered, on the total time taken to 
decide on manoeuvre. A further investigation of the significance effects scenario 
specific results showed that the mean decision time for scenario 3 (overtaking) and 
scenario 6 (overtaking with dual conflict) were predominantly different. In both the 
scenarios the mean decision time for Aircraft view was lower compared to the Airspace 
view display configuration. This could be explained due to the head-up and UA centred 
view presented to the participant, made it easier evaluate the encounter situation as 
the intruder aircraft was directly ahead of the UA. The scenario specific results also 
indicated predominant difference in the means of the decision processing time of 
scenario 2 (converging intruder aircraft, right-angled approach) for the two display 
configurations. The time to decide on manoeuvre was significantly lower in this 
scenario for Airspace view as compared to Aircraft view.  
 The results also indicated that there was no significance of accuracy of 
manoeuvre across display configurations. The percentage of accuracy of manoeuvre 
of participant was quite similar across the two display configurations. The workload 
measure results also indicated there was no significant effect across the two display 
configurations. Similarly, the results for the object spotting task also indicated no 
significant effects across the display configurations. This was expected as the spotting 
task performed on the flight simulator, the participant ability to control the aircraft flight 
on the simulator was responsible for the performance of the spotting task. Similarly, 
the workload performance measures were impacted by the flight simulator task which 
had a similar level of difficulty across all the display conditions except the variation in 
location of objects to the spotted by the participant.  
 The subjective results of the experiment are more conclusive and show a 
preference for particular display configuration. Nearly all participants preferred the 
aircraft view (modified ATC display) over the airspace view (standard ATC display). 
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The results for the overall ratings of the track symbol and colour format used for 
highlighting the UA in relation to other surrounding aircrafts also showed that they were 
very valuable for the participants to identify the UAS aircraft and the intruder aircraft 
(separation conflict) from other aircrafts in the airspace in order to decide on the 
manoeuvre to execute based on the rules of the air. Hence these features which were 
developed in an existing ATC display were useful aids for improving situation 
awareness and also improve the decision-making ability of the users of the GBSAA 
information display system.  
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Chapter	9: Conclusions		
The main aim of this research is to examine the issues associated with guaranteeing 
that information on which decisions are made is valid and of very high integrity in an 
Air Traffic environment where UAS is an integral part. This leads to the derivation of 
the three key aspects that are addressed in the research. 
 The first aspect that the research focussed on was to examine the current 
architecture of the Air Traffic Management (ATM), which is a System-of-System (SoS) 
in itself, and its evolution to enable the integration of UAS into the national airspace 
system. This research used a systems approach to understand the problem of UAS 
integration in non-segregated airspace more holistically.  The underlying framework 
for this approach was based on a high-level architecture analysis using architecture 
patterns. This research shows that the method of using architecture patterns to 
represent an inherently complex SoS such as the current ATM can provide a 
significant step in the understanding of the SoS operation. This approach is especially 
useful when integrating new airspace users, such as UAS, which are completely 
different to current airspace users, into an already complex SoS. The architecture 
patterns to represent future ATM architectures is also presented which provides a 
basis for understanding the trade-offs between different architecture solutions where 
the UAS is integrated in a phased manner into the ATM architecture. The next 
generation ATM architecture is envisaged to be designed in such a way that more and 
more decisions will be made by the system rather than humans; hence it is imperative 
to understand the evolution of ATM architecture to enable safe and efficient operation 
of UAS in the national airspace system.  
 The second aspect of this research involved looking into the specific issue of 
UAS sense and avoid. The research evaluated several system architecture solutions 
for UAS Sense and Avoid with regards to decision making processing i.e. whether 
remotely or on the ground. The various approaches to the problem had varying 
technology readiness, commercial viability, development risks and timescale for 
operational implementation. The industrial nature of the project meant the solution was 
looked at not only in a technical nature but also from a commercial viability. Further 
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research then focussed on Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) system which 
is seen as a short-to-medium term solution to achieve separation assurance capability 
for UAS in non-segregated airspace. This research provided an analysis of the 
technical, operational and technical aspects of a UAS GBSAA system. 
 The third aspect of this research was to develop a GBSAA simulation 
environment in order to investigate the effects of different display configurations of 
GBSAA information display system on the decision-making capability of the human 
operator. The experiment was made possible by performing human-in-the-loop 
simulator trials with these two display configurations: Airspace view that used a 
standard ATC display (with few track symbol and colour changes) which presented a 
north-up top-down view of the UA and surrounding aircraft tracks. Whereas the Aircraft 
view used a modified ATC display (incorporating the benefits of TCAS and ATC 
displays) which presented UA head up view on a moving map display with UA always 
centred on the display. The results show that a key performance measure the decision 
processing time (total time taken to decide on manoeuvre) for both display 
configurations (Airspace view: Mean = 9.256 sec, Aircraft view: Mean = 9.379 sec) 
were below the decision processing timeline (10.1 sec based on human see and avoid 
capability) that would be required for a sense and avoid system for proving the safety 
case. The objective measures did not show any significant difference in the decision 
processing time across the two display configurations. However, the subjective results 
were more conclusive and showed a preference for aircraft view display configuration, 
most of the participants preferred the aircraft view (modified ATC display) over the 
airspace view (standard ATC display).  
 The outcomes of this research are briefly outlined in the form the 
recommendations that would provide more knowledge to the field of integration of UAS 
into national airspace. First and foremost is a change in mind-set and behaviour is 
required among main stakeholders (Aviation authorities, other airspace users, public 
pressure groups, UAV operators etc.) to provide a solution such a complex SoS 
problem. The wide viewpoint of major stakeholders on the problem to the solution has 
meant that there has not been much progress until even with huge resources (money, 
time and effort) spent for integration of UAS in national airspace system. A key area 
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where the change in mind-set is required is in the perception of UAS operational risk 
by aviation authorities.  
 The other recommendation of this research is based on the research study on 
UAS Sense and Avoid and outcome of the GBSAA prototype system evaluation. The 
process of UAS integration in non-segregated airspace should occur in a phased 
manner which will enable only restricted access initially which would lead to more 
learning and information on operational performance of UAS. GBSAA is one of the 
approach which will enable restricted access to national airspace for some UAS 
operators (government and military agencies) at the initial phase. The safety case for 
GBSAA based on the current view of the aviation authorities is presented in this 
research.  
9.1 Thesis	Contributions	
The contributions to the research area based on the method and techniques adopted 
in this thesis can be listed as follows: 
● The problem of integration of UAS in non-segregated airspace was looked at 
holistically using an underlying systems engineering framework. The research 
uses the method of architecture patterns to represent SoS and applies this to 
the current ATM architecture to understand its operation in a better way and 
also examine the possible architecture solutions for integration of UAS into ATM 
architecture in the future. Although there has been a lot of research into the 
field of UAS integration in national airspace the routine operation of UAS in 
national airspace is still not yet been possible. The challenges are well beyond 
the technical and regulatory aspects. This research used wicked problem (often 
used in Social Science to describe a social or cultural problem that is difficult or 
impossible to solve) as an analysis method to examines the key issues 
associated with the integration of UAS in non-segregated airspace. Therefore 
an interdisciplinary approach was applied to the research problem. 
● The development of a GBSAA simulation environment to prove the application 
of the concept. This involved several software changes to an existing ATC 
display system in order to automate some of the features for it is used as a 
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Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) information display system. The use 
of an existing ATC display greatly reduces the rigorous software certification 
process for proving the safety case which would led to easier certification route 
for a commercially feasible product. This provides a high level of integrity to the 
proposed GBSAA information display concept. The integration of the flight 
simulator with the prototype GBSAA information display system that would 
provide as a demonstration platform for the concept and also enable further 
research in order to perform field trail with a fully integrated GBSAA system.  
● The GBSAA information display system simulation experiment showed that the 
concept of using a modified ATC display as an information display system could 
be viable. The experiment set out to assess the effects a standard ATC display 
and a modified ATC display (for use as a GBSAA information display system) 
on the situation awareness and decision-making ability of participants to resolve 
aircraft separation violation situations. The objective measures of the 
experiment were not conclusive in terms of the preference of display, however 
the subjective results showed that the participants rated the modified ATC 
display (includes features such a moving map display and UAS aircraft as 
display centre) much better and preferred that display over a standard ATC 
display. The experiment also proved that a modified ATC display could be used 
to provide situation awareness and intent information to the human operator on 
the ground that will enable them to resolve separation conflict situation with 
surrounding aircrafts. This could be seen as an extension to the current 
operation of UAS in national airspace which involves a ground observer always 
being within visual line-of-sight of UAS to avoid separation conflict situations 
and stay well clear of other surrounding aircrafts.  
9.2 Further	Research	
Future research should focus on mining more high-level architecture patterns of the 
current ATM system and alternative architecture solution for integration of UAS into 
ATM system. The architectural patterns could be specified in an architecture modelling 
framework so that different architecture solutions can be evaluated though modelling 
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and simulation approaches. This will enable in analysing the impact of different 
architecture solutions on the performance of the overall SoS. 
 With the experimental constraints and sample size limitation in this research, 
further work is required in terms of understanding the effects of prototype GBSAA 
information display system (modified ATC display)  on the situation awareness and 
decision-making ability of UAS operator/observer. The key challenge faced in this 
research which is common to aerospace studies was the recruitment of primary users 
of the system for the experiment. If primary users of the system were recruited, the 
scope of the experiment could expand further with having a UAS pilot and a UAS 
observer together in a UAS GCS performing the experiment. The communication 
between the UAS pilot and observer can also be assessed as this would be important 
to ensure safe separation of UAS from other aircrafts.  
 The future work could be expanded to developing a fully integrated GBSAA 
system which will include the ground based sensor element along with the information 
display system. The field trails of the fully operational GBSAA system would enable is 
further validating the proof of concept and also help generate performance data in 
order to support the development of a safety case.  
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Appendices	
Appendix 1: Consent Form 
 
 
Effect of Increasing Workload on Potential Remotely Piloted System Operators 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
(to be completed after Participant Information Sheet has been read) 
 
The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me.  I understand that 
this study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures have 
been approved by the Loughborough University Ethical Approvals (Human 
Participants) Sub-Committee. 
 
I have read and understood the information sheet and this consent form. 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation. 
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study. 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage for any 
reason, and that I will not be required to explain my reasons for withdrawing. 
I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in strict confidence and 
will be kept anonymous and confidential to the researchers unless (under the 
statutory obligations of the agencies which the researchers are working with), it is 
judged that confidentiality will have to be breached for the safety of the participant or 
others.  
 
I agree to participate in this study. 
                    Your name 
              Your signature 
Signature of investigator 
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Appendix 2: Participant Pre-briefing material  
 
Introduction to the experiment 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the various interface display concepts for 
Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) system implementation to support UAS 
operations in non-segregated airspace. The experiment is based on various 
scenarios, which are designed so as to analyse the evaluation of separation violation 
potential, prioritizing of impending loss of separation threats and determining a 
manoeuvre to avoid the impending loss of separation. This includes the functions of 
operator that are noticing the alert situation, assessing the air traffic picture in the 
vicinity of UA and then determining a manoeuvre to be performed to avoid the 
impending loss of separation between UA and intruding aircraft. The performance of 
the participant based on the kind of manoeuvre they make and the effects of their 
manoeuvre will be used as one of the many outputs measured from the experiment. 
The aim is to always ensure that the separation with other aircrafts is maintained at 
always to ensure safety of the airspace. Hence causing a loss of separation event 
would be the undesirable at all time during the scenarios. 
 
General Rules of Air (International Civil Aviation Organisation) 
Note. — It is important that vigilance for the purpose of detecting potential collisions be not 
relaxed on board an aircraft in flight, regardless of the type of flight or the class of airspace in 
which the aircraft is operating, and while operating on the movement area of an aerodrome. 
 
3.2.1 Proximity 
An aircraft shall not be operated in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision 
hazard. 
 
3.2.2 Right-of-way 
The aircraft that has the right-of-way shall maintain its heading and speed, but nothing in these 
rules shall relieve the pilot-in-command of an aircraft from the responsibility of taking such 
action, including collision avoidance maneuvers based on resolution advisories provided by 
ACAS equipment, as will best avert collision. 
 
3.2.2.1 An aircraft that is obliged by the following rules to keep out of the way of another shall 
avoid passing over, under or in front of the other, unless it passes well clear and takes into 
account the effect of aircraft wake turbulence. 
 
3.2.2.2 Approaching head-on. When two aircraft are approaching head-on or approximately 
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so and there is danger of collision, each shall alter its heading to the right. 
 
3.2.2.3 Converging. When two aircraft are converging at approximately the same level, the 
aircraft that has the other on its right shall give way, except as follows: 
a) Power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft shall give way to airships, gliders and balloons; 
b) Airships shall give way to gliders and balloons; 
c) Gliders shall give way to balloons; 
d) power-driven aircraft shall give way to aircraft, which are seen to be towing other aircraft or 
objects. 
 
3.2.2.4 Overtaking. An overtaking aircraft is an aircraft that approaches another from the rear 
on a line forming an angle of less than 70 degrees with the plane of symmetry of the latter, i.e. 
is in such a position with reference to the other aircraft that at night it should be unable to see 
either of the aircraft’s left (port) or right (starboard) navigation lights. An aircraft that is being 
overtaken has the right-of-way and the overtaking aircraft, whether climbing, descending or in 
horizontal flight, shall keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering its heading to the 
right, and no subsequent change in the relative positions of the two aircraft shall absolve the 
overtaking aircraft from this obligation until it is entirely past and clear. 
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Appendix 3: Pre-experiment Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire will be used only to obtain information about your background and 
experience of using several interfaces in day-to-day life. Researchers will only use 
this information to describe the participants in this study as a group. Your identity will 
be kept anonymous. 
1. Have you seen/used Air Traffic Controller (ATC) displays before?   
Never, Seen, Used 
2. Have you seen/used Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) displays before? 
Never, Seen, Used 
3. Rate your level of motivation to participate in this study?  (1-10 scale) 
4. Do you wear glasses for eyesight correction? 
5. Rate your level of fatigue or tiredness at this time of day? (1 – 10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  272 
Appendix 4: Post-Experiment Questionnaire Form 
 
1. Which is better display? 
 
Airspace Centric                                                                                                    Aircraft Centric 
 
          
Absolutely better   much better    better      slightly better    same     slightly better   better     much better    Absolutely better 
 
2. What was your overall strategy for avoiding conflicts and did it change with the 
display? 
 
3. Rate each information for its use in resolving separation violation situations? 
● UA track highlight 
● Prediction vectors 
● Highlight of intruder track 
● Surrounding aircrafts variable colour format 
● Track list window 
 
     
Very detrimental        Somewhat Detrimental     neutral            somewhat valuable  Very valuable 
 
4. What information should be added to the display? 
 
 
5. What information was unnecessary on the display? 
 
 
6. Any further comments or suggestions on the display? 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  273 
Appendix 5: NASA-TLX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  274 
Appendix 6: Surveillance Data Exchange Category 048  
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Appendix 7: Surveillance Data Exchange Category 034  
 
 
